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CSSR came out in 2012 as a yearly publication on the popularization of science. Its aim is to publish scientifically relevant articles which originally came out in Catalan translated into English. By doing so, CSSR addresses academicians, professionals and students around the world interested in social sciences subjects and Catalan research. The articles relate to social sciences subjects such as Philosophy, Pedagogy, Psychology, Sociology, Demography, Geography, Law, Economics, Anthropology, Communication and Political Science. Each subject constitutes a section of the review.

The objectives of CSSR are:

1. To promote, foster and spur on Catalan academic scientific production related to Philosophy and Social Sciences
2. To coordinate an international diffusion platform on Catalan scientific production related to the various disciplines under the generic category of "social sciences"
3. To participate in the initiatives for the international diffusion of Catalan science in English through the IEC on line publications catalog
4. To guarantee the access to Catalan high quality research on social sciences to the world scientific community, emphasizing the fact that the results have been originally drawn in Catalan
5. To contribute to create a shared supportive cultural membership feeling among philosophy and social sciences researchers from all Catalan speaking countries and territories

Catalan is a language spoken mainly in four Autonomous Regions of East Spain (Catalonia, Valencian Country, Balearic Islands and part of Aragon) and also in Andorra, Rosselló (South East France) and the city of l'Alguer (Sardinia, Italy).



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## Donor anonymity, or the right to know one's origins?

Esther Farnós Amorós\*

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

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Translated from Catalan by Mary Black

### Abstract

*Taking into account a recent decree enacted by the Catalan government stipulating the procedure to provide information on a person's biological roots, this article examines the tension between the anonymity of the gamete donor and the child's right to know their origin. The analysis of legal systems that recognise this right for children conceived through donated gametes spurs us to further examine the hypotheses, quite widespread today, which consider traditional arguments for secrecy outdated. In this regard, the article also challenges the different treatment granted to adopted children and donor gamete children by legal systems such as Spain's. Beyond the possible conflicting rights of children, donors and parents, arguments provided by anonymity supporters, such as the moral damage resulting from disclosure or the possible link between disclosure and a decrease in the number of donors, should be also taken into account. However, these arguments require absolute empirical evidence, which is not currently conclusive. Alternatively, disclosure of the donor's identity is consistent with the needs of donor families and with a major trend in family law supporting the right to know one's genetic origin, dissociated from biological and legal parentage.*

**Key words:** Genetics, biology, donor families, anonymity, secrecy, origins, right to know, assisted reproduction techniques, parentage

### 1. Introduction

On the 11th of June 2014, the plenary session of the Bioethics Committee of Catalonia (CBD) approved a proposal from a multidisciplinary working group whose mission was to draft a reflection on the draft decree stipulating the procedure to provide knowledge on a person's biological roots; this effort has given rise to Decree 169/2015 dated the 21st of July 2015, which establishes the procedure to provide information on biological origins (DOGC no. 6919 dated 23rd of July 2015). Because of issues involving competences, the decree only

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stipulates this right for adoptees, since donor anonymity is the general rule in Spain regarding people conceived with assisted reproduction techniques (ART) (article 5.5 of Law 14/2006 on Human Assisted Reproduction Techniques, dated 26 May 2006 [abbreviated LTRHA]), and the Catalan Parliament does not have authority over this matter (1st final provision of the LTRHA). In practice, this limitation confers a more restricted scope on article 30.2 of Law 14/2010 on the Rights and Opportunities of Children and Adolescents, dated 27 May 2010 (abbreviated LDOIA) than what stems from its literal reading, according to which “children and adolescents have the right to know their *genetic origin*, *biological* parents and *biological* relatives”.

In the current legislative context, the joint interpretation of the LTRHA and the Catalan Civil Code (CCC) leads us to equate genetics and biology; however, it is telling that the aforementioned art 30.2 of the LDOIA contrasts the two terms, indicating that they are not identical. Thus, for example, genetics and biology may be dissociated in surrogate pregnancy, such as in partial surrogate pregnancy, when one woman provides the egg(s) to be fertilised while another brings the pregnancy to term. Something similar might occur in heterosexual couples who use heterologous fertilisation with donated eggs, or in couples comprised of two women, in which the reception of oocytes from partner (ROPA) technique is used to impregnate one of the two with embryo(s) created from the egg(s) of the other and donated sperm. In both cases, the two women who take part in the process play a biological role, but only one of them plays a genetic role by providing the gametes. With the exception of couples with two women, in which the maternal relationship can be proven with both partners (article 235-8.1 and 235-13.1 of the CCC), in other cases the maternal relationship is governed, genetics aside, by the principle of Roman law which states that motherhood is determined by the biological fact of birth (article 235-3 of the CCC). Given that article 30.2 mentions both biology and genetics, at least hypothetically we could question whether the Catalan lawmakers' choice reflects a voluntary decision to expand the right to know one's origins to the sphere of ART.

This interpretation would be coherent with the biology-driven system that has traditionally inspired Catalan law on issues of parentage (Alegret, 2014: 618-620). For this reason, despite its limited authority, the group created within the CBD aims to reflect on the possible existence and consequences of a right to know one's origins not only in the sphere of adoption, both national and international, but also in cases of heterologous ART with donated gametes. In this article, I shall focus on the scope of the law in this latter case.

According to Spanish laws on ART, the information on the donor that the child conceived through ART may obtain is generally restricted to very basic data, and revealing the donor's identity is limited to extraordinary circumstances which entail a certain danger of the child's death or health, or when this information is needed according to criminal trial law, whenever it is absolutely indispensable (article 5.5 of the LTRHA). The main issue sparked by this law stems from its conflict with a possible right to know one's origins which, if it does exist, would render the law devoid of content. My working hypothesis assumes that the recognition of this right only for adoptees places those who were conceived through donated gametes on a lower rung. In my opinion, we cannot ignore the fact that the result of a successful ART procedure is the birth of a person with the same rights as a person conceived any other way.



At a time like now, when more and more families are based on affect and a non-biological conception of parentage, it may be surprising that there are claims for the right to know one's origins. The reason for these claims is twofold: first, this is each individual's personal choice which must be respected if they choose to exercise it once they are legally of age; and secondly, when using ART, this information is already available to third parties and is therefore accessible.

## 2. Recent data

According to the data published by the Department of Health of the Generalitat de Catalunya, 54.5% of the IVF-ICSI procedures carried out in 2011 were performed with donated eggs and 15.4% were performed with donated sperm (Fivcat.net, 2014: 16). However, the figures from semen banks show a rise in the number of donors in both artificial insemination procedures and in-vitro techniques (Fivcat.net, 2014: 7).

The statistics do not reflect the cases in which the person who uses ART is a single woman or a couple with two women, who necessarily require an anonymous donor. We do, however, have data on the United Kingdom, where this group already accounts for one-third of all ART recipients. In the UK, too, it is estimated that one out of every ten fresh IVF procedures uses donated gametes or embryos, and that the number of donors of both sperm and eggs has been on the rise since 2005 (HFEA 2014: 8). Of all the British couples who used heterologous IVF between 2012 and 2013, 39% did so with donated sperm, 59% with donated eggs and 3% with donated eggs and sperm or embryos (HFEA 2014: 19-20).

Among the supporters of maintaining the rule of donor anonymity, there is some concern that the abolition of this rule might trigger a decline in donations, and thus in the practice of ART, with the obvious repercussions this might have on what has been described as a "business" (Igareda, 2014: 239). Despite this, in the United Kingdom the Nuffield report reveals that the legislative change that took place there in 2004 has not stopped donors from donating (2013: 54 and forward). In October 2014, the executive director of the National Gamete Donor Bank confirmed these figures, specifically that in the ten years that have elapsed since the enactment of the new law, not only have there been more donors, but the donors are becoming younger, which has led to higher ART success rates (<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/9386.html>).

While there are few studies on the attitudes of persons conceived with donated gametes, and the studies that do exist largely focus on those who were conceived with donated sperm, it is claimed that the most commonly sought information revolves around the personal characteristics of the donor, their reasons for donating, their possible shared traits and their health history (Nuffield, 2013: 54 and forward).

Regarding the impact of this information, recent studies corroborate what previous information noted: both families that reveal the method of conception and those that do not work well until early adolescence. However, the discovery of this origin in adulthood or by third parties has significantly negative effects. Likewise, parents who tell children about their origins rarely regret this decision, while the same cannot be said of parents who do not, some of whom perceive the "secret" as a burden (Nuffield, 2013: 54 and forward).

### 3. Brief comparative study

In recent years, many countries have evolved from an anonymous donation system to one that is more flexible and transparent (Schwenzer, 2007: 9-11). Today, between 20% and 36% of the sixty countries analysed in a study by the International Federation of Fertility Societies (IFFS) no longer have a system based on donor anonymity. Of these, 36% allow identifying information on the donor to be accessed, 24% allow non-identifying information and between 24% and 36% do not distinguish whether this information is identifying or not (IFFS, 2013: 74).

Many European countries have adopted the policy launched by Sweden in 1984 and followed by Austria in 1992, which allows the person conceived via donated gametes to access *identifying* information on the donor once they are mature enough. This also applies in Switzerland (with a 1998 law which has been in force since 2001), Norway (2003), Holland (with a 2002 law which has been in force since 2004), the United Kingdom (2004), Finland (2006). Outside Europe, worth noting are the laws in the Australian state of Victoria (1995), Western Australia and New Zealand (2004), New South Wales (2007), Southern Australia (2010), Uruguay (2013) and Argentina, where the new *Código civil y comercial de la nación* (Civil and Commercial Code of the Nation), approved by Law 26,994 dated the 1st of October 2014, also recognises this right. Other legal systems have chosen a double-track system, which allows the donors and the users of ART to choose between the anonymous or identifiable donation track (in favour of their adoption, given that this allows for a better balance between the rights involved; Pennings, 1997: 2839-2844). In 1996, Iceland chose this model, which is the preferred one in many US states (Cohen, 2014: 31-37).

One common denominator among all the laws that allow the donor to be identified is the dissociation between knowledge of genetic parentage and the establishment of legal parentage. This is provided for in Spanish ART law for the few exceptions to the general rule of anonymity (article 8.3 of the LTRHA), and it is generally provided for in the case of adoption (article 180.4 of the Spanish Civil Code [CC] and 235-49.2 of the CCC).

The general rule of donor anonymity is also being called into question, with a few nuances, in the numerous recent official reports, such as France's *Filiation, origines, parentalité*, written by a working group presided over by the sociologist Irène Théry. The report concludes that the Civil Registry should allow children who are legally of age to learn the way they were conceived (2014: 213, 230 and forward). However, the report suggests revealing the identity only when there is a previous request by a legally adult child and consent of the donor (320), in that it claims that anonymity is not incompatible with the right to a private and family life recognised in the European Human Rights Convention (63-64). In Australia, the general trend in favour of the possibility of knowing the gamete donor is captured in the Senate report entitled *Donor Conception Practices in Australia*, which recommends banning anonymity in donations and providing compulsory counselling, especially targeted at parents' revealing to the child the origin of their conception in order to prevent the latter from having identity issues (2011: 11 and 15). The report recommends that the child be able to access *non-identifying* information on the donor after the age of 16 and *identifying* information after the age of 18 (95), and it bases the right to

know donors on medical reasons, on getting important information on lowering the risk of relations between relatives, on establishing relationships with donors and half-siblings, and on access to a more complete notion of identity (80).

#### 4. The right to know one's origins

Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognises the child's right "to know their parents... to the extent possible", as well as the member states' obligation to ensure the effectiveness of these rights according to their national laws and specific obligations stemming from international agreements on this matter. In 2002, the UN's Committee on the Rights of the Child, aware that children who were born out of wedlock in the United Kingdom or who were adopted or conceived through ART did not have the right to know the identity of their biological parents, recommended, based on article 7 in relation to the higher interest of the minor (article 3), that all the member states take all the necessary measures "to allow all children, irrespective of the circumstances of their birth, and adopted children to obtain information on the identity of their parents, to the extent possible" (*Concluding Observations*, recommendations 31 and 32, CRC/C/15/Add.188, 8).

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has never handed down a decision on the scope of the right of persons conceived through ART to know their origins. However, it has ruled on minors under the guardianship of a public administration and adopted children (*Gaskin v. United Kingdom*, 7.7.1989; *Odièvre v. France*, 13.2.2003, and *Godelli v. Italy*, 25.9.2012), and to justify the provenance of actions and claims to non-marital paternity (*Mikulic v. Croatia*, 7.2.2002), even beyond the statutes of limitations for these actions stipulated by the national laws (*Jäggi v. Switzerland*, 13.7.2006 and *Backlund v. Finland*, 6.7.2010). Based on all of these cases, we can infer that the right to know one's origins is an essential right in the development of an individual's identity, which does not necessarily have to evolve towards a legal bond of parentage with the parent(s), and which is part of the right to private life recognised in article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

There is an increasing number of voices in favour of recognising this right within the context of ART, in that the traditional justifications of maintaining secrecy have gradually lost value (Blauwhoff, 2009: 10-11, 341 and forward; Cahn, 2009: 127). The evolution towards a system in which the identity of the donor is open is the outcome of a new focus on the rights and interests of people conceived with donated gametes, which are not viewed as symmetrical to the rights of the parents or donors (Cahn, 2014: 1111-1112; Raes, Ravelingien, Pennings, 2014; for Spain, *vid.* Garriga, 2007: 184-186, according to which the LTRHA has focused on the interests of the recipients, in contrast to the norms that regulate adoption, which revolve around the child's interests). Ultimately, it is claimed that family relationships should be governed by honesty (Garriga, 2007: 173-174, with citations of numerous studies in the field of psychology; Nuffield, 2013: 86 and forward).

If a rule in favour of abolishing anonymity is chosen, one of the most controversial issues is whether the right to know one's origin's should be applied retroactively, since if there is in fact a subjective right, one should always be able to exercise it. On this point, the reports that recommend that anonymity be

abolished believe that the right to privacy should be preserved if the donor was not informed that the person thus conceived could find out their identity when they donated the gamete (*Filiation, origines, parentalité* 2013: 222 and 233). In this sense, the claim is that abolishing anonymity non-retroactively would not affect donors' rights. The report by the Australian Senate stresses that none of the four states which have approved laws in favour of the possibility of knowing the donor (Victoria, Western Australia, Northern Territory and New South Wales) has done so retroactively (2011: 77-78 and 96). The report stresses that gamete donation often takes place through a contract between the donor and the centre, and that breaking these conditions could lead donors to file requests for monetary compensation against the centres or states. In the absence of evidence on the legal and ethical implications of abolishing anonymity retroactively, the Australian Senate expressed its approval of donors' right to maintain the anonymity that they were guaranteed when they decided to donate. However, if we claim that the child thus born has the right to know their origins, the justifications based on the non-retroactivity of the provisions that guarantee this law become devoid of content. In view of this conflict, perhaps the best way to reconcile the different interests involved would be for the legal systems to create voluntary registers that only reveal the information if both the child and the donor request it, similar to what some of the legal systems that have abolished the guarantee of anonymity have done, such as some Australian states, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

## 5. Donor anonymity

Many of the authors who support maintaining donor anonymity believe that the child's right to know their origins too readily assumes that this recognition may bring the child more harm than benefit, and that it enters into conflict with the donor's right to privacy and the right to reproduction (De Melo Martín, 2014: 28-35). The field of psychology notes that it is beneficial for children to grow up feeling like they are part of a family (cited by Garriga, 2007: 173-174). It also appeals to the importance of parental autonomy when taking decisions that affect their children's wellbeing (De Melo Martín, 2014: 30; Pennings, 2014), and it questions the existence of a right to know one's origins based on the right to health (De Melo Martín, 2014: 28-35). Ultimately, those in favour of the anonymity rule object to the fact that many people who do not have this information do have a clearly delimited identity, and that attaching too much importance to genetics is not the best way of guaranteeing the wellbeing of families that do not share the same genetic make-up (De Melo Martín, 2014: 32).

One of the most frequent objections to the right for children conceived with donated gametes to know their origins is that this conflicts with the donor's right to privacy. However, in reproduction with ART, unlike in sexual reproduction, the intervention of people outside the reproductive process in order to make conception possible breaks the rule of anonymity from the outset (Farnós, 2014: 112-115). Yet in this conflict of rights, the right of the child must prevail, since even though medical information is confidential, the matter shifts once a person is born (Garriga, 2007: 179-180, 2014: 777). Regarding the argument that abolishing donor anonymity may violate the right to reproduction in that it might lower the number of donations, in addition to the

fact that there is no empirical evidence to support this claim (see section 2), a more transparent policy would only affect reproduction stemming from heterologous ART. What is more, ultimately a system in which the donor decides whether or not they want to be identified would continue to respect all the rights involved.

## **6. Weak points of Spanish law on assisted reproduction techniques**

The possibility of learning the donor's identity (article 5.5 of the LTRHA), already exceptional in Spanish law, is even further restricted if we bear in mind that the origin of parentage cannot be recorded in the Civil Registry (article 7.2 of the LTRHA). In consequence, if the parents say nothing to the child about the origin of their conception, the child has no way of accessing this information beyond chance discovery or birth within a homosexual couple. Given the uncertainty entailed in leaving the supply of this information in the parents' hands (Golombok et al., 2002: 830-840), it is advisable to have a system in place that provides for a record of the origin of the birth. This uncertainty might be eliminated by guaranteeing that the origin of the conception is recorded in the Civil Registry, as it is in cases of adoption, where the information on the adoptee and the original parentage are under a system of restricted public access (article 21 and 22 on the Civil Registry Regulation [RRC]). Likewise, it could be recorded on the birth certificate, in line with the provisions of article 563 of the new Argentine CC, or in a national donor registry, such as the ones in Sweden and the United Kingdom. The latter may be useful for revealing the donor's identity, although it would be sufficient if the origin of the conception appeared in the Civil Registry (Garriga, 2007: 219-221).

A second aspect of Spanish law on ART that is surprising is that the right to know one's origins is guaranteed to the adoptee but not to the person conceived using these techniques. Thus, article 235-49 of the CCC allows adoptees who are legally of age to perform actions leading to the discovery of their biological parents' identity without this affecting their adoptive parentage. Ever since the law in Book II of the Catalan Civil Code was adopted, this right has been complemented by adoptive parents' obligation to inform the adopted child about the adoption (article 235-50). Even though forcible compliance with this law does not exist, nor are there legal consequences for failing to comply with it or even a means to check compliance with it, its enactment signals yet another step in the recognition of the child's right to information on their own origin. This does not affect the parents' right to personal or family privacy, since the law protects the circumstance of the adoption from public knowledge, as it is subjected to restricted public access in the Civil Registry (Garriga, 2014: 778-779). Other regional laws on the protection of minors recognise that the adoptee has the right to know their original parentage (Garriga, 2014: 766 and 778). In article 180.5 of the CC, based on the reform introduced with Law 54/2007 on International Adoption dated the 28th of December 2007, the state lawmakers limited themselves to guaranteeing adoptees the right to know "the information on their biological origins" either once they are legally of age or through their legal representatives when still minors. The scope of this precept was further fleshed out by Law 26, 2015 dated the 28th of July 2015, which changed the child and adolescent protection system (BOE no. 180 dated 29.7.2015), which introduces a new article, 180.5 CC, which states that information on the minor's

origins, especially any information related to “the identity of their parents” must be conserved for at least 50 years after the adoption effectively takes place.

We might think that in the case of adoptees the justification for accessing their origins is that there has been a more extensive bond (legal and even affective) with the biological family, while in the case of people conceived through donated gametes this bond has not existed, plus the child usually has a biological bond with one of the people who use ART. In my opinion, the objection of prior history, meant in the broad sense beyond mere biology, as a distinctive feature among adoptees and people conceived via donated gametes is not sufficient justification if we bear in mind that from the standpoint of the child’s rights it is difficult to justify why the law denies children conceived via assisted reproduction a right that it does grant to adoptees.

## 7. Final reflections

Despite the questionable constitutionality of article 5.5 of the LTRHA (Pantaleón, 1988: 31-36), the Constitutional Court’s ruling 116/1999 dated the 17<sup>th</sup> of June 1999 endorses its counterpart article 5.5 of the 1888 LTRA by arguing that when one uses ART the investigation guaranteed by article 39.2 of the Spanish Constitution does not have the purpose sought by the Constitution, which is the establishment of comprehensive legal bonds of reciprocal rights and obligations; that identity can be revealed in the exceptional cases provided for by law; and that the donors’ right to privacy must be guaranteed because, among other reasons, it is a necessary measure in order to continue practising ART. However, the increasing dissociation between the different spheres of parentage (Schwenzer, 2007: 11; Singer, 2007: 148), the tendency towards a society with families based more on roles than on biology, and a distancing from the image of donor-parent are all arguments that suggest that a revision of this doctrine is in order today (Puigpelat, 2012: 190-191).

One study performed in Sweden after the law that allows the donor’s identity to be accessed entered into force shows that many people conceived through donated gametes are not informed of this by their parents, such that anyone who has reason to believe that they were conceived in this way has the right to be assisted by the Social Welfare Committee in order to find the information available at the centre where the ART was performed (Singer, 2007: 148). This study reveals that ultimately the possibility that the person conceived via donated gametes can learn their origins spotlights the need for a deeper and slower social change. Laws guaranteeing these rights are worthless if attitudes do not change, in that the state has no means to obligate parents to reveal information on the origins of their children (*vid.* the reference to article 235-50 of the CCC in the previous section). However, the body of laws, such as the codes of good practices that countries like the United Kingdom developed just before the reform that abolished anonymity entered into force, play a pedagogical role in this context. Once secrecy ceases to be the rule of thumb and the laws encourage the recognition of origins, this knowledge becomes perceived as positive.

When the state hinders access to identifying and non-identifying information on the donor, it is depriving the child conceived with gametes via ART from an important aspect of their individual autonomy: the freedom to

choose what meaning they assign to the genetic components of their identity (Ravitsky 2014: 36-37).

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## The redesign of social policy in a time of economic crisis

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### Abstract

*Demographic trends, with the relevant ageing of the population, are mostly determining the direction of social policy (in terms of healthcare, social services, pensions, future proposals to cover dependence, etc.). This is unfortunate, as the social policy agenda should be much more focused on poverty than on age, equal opportunity policies, fighting unemployment, combating social exclusion and guaranteeing the basic rights of all citizens. If current trends do not change, the elderly will become the main beneficiaries of an increasing proportion of social expenditure over GDP.*

**Key words:** Social policy, economic crisis, ageing of the population, inter-generational welfare

### 1. Introduction

The economic crisis in which we are still currently enmeshed, which effects will probably remain long enough to change the way we understand the State involvement in our lives, spurs us to embark upon these reflections to make several proposals for action that should inform new forms of social policy. Until today, social policy has focused more on the intra-generational aspects of welfare (variations between rich/poor, educated/illiterate, professionally trained/less trained, the healthy/the ill and between citizens with debts or savings!) than on the inter-generational aspects of the young and elderly cohorts. This has taken for granted that what social policy had to do for the elderly it was compensated for what technology did for the human capital, productivity and improved salaries of the younger population. This balance is being broken today given the evolution in the job market (young people are suffering from more unemployment, their training is stagnating and low-salary jobs go with precarious jobs) and demographics. The reflection below aims to provide a brief overview of the effects of demographic ageing, bearing in mind the behaviour of the job market and its effects on different aspects of our lives. We should note in advance that the rise in life expectancy is a valuable social fact in itself, and that

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the goal is that by reorienting public social policy, to restore an acceptable balance for overall welfare of our generations.

## **2. Effects of the new state of affairs: The ageing of the population**

The ageing of the population affects the intergenerational balance of welfare through the following elements of economic policy:

- The impact on income/assets bearing in mind the effect of the investment first, and then the liquidation of assets throughout the life cycle.
- The balance between consumption and savings.
- Some components of consumption: entertainment, housing, transport, personal services, etc.
- Finally, the mix of public/private consumption.

Ageing affects the following elements of social policy: pensions, healthcare, benefits for long term care and other social services. This intergenerational effect is due to their impact on the ordinary budgets, and its fiscal response: either higher taxes, the substitution effect they exert on other public policies if the goal is to keep a balanced budget, on the public debt if it is financed in this way. In any event, this would lead the elderly incomes to depend mostly on public benefits at the expense of the young contributors.

The proportion of the population older than 60, as a proportion of the total population of Spain, will double by 2040 according to some forecasts. Without changes in public policies, this is, maintaining the current policies, this will mean that the proportion of public spending on benefits for the elderly will rise from 12.6% to 33.1% of the GDP. In terms of total public spending, this would crowd-out other (current or future) public policies targeting the share of those groups from their current 68% to only 28% of the GDP. If total public spending increased in such a way to prevent this substitution effect, the fiscal pressure would have to rise from its current 38.2% to 57.2% by 2040: this is, a fifty per cent. If these benefits are financed through deficit and debt, by 2029 we would enter into what is called the “snowball effect” (150% of the GDP). Finally, from another vantage point, 68% of the net incomes our elderly would depend on social spending. What is more, the tax-free incomes of the passive classes would even exceed the incomes of actively employed persons (because of the burden of taxes and payments on the latter). This makes for a clearly unsustainable situation.

Finally, we should note that at the current pace, the complement from private pensions would only yield a compensating effect of three points of GDP (one-third, for example, of its share in the United Kingdom or Canada). Likewise, the “cushion” brought about by our elderly’s cohabitation with their adult children would continue to be essential: 40% compared to 6% in some Nordic countries, and in this sense the new benefits for dependence would have to level the playing field in the decision on whether or not to institutionalise dependents, at present family and basically females dependency. However policies should be kept neutral towards informal and formal care and on institutionalisation in/outside home.

All of this new situation necessitates the following counterbalances: 1) keeping a global perspective on social spending and finance resulting from the demographic change: who receives what and who finances who. For this, a more horizontal and less “compartmentalised” vision is required of the impact of ageing on public policies by focusing them on their recipients: not who does what, but for what purpose is done; 2) maintaining a fair distribution rule in response to the evolution in the demographic vector (the elderly) and the job market (young cohorts) in an integrated fashion. Otherwise, there is a danger of a substitution effect of the benefits of one group in favour of others; 3) acting via selective policies. The elderly are not on average the poor of the country today. They may be the poor in terms of income, but not in terms of assets. Their real purchasing power is often higher than for the rest of the population, they face less vital expenditures and their public benefits help to improve at least partly their welfare. However, there is significant variation among them. There are major pools of poverty among the elderly. In this sense public policy should be less universal and more selective, more closely tied to proof of need and means.

In short, demographic trends, with the relevant ageing of the population, are determining the direction of social policy (in terms of healthcare, social services, pensions, future proposals to cover dependence, etc.). This is unfortunate, as the social policy agenda should be much more focused on poverty, equal opportunities, active employment, combating social exclusion and guaranteeing the basic rights of all citizens, not unambiguously linked to age.

If the current trends do not change, the primary beneficiaries of an increasingly large share of social spending within the GDP will be unavoidably the elderly (an electorally important group with more concentrated political dimensions). The evolution in pensions and the derived internal rate of return (IRR) for current pensioners, the dynamic of non-contributory pensions, healthcare without equity discrimination in the allocation of resources (fair innings), the evolution in some asset values, and the dynamic of new job contracts dissociated from productivity will be the main causes.

The described situation contrasts with the need for new workfare policies and to reorient fiscal pressure, today still highly concentrated on certain groups of contributors, in order to guarantee social reinsertion, housing, active human capital training policies, efficient salaries, job market security, etc. All of these kinds of policies have at present low relative importance and may even have less in the future.

On the other hand, we should consider the need to coordinate public and private pensions by offsetting fiscal spending regressiveness of private funds, as well as considering the relative price differential in view of the different shopping baskets for pension indexation. We must also assess the importance of delayed retirement, which affects both contributions and pensions, and consider the delay in the entry into the job market and a shorter contribution course, more likely in among those with less training and lower qualifications. Their shorter life expectancy compared to the greater longevity among the wealthy today may create an additional intragenerational unbalance.

Ensuring future retirement today primarily depends therefore on the quality, quantity and distribution of the productive assets – physical, human and environmental – that the new generations have or inherit. More policies

centred on ‘ex ante’ child investments would guarantee a better future welfare than ‘ex post’ inherited wealth transmissions.

Otherwise, under the present situation, we face postponing emancipation, extended education and training or unemployment for a longer time, and delaying stable coupledness. All this leads to a drop in the birth rate, with fewer overall opportunities to save for the late stages in life.

We can also see a foreseeable better future (in terms of pensions) for couples in which both work and have more training in a context that favours greater “endogamy” of monogamy among couples with similar educational levels. Otherwise, higher income and more education imply fewer children and thus a further concentration of wealth.

Despite all this, families’ financial precariousness is worrisome, not so much because of the financial burden of their debt as because of the distribution of assets by income deciles and how this economic cycle has affected them (Family Financial accounts, Bank of Spain 2015).

We should amend the unequal opportunities we observe the sooner the better: in childhood, within the family, with a new equilibrium between work – for both women and men – and family assistance, in order to prevent couples from being “penalised” for having children (levelling out the incentives for home care); the uncertainty of poverty (number of children); broken families (single-parent families) and dynastic accumulation. The importance of training human capital from the early years (cognitive skills, discipline, health and motivation to learn, all of which are closely tied to the family and cultural *milieu*) has been proven, as has its influence on job opportunities (likelihood of unemployment), income (salaries) and wealth and its accumulation.

Therefore, attention must be paid to investment inequalities in many areas associated with poverty (single-parent families, immigrants, etc.) and to the challenge of making the measures compatible with a major influx of women into the job market. We should likely focus on “first-year” mothers with low-skilled jobs, avoid concentrations in schools linked to poor housing or by other forms of segregation. We need to grasp that what is fair is different than simple egalitarianism and apply it from a generational perspective (throughout an individual’s lifetime, bearing income dynamics in mind).

*Intergenerational accounting* provides for this purpose the bridge between today’s public debate on social deficits and the necessary future financial surplus (under intertemporal budgetary constraints). It identifies the present and future net per-capita transfer for each generation (in current values), given the demographic prospects and taxpaying and the age public spending profiles. That is, it calculates how much a newborn today will have to contribute to public spending (or private spending, accepting a rise in taxes) if they end up with a zero balance throughout their lifetime.

### **3. Ways to rebalance inter-generational welfare**

*Musgrave’s Rule*. Based on the active-passive ratio (workers/pensioners), a referent must be established. This is the case of the so called Musgrave rule. It

requires a predetermined coefficient of relative positions<sup>1</sup> among age groups such that the variation in contributions (payments) vs. benefits (pensions) keeps the per capita (net) income coefficient of the active population constant with respect to the per capita (net) benefits of pensioners. Once the ratio has been determined, the taxes should periodically be adjusted to reflect demographic changes (downward) and productivity changes (upward). Therefore, if the population ages, the taxes rise but pensions drop in such a way that everyone “loses” in the same proportion. Therefore, the past income distribution is initially conserved.

Regarding structural reforms for fiscal consolidation purposes, which can be analysed as substitutions rather than complements, the sovereign debt, has to be considered a sort of postponed tax. Non-structural reforms are today’s incomes redistribution within the same generation. The introduction of an entry barrier is in this sense equivalent to wealth that is transferred from future generations towards current generations. The opposite holds true, too: these restrictive regulations must be removed. The scope of laws for employment protection and rent control today extract income from future generations in favour of current ones. Fiscal consolidation is worse for this purpose than structural reforms, since even though both restore the generational balances, the former raises taxes and thus generates an excess burden that enlarges both the current and future consequences. Even though the measures are substitutive, they are not alternative, we have to be able to analyse the optimal composition combining these at any rate both two fronts.

Another way to tackle the unbalanced effects is through the accumulation effects, first, and the liquidation of the assets of the baby boomers, later. In fact, the literature claims that movements in the price/earnings ratio of shares closely follow the coefficient between the middle-aged population and the elderly. When pensioners complement their pensions by selling assets, they put pressure on the price of assets for everyone and hinder young people from accessing wealth.

Likewise, in view of the internal rates of return or the expected net transfers for each incoming cohort, the proportion of debt, both in the sense of the Kotlikoff effect<sup>2</sup>- and the effort to pay it off-, and its magnitude -given the impact that public debt has on economic growth-, other things equal (the 90% of the GDP Reinhart/Rogoff rule), with an average drop in the growth rate is estimated at slightly higher than 1% of GDP.<sup>3</sup> Finally, with contexts of almost zero interest rates such as today, the claim that higher inflation is needed leads to an additional uneven damage, that will depend on the groups’ relative degree of indebtedness and financial protection because either the indexing of pensions or the credit conditions.

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<sup>1</sup> A good description can be found in G. Esping-Andersen, D. Gallie, A. Hemerijck and J. Myles (2002), *Why We Need a New Welfare State*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

<sup>2</sup> A good description of its application in Spain can be found in C. Patxot and R. Farré (2007), *Evaluación de la sostenibilidad del estado del bienestar en España*, Barcelona, Universitat Abat Oliba, Fundació pel Desenvolupament Humà i Social.

<sup>3</sup> C. M. Reinhart and K. S. Rogoff (2008), “This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises”, *NBER Working Paper*, no. 13882 (March).

In brief, for all the former purposes, a ‘new-new’ welfare policy needs to be designed. Family structure and workfare strategies are central pieces if we wish to rebalance the equity effects that at present deteriorate the intergenerational equilibrium of welfare for our younger generations.

## Can we exit the crisis without the emerging countries?

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### Abstract

*Advanced economies resemble each other, while emerging economies are very different from each other. That is why the emerging countries can exit this crisis in a different way than the advanced economies. This is because the crisis has affected each type of country differently according to their demographics, size and development, and the emerging economies do not need to carry out the same actions as the advanced economies.*

**Key words:** Emerging countries, crisis, advanced economies

One of the professors I had who left me with some of my worst memories was a man who whenever I asked him a question in class answered me with: "That's not the question you should be asking!" And I realise that this question of whether we can exit the crisis without the emerging countries may not be the question we should be asking. Let me explain: the question is more whether we should think that perhaps this time the emerging countries will exit a crisis without us; that is, we shall talk about advanced economies and emerging economies, and I would like to begin by providing figures on each of them.

The distinction between an advanced and an emerging economy is the distinction between linear and non-linear equations. That is, linear equations all resemble each other while non-linear equations do not resemble each other much at all. The same holds true with emerging economies and advanced economies.

Advanced economies are essentially economies that resemble each other, since they have the same productive structure; in contrast, emerging economies are very different to each other in terms of their size, development, the relative importance of the sectors they have, demographics... just about everything. Therefore, instead of talking about emerging economies, we shall in general focus in on some of them. I have chosen three of them: China, Brazil and Angola.

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If we take the world economy as a whole, advanced economies make up 56% of the world GDP, 66% of world trade and 14% of the world population, and what we call emerging economies account for a little over half of the GDP, one-third of trade and 86% of the population. We can draw a few conclusions from these aggregate figures: if we look at the USA, the proportion of world exports coming from this country is the same as the proportion of world exports coming from China, and it is less than the proportion of world exports coming from Germany, which somewhat upsets our notion of the emerging countries. We should say that we are talking about exports of goods, not goods and services, which leads the USA's importance to drop, as it exports many services.

The first thing we should focus on is a figure that does not seem sustainable in the long term: the fact that 14% of the population has 56% of the GDP and that 86% of the population has the rest. This is something that will be corrected over time because if not, it may continue to worsen until it becomes unsupportable. To begin with, let us examine demographics. We economists are forced to talk about things in the long term; however, if there is a variable on which we can rely in the long term, it is demographics. No one knows what the technology will be like in five years, nor what institutions there will be, but we can know what the demographics will be. That is, we can know what they will be 20 years from now, but not 50 or 60 years hence. The UN's forecasts, for example, say that the world population will stabilise in around 2075 at approximately 8.6 billion people, let us say 9 billion, 50% more than now, although there are alternative hypotheses that range from 36 million to 2.5 billion. They are not very accurate forecasts beyond the first 50 years, but they are indeed valuable for the first 50 years; therefore, let us accept 8.5 billion people. This will largely happen by a drop in the fertility rate and the ageing of the population; as the population ages, the mortality rate rises and then there comes a point when the fertility rate drops and the mortality rate rises and reaches a maximum. From then on, the population will drop a bit and later, in around 2075, it will stabilise; however, what will not stabilise is the population distribution. Notice that in 1950, 29.5% of the world population was living in what we call "advanced economies", 22% were European and 7% in North America. In 2000, it was only 17%. The forecasts today for the long term are never over 13%, which means that the population living in what we consider advanced economies will have gone from almost one-third of the population to less than 15% within the next 75 years.

Given this proportion, where will the increase be? Not in Asia, which right now has 55% of the world population. This population will continue to account for 55% of the world population 300 years from now, we assume after 2075.

Latin America will never reach 10%; it is now at 6.6% and will reach 8%. The major shift is Africa. It accounted for 6.8% of the world population in 1950 and is expected to surpass 23.6%, despite AIDS, malaria and other diseases. There will be a change in the world population distribution, which will take place not so much in Asia or Latin America as in Africa compared to the advanced countries. This consideration, in my opinion, is enough for us to ask if we are the ones that should depend on the emerging countries, or whether the emerging countries are the ones that should depend on us, because it is clear that the economy's centre of gravity will shift towards them.



If we take the secondary variable, trade, we find what we already know. The advanced countries export goods to each other. If we take the case of Germany, for example, 86% of its exports are goods, 73% of its imports are goods and 76% of their trade is with advanced economies. Germany is a very open country, but primarily very open to other industrial countries, not to the rest of the world.

The case of the USA is a bit different. Less than 50% of its trade is with advanced economies; that is, more than half of this country's imports and exports are with the rest of the world, not with the EU, and not even with Mexico or Canada.

If we take the case of a medium-sized country like Spain, 76% of the exports are goods, and agricultural raw materials are fairly important, since they account for 15% of exports. Seventy percent of imports are goods. From this standpoint, we are an advanced country, as we export and import certain goods. Our dependence on the advanced economies is quite important. Seventy-seven percent of our trade is with advanced economies, and of them 70% is with the EU; we are an EU province from this vantage point.

China is a totally different country. Ninety-three percent of its exports are goods, and it imports 71% of its goods because one of things that China does is import goods, assemble them and once again export them. Many of its exports match this description. When it is said that China exports advanced technological goods, it is often not true. It exports computers, and its Apples are made in China, but this means that it assembles them, not that it envisions or designs them; instead, they are simply assembled there. It imports a lot and exports a lot; it does a lot of traffic in fine-tuning. Naturally, in a case like China, the proportion of mineral resources and fuel is quite high; it is around 22%, much higher than in many European countries, with the exception of Spain: we have the highest proportion of energy imports in the EU, namely 20%. Yet the proportion of China's trade with advanced economies is much lower than that of other countries: 53% of its exports go to advanced economies. In other words, the USA is not the country that China floods with t-shirts and tennis shoes; instead, other countries receive a larger proportion than the USA does.

If we examine a country like Brazil, much of its imports are agricultural. Finally, we can find a textbook example: the developed countries export goods and import agricultural products, and the developing countries do the opposite. Thirty percent of Brazil's exports are agricultural products, 20% are minerals and 47% are manufactured goods. This is less than in the advanced economies, since its trade with advanced countries is much lower. The proportion of exports to advanced countries is only 40% because industrial countries' trade tends to be highly concentrated with other industrial countries, while the trade of non-industrialised countries does not primarily go to industrial countries.

It is clear that Brazil has a major client which is an emerging economy: Argentina. Twenty percent of Brazil's exports go to Argentina, 11% of its imports come from China and 7% of Brazil's exports go to China. This is a fairly significant figure because it is essentially comprised of soy; Brazil is the second largest soy producer in the world after the USA, and China is the leading soy consumer in the world. Therefore, there is a very important stream of soy running from Brazil to China, as an alternative to the USA. Thus, we can see that the largest manufacturing platform in the world right now is China, whose

degree of dependence on the West is lower than we might have thought. Perhaps we have imagined that most of China's imports come from the West, but this is not true, and that many of China's exports go to the West, but this is not true either, because they go to the rest of the world. And consider that Japan is one of the advanced economies, meaning that exports between China and Japan are counted among those of industrial countries, not emerging countries.

The last country we wish to examine is Angola. One advantage is that there are virtually no figures on Angola. A total of 98.7% of Angola's exports are mineral and energy resources. What is more, this country has another unique features, which is that there are one million Chinese workers in Angola who are primarily building roads and railways, but not only railway to carry minerals from the mine to the port, which is what we did. Instead, they are also building a railway network for the entire country.

The last thing we should examine, apart from demographics and trade, is capital. It is well known that the capital in advanced countries has decreasing performance; this is why it ends up being invested elsewhere and therefore the capital of England, the USA and other developed countries ends up being invested in under-developed countries. This was applied quite frequently in the 19th century, until English capital was ruined by purchasing shares in South American railways; since then, the capital from advanced countries does not so much go to Third World countries as the opposite. What has happened is that first savings shifted from advanced countries to the emerging countries, primarily to countries like China, and these countries have then devoted themselves to financing the advanced countries. As Paul Krugman said, the American economy consists of the fact that Americans build houses with the money lent to them by China. This is an oversimplification, of course, but it contains a grain of truth, since the Chinese, Japanese and Middle Eastern countries have financed the USA's spending for many years. The capital flows no longer go from the advanced countries to the emerging countries but in the opposite direction. Therefore, the major advantage of the advanced countries and especially the USA used to be having capital markets; that is, the USA's capital markets had fundamental features: first, they were liquid – one could buy and sell shares in vast quantities without really bothering anyone – and secondly, they were safe. This has come to an end: for a year and a half they have been neither liquid nor safe, and therefore this is one less reason why the emerging countries should be dependent on us.

Therefore, I think that this should lead us to conclude that it is not safe for the emerging countries to rely on us to exit the crisis and that they can exit the crisis that affects them differently than us; they can exit it without relying on us. They can serve as an engine for the advanced economies; what is always said about how the American economy is the engine of the world: they can play this role. However, can China replace the American economy as the engine of the world economy and help us to exit this crisis? No.

First, because the numbers do not add up. The Chinese economy is large, but it is much smaller than the economy of the USA. Secondly, because the trends do not line up either. What China should be doing right now is not strengthening its export sector but strengthening its internal demand. That is, a country as large as China cannot continue to develop through its export sector. This has a very great risk that we are beginning to glimpse; namely creating a

dual economy, that is, a modern economy, which is the economy that serves the export sector and develops, gets rich and leaves behind the second economy, namely the rural economy, which is stagnant. This phenomenon can already be seen in China. Consider the fact that the proportion of labour that works in industry today is the same as 30 years ago. Chinese industry has created relatively few jobs; obviously they are highly productive and very well paid jobs, but very few have been created and there is constant pressure from the rural world to join the modern world. This can only be achieved primarily through the export sector. Therefore, if China did what it should do, it would not be the engine of the world economy but the engine of its own economy. Thus, I think that neither the figures nor the trends will make these emerging countries help us exit the crisis too much. Despite that, we are living with a single economy, if I may, with the same image as always: we are all in the same boat.

I would like to point out something that seems inconceivable, even though it is not impossible, because stranger things have happened: that in 20, 30, 50 or even 100 years from now, we will have 8 billion people consuming the amount of resources that we currently consume per person or that Americans consume. Right now, there are restrictions on resources (water, food, cultivable land) which may or may not be heavy enough restrictions, but they are now. We are not very clear as to whether this can continue, such that the emerging countries can reach the same standard of living as the advanced countries. Let us say that it is fairly improbable in a world that is increasingly interconnected, when one part is increasingly aware of what the other parts are doing, that the major income inequalities remain in place; therefore, we can expect there to be some sort of convergence. I believe that this convergence is unlikely to happen at the upper end today; I am not saying that it is impossible, obviously. Instead, I mean that it seems unlikely. I think that this would not be feasible because major conflicts would arise due to the surplus of these major resources, and therefore the convergence would have to be more like a midpoint. Just to cite some figures, let us say that the world per capita income right now is \$10,000, the income in a country like China is \$5,000, in India it is \$2,000, and in the advanced economies it is \$37,000. These are huge, threefold, differences. And we are not talking about the poorest person in the world and the richest person in the world; no doubt they both live in Brazil. But we are not discussing that; we are talking about means: the difference is only threefold, and in the advanced economies it is tenfold, since there are major differences among the big countries. If we think that these differences will tend to converge because there are forces that tend to make them converge, it is difficult to imagine from the standpoint of natural resources that they can converge to the point where we are today, and even less so if we keep growing in this way. I think that that we can draw two conclusions from all of this, if we can draw any.

The first is that we should not take for granted that the emerging countries have to rely on us to exit the crisis because right now there is a real possibility that there are other physical circuits of goods and services. Let us think about the natural resources of Angola or Brazil and Chinese goods, including merchandise, services and capital. Remember the capital flow: even capital markets exist on the sidelines of the advanced economies. If there is not a large Asian capital market it is only for one reason: China and Japan do not get along with each other. This is the only reason. They have been working on monetary union projects for twenty years, but Japan has taken the role of

conceptual leadership, and China will never accept this. In other words, for the time being, as long as things remain thus, there will not be either an Asian monetary fund or an Asian capital market, two issues which have been discussed for some time now.

However, it is possible that China and Japan do manage to overcome these differences for the sake of the advantages that a closer union could bring them. In my opinion, the relationship between these two countries is the only obstacle to creating a single Asian market. Therefore, we cannot assume that the emerging countries have to rely on us to exit their crisis; we cannot expect them to remain our engine because they will not be.

As mentioned above, neither the figures nor the trends lead us here; therefore, as usual we are taking the worst possible attitude to facilitate an understanding of the emerging economies and ourselves, because we are looking at them over our shoulders, as always. The Americans are teaching the Chinese lessons on how they should make their exchange rate work; luckily they are not teaching them lessons on how to run their banking industry. They were doing this ten years ago, but now they have stopped. The rest of us are teaching them lessons on their human rights, and that is fine, but it should not be the only thing we have to say about countries like China. If you had lived in China, you would have seen to what extent the Western press, the press not only from here but from everywhere, has a systematically hostile attitude towards what happens in China.

That is, any report that could be interpreted either negatively or positively is always interpreted negatively. The Chinese know this, and these are things that build up over time and make our lives more difficult than they have to be.

The second conclusion, in my opinion, is that these growing emerging countries, 84% of the world population, wants to reach a standard of living similar to ours, and this could cause a series of difficulties. It could lead us to the idea that perhaps convergence will not be entirely upwards, that we will not be where we are watching as the others approach us, but that this will force us to converge a bit towards the middle, and to make Keynes' idea about the economic possibilities of our grandchildren come true. Right now we are obligated to worship a false god; for the time being, for years what is good will seem bad and what is bad will seem good. Let me remind you about Mandeville's fable about the bees, which said that saving is a private virtue but a public vice; that if people save they do not consume, and that if people do not consume the economy grinds to a halt. This is what is happening now: we are being encouraged to consume, as Mandeville said, and Keynes said that they were false gods. For some time we will have to keep worshiping these false gods before things are the way they should be and we worry about what truly matters. This should have been written in around 1930. He should have spoken about his great-grandchildren, not his grandchildren. Perhaps this idea will actually come true during the lifetime of his great-grandchildren.

## **Study of the productivity and working partnerships of the Catalan and Madrilean clusters based on their output in the top Spanish communication journals**

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Translated from Catalan by Mary Black

### **Abstract**

*This study consists of an analysis of scholarly papers published in the seven highest-quality Spanish-language communication journals throughout the period 2007-2011. The study analyses the productivity and the collaborative models among the authors of these papers, and it draws an accurate, detailed map of activity in the Catalan and Madrilean clusters. The two clusters' production levels are similar, and together they account for most of Spain's output. The data also show the Catalan cluster's greater internal connectivity and a lower output in partnerships with the rest of Spain compared to the Madrilean cluster. Finally, the results show that international co-authorship is at a very early stage, and the joint output from Catalonia – Madrid is virtually non-existent.*

**Key words:** Catalonia, Madrid, communication journals, authorship, papers

### **1. Introduction and objectives**

The publication of papers in communication journals is a phenomenon that arose in the early 1980s, when this field of knowledge, adopting the model of the experimental sciences, began to use publication in scholarly journals as an essential way of disseminating the results of studies (Hicks, 2004). This led to a trend among authors to choose the journals according to the benefits they will bring to their CVs (Giménez & Alcain, 2006). On the other hand, agencies appeared with the goal of classifying journals in terms of quality, which promoted a small group of journals over others, giving rise to a competitive process among the journals to attract high-quality papers. This latter phenomenon had a key effect in non-English-speaking countries, since the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI-ISI) and SciVerse Scopus – both of which

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use English as their main language – became the international benchmarks in quality evaluation. In Spain, the reaction to this situation led the country to create its own evaluation systems with the goal of conferring prominence on high-quality Spanish-language publications. Despite this, the journals watched with concern as they were increasingly distant from the international productive epicentres and a slow series of efforts got underway to situate these publications in the most important international databases. At the same time, there were attempts to leave the hallmark of Spanish communication journals, which contained papers in Spanish, to evolve towards international quality standards dissociated with the regional origin of the papers. Notable examples of this are the fact that *El Profesional de la Información* in 2006, *Comunicar* in 2007 and *Comunicación y Sociedad* and *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico*, both in 2009, were added to the ISI database.

This new working paradigm has aroused interest among researchers in communication to evaluate the state of the art of Spanish publications. Noteworthy studies include the ones by Soriano (2008) on the consequences of the effect of National Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation of Spain (ANECA) on Spain in terms of language, authorship and citations (Fernández - Quijada, 2010; 2011), the methodological flaws in papers published between 1998 and 2007 (Martínez-Nicolás & Saperas, 2011), the internationalisation of the impact factor (Lauf, 2005) and analyses of the internationalisation and co-authorships of very extensive samples of scholarly papers on communication (Escribà & Cortiñas, 2013; Fernández & Masip, 2013). The studies unanimously express a concern over the deficient status of Spanish matrix publications in their records of international publications, even though they do provide a ray of hope, especially in studies after 2008, which dovetails with the entry onto the scene of the Spanish communication journals.

In order to bring more factors to interpret the situation, we believe it is worthwhile to focus on aspects involving the internal distribution of the output. For this reason, in this paper we perform a study of the leading Spanish communication journals with the goal of specifying the work patterns and productive records of the two main regions of scholarly output in the field of communication in Spain: Catalonia and the Community of Madrid. Our goal is to go beyond the outline offered by Escribà and Cortiñas (2013), which traces a few master lines of productive activity and partnerships among universities based on an analysis of the most frequent ties among universities. Therefore, the study below meticulously quantifies all the productive and collaborative activities that take place in Catalonia and the Community of Madrid and analyses the ways in which each cluster collaborates abroad.

Thus, our study pursues the following objectives:

- To measure the total and relative productive activity of researchers at the different universities in the Catalonia cluster and the Community of Madrid cluster based on the presence of papers in the leading communication journals in Spain.
- To analyse the structures of partnerships at the leading universities in each cluster in terms of the number of publications signed by a sole author and co-authorships, either within the same university, within the cluster, with the rest of Spain and with co-authors from abroad.

## 2. Method and materials

The leading communication journals were selected strictly according to objective quality and validity criteria during the period 2007-2011. Using the complete DICE<sup>1</sup> database, we analysed each publication to check its activity during 2007-2011, and we ascertained high-quality track records based on the journals' inclusion in ISI, Scopus, Latindex, ISOC-CSIC, *the journal-source* category in IN-RECS<sup>2</sup> and external reviews. We added *El Profesional de la Información* (EPI) to this classification, a journal which has openly expressed its aim of publishing research in the field of communication, even though it is included in the Library and Documentation databases.

The journals chosen for our study are:

- *Comunicar. Revista Científica Iberoamericana de Comunicación y Educación* Created in 1993 with the name of *Comunica. Revista de Medios de Comunicación y Enseñanza*, it adopted its current name in 1994. It is the most visible element in the activity of a group of Andalusian journalists and professors working under the name of *Grupo Comunicar* whose goal is to perform research in the field of communication. It has been an ISI member since 2007, and it also appears in Scopus. It is the Spanish matrix publication with the top position internationally. It comes out twice yearly.
- *Comunicación y Sociedad*. This is the quarterly (since 2013) publication issued by the Faculty of Communication at the University of Navarra which has been active since 1988. It has been present in both ISI and Scopus since 2009. Unlike other publications which choose to translate their issues into English, this publication has some papers in Spanish and others in English within the same issue. We should note that its desire for an international presence has been its main mission from the start.
- *Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico* is the journal of the Department of Journalism I of the Complutense University of Madrid. Twice a year since 1994, it has published papers in Spanish (primarily), French and English. It and *Comunicación y Sociedad* are the only two university-based journals listed in ISI and Scopus.
- *El Profesional de la Información* is a publication on information, documentation librarianship and communication which was founded in 1992 with the name of *IWE (Information World en Español)*. It had English and Dutch owners until it moved to Barcelona in 1997 and adopted the name of *IWE – EPI*, even though it was run out of Holland. After many changes, in 2005 it became a fully Spanish

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<sup>1</sup> DICE is the acronym of Editorial Dissemination and Quality (*Difusión y Calidad Editorial*) of Spanish humanities, social sciences and legal journals, the database maintained by the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) which contains all the communication journals regardless of their activity and quality.

<sup>2</sup> IN-RECS is the database run by the EC3 group at the University of Granada which organises communication journals according to their number of citations. IN-RECS assigns the *journal-source* category to a publication not only because it receives a high number of national and international citations, also because it has high marks on an evaluation of the editorial process as well as a qualitative evaluation by researchers.

publication headquartered in Barcelona, although it was printed in Granada. Finally, everything moved to Barcelona, and this came with a surge in its international projection, which is reflected in its addition to the ISI and Scopus databases in 2006.

- *Revista Latina de Comunicacion Social*. This is an annual electronic journal founded in 1998 and issued by the Faculty of Information Sciences at the University of La Laguna. It is one of the longest-standing journals published on the Internet and has gone through three phases of growth and internationalisation, which has allowed it to be added to Scopus while also gaining outstanding marks in Spanish quality classifications.
- *Zer. Revista de Estudios de Comunicación* is the journal issued twice yearly by the Department of Communication and Social Sciences at the University of the Basque Country since 1996. It earns high marks in the Spanish classifications but is not present in international databases like ISI or Scopus.
- *Anàlisi* is a trimestral publication issued by the Autonomous University of Barcelona and the Open University of Catalonia that publishes scholarly papers in the field of the Communication Sciences. It got its start in 1980, and although it is one of the publications with the highest marks in Spain, it is not present in international databases.

After choosing the journals, the next step was to determine which papers to include in the study. Of the total sample, we eliminated those papers which did not fit the pattern of scholarly study. Specifically, this included book reviews, personal reflections and papers expressly excluded by their own publications, which were not considered in this study. Thus, the corpus of this study was 1,182 papers.

Each paper was individually studied by describing its author(s) in terms of geographic origin and institutional affiliation with the goal of precisely outlining the productivity and work alliances. The tallying process was supported by statistical analysis carried out with the help of the Microsoft® statistical package and the UCINET6 programme, complemented by the text by Bogartti, Everett and Freeman (2002).

### 3. Analysis

#### 3.1. Total productivity

##### 3.1.1. Catalonia

The results of the analysis of the data on total productivity show how the output is distributed in the different universities. Figure 1 shows how the three most productive Catalan universities are the UAB,<sup>3</sup> the UPF and the UAB, which appear in a total of 150 of the 176 papers which were signed exclusively in Catalonia during the period 2007-2011. The remaining 26 papers had authors


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<sup>3</sup> Table of acronyms of the universities included in this study which are not explicitly specified in this text.



either exclusively from the URL, the UVic, the URV, the UOC or the UIC, or were co-authored by professors within the same university or from these universities. Thirty-one more papers were authored by Catalans with alliances outside the Catalonia cluster, making a total of 207 papers in which at least one author is from Catalonia.

**Figure 1. Productivity of the Catalonia cluster**



This analysis enables us to sketch the working patterns which reveal the desire to seek openness, regardless of productivity. Even though its productivity is not very high, the URL does show a high output of papers signed jointly with other universities. All told there are 13 papers signed in this way, while 6 are signed either individually or with other authors from the URL. These 13 papers are distributed unevenly. Six are the outcome of joint efforts with the UPF, 2 with the URV and 5 comes from sole partnerships with the UIC, the UB, the UNAV, the UNEX (University of Extremadura) and the UOC. This interpretation could also extend to the UOC, although in a less obvious way, since it has a total of 8 papers with other universities compared to 11 authored within the UOC itself.


The analysis of universities with the highest volume of output shows how the UPF, the second-ranked Catalan university in terms of the number of papers published, has 33 papers co-authored with other universities, compared to 23 signed individually and only 10 with internal co-authors. Regarding the UB, it has numbers that concur with the hypothesis that the Catalonia cluster focuses on studies open to other universities compared to internal studies; however, the UAB's results do not seem to match this trend and show a total predominance of individual output compared to papers with external partners.

### 3.1.2. C. Madrid

The Community of Madrid cluster shows a similar structure to the Catalonia cluster in terms of productivity, as practically all its output comes from three universities, the UCM, the URJC and the UC3. In overall terms, the Madrid core

signed a total of 189 papers, and 8 of them come from studies performed by the UDM, UEM and UPOLM, either individually or with co-authors from the same university. We should note that we found no joint publications among the three least productive universities in this cluster. The overall interpretation of the Community of Madrid cluster yields a total of 239 papers in which at least one author is affiliated with a university in the Autonomous Community of Madrid.

**Figure 2. Productivity of the Community of Madrid cluster**



According to Figure 2, individual and internal work within the university is more common than openness to partnerships with other universities. In none of the universities, regardless of their overall productivity level, do external co-authorships exceed internal output. One noteworthy feature is that in the three leading universities, individual papers come first, following by external partnerships and finally internally co-authored papers.

### 3.2. Relative productivity

In order to complete the study on institutional productivity, we analysed the number of papers written at a given university – in sole authorship or shared internal or external authorship – in relation to the number of research staff members with permanent ties to the university.<sup>4</sup> This ratio (number of papers/number of tenured researchers) has the highest value at the UPF, at 1.74, followed by the UB at 1.48. It is interesting to note that the universities with the largest faculties (UAB and UCM) showed values of 1.01 and .097, respectively, that is, one paper per professor.


<sup>4</sup> To tally this, we considered the categories of career civil servant, tenured PhD professor and assistant professor, which is equivalent to a tenured PhD professor in Catalonia and the Basque country.

### 3.3. Regions associations within the clusters

#### 3.3.1. Catalonia

Figure 3 allows us to analyse all the collaborative interactions which have taken place during the period of the study within the Catalonia cluster. The activity represented provides a very clear picture of the policy of exchanges among universities. With the exception of the UIC, which has no papers co-authored within the cluster, as its only case of co-authorship is with Switzerland – the remaining universities clearly interact with each other. In this sense, the UPF has issued publications in conjunction with 6 other Catalan universities, followed by the URL with 5 other universities. The UAB has poorer results with the two kinds of partnerships. This corroborates the results of the volumes of productivity in co-authorship abroad.


**Figure 3. Description of institutional affinities within the Catalonia cluster**



#### 3.3.2. C. Madrid

Figure 4 shows the nodal distribution of all the partnerships among the universities in the Community of Madrid cluster during the period 2007-2011. The diagram shows that the number of partnerships was never higher than 3, while it also shows that the UCM served as a core, particularly fed by partnerships with the UC 3 and the URJC, which, in turn, only cooperated on one occasion. Regarding the UPOLM, none of its co-authored papers were signed in partnership with researchers from the same autonomous community.

**Figure 4. Nodal description of institutional affinities within the Community of Madrid cluster**




#### 3.4. Regions associations external to the clusters

The information collected shows the collaborative dynamics of the universities in both clusters in terms of their affinities beyond their corresponding autonomous communities.

##### 3.4.1. Catalonia

Catalan universities yielded the results shown in Figure 5. The figures reveal first a very low presence of papers coming from alliances between the Catalonia and Madrid clusters, and secondly the fact that in the universities with lower levels of co-authored scholarly output this output is not exclusively with other universities in Catalonia and instead there is a significant percentage that extends beyond the geographic boundaries of the Catalan cluster. In this sphere of analysis, the institutional dispersion factor is important when establishing alliances, that is, the number of different universities with which research projects have been signed. In this tally, the UPF is the institution that has co-authored papers with the highest number of different universities outside of Catalonia (10), followed by the UAB, the UB and the UOC, with 5 each.


**Figure 5. Regional distribution of external co-authorships in the Catalonia cluster**



#### 3.4.2. C. Madrid

The external co-authorships of the universities in the Madrid cluster are primarily with the rest of Spain. The UCM, the leader in terms of output, combines 3 co-authorships with Catalonia and 3 with countries outside of Spain, with a predominant presence of papers with the rest of Spain. It is interesting to note the figures for the UC3, which has no papers that were co-authored with the Catalonia cluster and no papers with international co-authors. Regarding institutional dispersion, the Madrid-based universities got high scores. The UCM, with 17 different institutions outside of its own autonomous community, is the university with the most alliances in Spain. The URJC and the UC3, with 11 and 10, respectively, follow it with figures similar to those obtained by the UPF in Catalonia.


**Figure 6. Regional distribution of external co-authorships in the Community of Madrid cluster**



*3.5. General schema*

An examination of the internal and external productivity of the clusters allows us to sketch a highly precise regional and institutional picture of the output of scholarly papers published in major communication journals. On the one hand, we should stress that in five years there were four papers between the two most productive clusters in Spain. These four papers correspond to the following partnerships: UPF and UCM, UPF and URJC, UCM and UB, and UCM and UAB. On the other hand, the Catalan cluster co-authored 19 papers with the rest of Spain, which account for fewer than half of the 41 that the cluster co-authored with the Autonomous Community of Madrid. Regarding the presence of papers with authors from outside of Spain, the Catalonia cluster co-authored a total of 8 papers, compared to 5 for the Madrid cluster. Figure 7 shows the information organised in a nodal fashion.

**Figure 7. Distribution of external co-authorships in the clusters**



#### 4. Conclusions and discussion

In absolute terms, the productivity between the two clusters is similar. The Catalan cluster published a total of 176 internal papers and 31 more with partnerships from outside its autonomous community. The Madrid cluster, which had 189 internal papers and 50 with external co-authors, ranked ahead of Catalonia in terms of overall productivity. The percentage analysis situates the Catalan cluster far from the Madrid cluster in terms of papers with partnerships from outside the cluster (14.9% compared to 20.9%). This fact, motivated in part by the higher population of universities within the Catalan cluster, should not blind us from a reflection on the need to forge even more international alliances.

In terms of the analysis of overall productivity, too, both clusters showed a high concentration in three universities: the UAB, the UPF and the UB in Catalonia, and the UCM, the URJC and the UC3 in the Community of Madrid. Despite this, this study has pointed to a difference in the way the two clusters work. The Catalan cluster shows a clear focus on working within the network, while the Community of Madrid cluster works more centred around the UCM. In any event, the influence of the distribution of universities, the geographic scope of each autonomous community and the number of universities should be taken into consideration before drawing any conclusions.

A third aspect shown by the figures refers to the relative productivity values. In this sense, the UPF's tally is notable (1.79 papers/researcher on a tenured contract) compared to that of the two largest universities in Spain, based on their tradition and volume of output. The UCM and the UAB show an approximate ratio of 1 paper/researcher. In order to truly see what this means, it is important to bear in mind that the study was performed over a 60-month period. This means that on average, a researcher with a tenured contract publishes one paper every 5 years, while at the UPF they do so every 2 years and 9 months. It is clear that the study does not consider publications in non-Spanish communication journals, yet nonetheless, the results do not show a high level of productivity if we bear in mind, for example, that a doctoral candidate who chooses to do their thesis as a compendium is required to publish 4 papers in 36 months (9 months per paper).

In terms of connections, we have already discussed that Catalonia shows a configuration more given to networking within its own cluster than the Community of Madrid. The overall internal analysis of this cluster in terms of the ratio between the number of different universities and the number of papers with external co-authorship shows that the URJC (0.67), the UCM (0.63) and the UAB (0.58) are the universities with the greatest collaborative variety, while the UC3 (0.57), the UB (0.56) and the UPF (0.49) and are the ones with the lowest variety. It is interesting to note that both the UPF and the UB are the universities that create the most connections within the Catalan cluster, which leads to the conclusion that both show high connectivity within Catalonia but a lack of collaborative variety outside of this autonomous community.

Without leaving this collaborative aspect behind, we should also note the considerable difference in the two clusters' connections with the rest of Spain. While the Catalonia cluster signed 19 papers with universities in the rest of

Spain – not counting the Community of Madrid – the Madrid cluster signed 41. This considerable difference could be attributed to a language issue, but this hypothesis does not make much sense if we look at the journals analysed. With the exception of *Anàlisi*, they are all in Spanish. Regarding authorships with universities from outside of Spain, the tendency is considerably lower, since the Catalonia cluster shows only 8 papers and the Community of Madrid cluster has just 5.

Finally, it is also important that only four papers were signed jointly by universities from the two clusters analysed: that is, Catalonia signed 1.9% of its papers with the Community of Madrid and the Community of Madrid signed 1.7% of its papers with Catalonia. This means that one of these papers was published every 15 months – on average – and reveals the fact that even though the two clusters are the home to the most productive universities in Spain, they are resistant to joining forces and instead prefer to seek other alliances.

Therefore, the Catalonia cluster seems to display nodal activity and internal connections that are clearly more active than the Community of Madrid cluster, while the Community of Madrid shows the same working paradigm when it is analysed within the framework of Spain as a whole. Outside the state borders, however, both of the most important production nuclei in Spain are at the very early stages of international alliances, which is further aggravated by the duplicated efforts generated by the weak and almost non-existent cooperation in the Catalonia-Madrid axis.

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## Philosophy of History as theodicy

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### Abstract

*Taking Adorno's critique of Hegel's Philosophy of History as point of departure, this paper: (1) sketches the general outlines of the modern Philosophy of History in order to (2) spotlight their commonalities and differences. Hegel's Philosophy of History (3) can be described by considering pain and the negative. It highlights these topics in a way that had never been done before, so it became a turning point, as revealed by the fact that he treated the Philosophy of History as theodicy. Despite his initial intention of carrying out theodicy, which Leibniz depicted in a metaphysical and abstract way, in the specific field of history, this intention was realised not in the Philosophy of History (it only conceptualises theodicy as viewed as a framework of meaning for action) but instead in the absolute spirit, in his reference to Christianity and specifically to incarnation and Christ's death.*

**Key words:** Hegel, Philosophy of History, theodicy

It is common knowledge that with his Philosophy of Universal History, Hegel explicitly set out to carry out Leibniz's programme of developing a theodicy freed from his metaphysical, abstract or indeterminate approach in the specific sphere of history. After outlining the general principle under which history must be considered, namely that it is governed by reason, *nous* or divine providence, he concludes that "our mode of treating the subject is, in this aspect, a theodicy – a justification of the ways of God – which Leibnitz attempted metaphysically in his method, i.e., in indefinite abstract categories, – so that the ill that is found in the World may be comprehended, and the thinking Spirit reconciled with the fact of the existence of evil. Indeed, nowhere is such a harmonising view more pressingly demanded than in Universal History." (Hegel, 1970: 48).

In this text, we shall examine the expression of Hegel's position with all its nuances, such that according to his assessment: 1) we shall begin by recalling the general outlines of the critique levelled by Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) against Hegel's Philosophy of History; 2) we shall recall the main lines of this

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philosophy in the modern age in order to situate Hegel's attempt to build his Philosophy of History as a theodicy within the tradition of the Philosophy of History; and finally 3) in conclusion we shall outline the features that distinguish Hegel's position and to what extent it is a theodicy.

### 1. Adorno's critique

Adorno's criticism of Hegel is far-reaching; it can be regarded as a correction of the entirety, albeit not without having combed through the philosophy he criticised and learned a lot from it, thus making his criticism even more piercing. Here, therefore, we cannot enter into this criticism in its entire breadth and depth; instead we shall limit ourselves to his criticism of the Philosophy of History meant as theodicy. Another exception is that here we take Adorno's position as typical of many others which are usually not as understanding of Hegel's philosophy which perhaps without even entering the letter and spirit of Hegel's Philosophy of History simply discredit it with the cliché that reduces it to exposing the triumphal march of reason and spirit in the world.

Adorno views Hegel's *Philosophy of Universal History* as an expression of the domain of the universal<sup>1</sup> (Adorno, 1970: 319, 304, 305) and of the thought of identity (308, 318). For this reason, he considers the *Philosophy of Law* and the *Philosophy of Universal History* as intertwined. With this union, he does justice to Hegel's approach, which indeed does make the *Philosophy of Universal History* the last chapter in his *Philosophy of Law*. His main thesis can be summarised by saying that "the cult of the world's course" (301), which the *Philosophy of Universal History* discusses, is nothing other than the reflection of the "violence of the universal" (304), of the "predominance of unity" (308) over individuals. In this sense, the meaning of the *Philosophy of Universal History* which comes to the fore is that history forms a continuous, unitary process aimed at a purpose, which is what unifies it and endows it with meaning. This purpose is freedom. History appears to us as progress: the process of the spirit "is essentially progress" (Hegel, 1970: 70).

This unitary and teleological process subsumes and absorbs individuals as the means to achieve the end sought. Not doing justice to the individual, to the private person, betrays the subject of the process (reason or the spirit) as a private individual: "What tolerates nothing particular is thus revealing itself as particularly dominant. The general reason that comes to prevail is already a restricted reason... [because]... it is imposed" (309). With this contrast, the presumed unity is revealed to be a split and reason is shown to be irrationalism (ibid).

This marginalisation of individuals is associated with the marginalisation of suffering, since it also becomes a mere instrument or necessary step to achieve the end; it becomes the negativity that the spirit must accept, but that in the process does not become something accidental: "the negativity of the world spirit becomes an accidental trifle" (298).

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<sup>1</sup> Curiously, this is the oft-repeated and not always well-grounded cliché from different perspectives, since such a varied range authors as K. R. Popper and K. Löwith concur on it (Bouton, 2004: 111 s.).

In any event, Adorno is aware that Hegel does not ignore suffering and negativity: “Hegel himself had conceived universal history as unified merely on account of its contradictions” (311). It is the same contradiction that lies within the conception of society, which “stays alive not despite its antagonism but by means of it” (312). What he criticises is that despite this, Hegel clings to the idea of continuity and unity. To Adorno, this continuity does not exist except on the technical plane, but not on the human plane: “No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb” (312). What is more, postulating this continuity and with it progress is “cynical”, since it means “say[ing] that a plan for a better world is manifested in history and unites it” (312). This assumption that all suffering is for a higher good is tantamount to reducing it to mere appearance, to a *quantité négligeable*, since by doing so he transfigured “the totality of historic suffering into the positivity of the self-realizing absolute”, through which this suffering is approved and justified, such that the totality “would teleologically be the absolute of suffering” (312). “The world spirit ... would have to be defined as permanent catastrophe” (312). With this, he is not rejecting the *Philosophy of Universal History* but more regarding it as a reflection that is not only possible but also necessary, but now on the conditions under which history, originally a process of progress, has inverted to become the opposite: regressive (Geyer, 1980). And thus concludes Adorno’s devastating critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Universal History*.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. The modern Philosophy of History

To calibrate the characteristics of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Universal History*, we should recall the general features of the Philosophy of History in modern times so it will be easier to see both the commonalities and differences.

The Philosophy of History is a typically modern and enlightened concept, created with the intention of affirming the domination of reason and man. It is a figure from modern thinking. The term was first used by Voltaire (1694-1778) in his work *Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations* (1756), and he devotes a work entitled *Philosophy of History* (1765) to this subject (Voltaire, 1990).<sup>3</sup> He wrote against or in contrast to the theology of history (and with the view of replacing it), as Bossuet had outlined in his work *Discourse on Universal History* (1681), which presents an updated version of the consideration of history as the history of salvation according to the Augustinian model.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the Philosophy of History was founded as a secular and secularising response to the theology of history, which claims that the principle that governs history is not God’s will or Providence but man’s will, actions and plans, and this gives

<sup>2</sup> Regarding the criticism of the Frankfurt School in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Universal History*, albeit expressed more according to Horkheimer’s thinking, see Schmidt (1976), Geyer (1980), the extensive, well-documented study by Zamora (1995), Schäfer (1996). Estrada (1996) examines the issue from this perspective.

<sup>3</sup> In any event, Voltaire cannot be regarded as a philosopher of history in its later sense; he offers instead a “philosophical history” (Dierese & Scholtz, 1974; Zamora, 1995: 56). The collective singular term “history” was forged at this time, leading history to be conceived as a totality, as shown by Koselleck (1967 & 1975); Baumgartner (1987).

<sup>4</sup> A brief survey of Bossuet’s theology of history can be found in Angehrn (1991).

expression to the enlightened faith in progress. With this, it became the adversary more than it sought to, since the progress of the human genus came to play the same role that Providence used to play, meaning that it would have to accept the weight of theodicy (Zamora, 1995).<sup>5</sup>

This connection in the birth of the Philosophy of History is not regarded as coincidental but is instead claimed by some to be the very fabric of the Philosophy of History, such that according to K. Löwith, for example, the “philosophy of history originates with the Hebrew and Christian faith in a fulfilment and...ends with the secularisation of its eschatological pattern” (Löwith, 1967: 11); that is, it ended with what should have served as an example. What causes its birth also caused its death.<sup>6</sup>

What is the Philosophy of History about? “The interpretation of History [that is, the Philosophy of History] is primarily and ultimately an attempt to understand the meaning of historical action and suffering” (Löwith, 1967: 13). Its theme is therefore the meaning of history, of all individual and collective human action in this undefined stream that is history, which in turn acts as a determinant of acting and suffering. This question about meaning emerges in light of the experience of non-meaning, in general, and especially in view of pain, as pain seems to be non-meaning par excellence. To confer meaning on the entire heterogeneous body of human action and suffering, the Philosophy of History starts with a general principle and bears it in mind when reading and interpreting history, such that the Philosophy of History is nothing other than “a systematic interpretation of universal history following the thread of a principle through which historical events and consequences are unified and directed toward an ultimate meaning” (Löwith, 1967: 11).

Modern Philosophy of History provides an optimistic, enlightened answer to the question of the meaning of history: the very trust in reason – which is the framework within which this philosophy operates – is reflected in the course of history, since it entails a constant strengthening of reason. In short, the meaning of history is progress, the progress of reason, of knowledge (versus obscurantism, ignorance and superstition) and of freedom (versus domination and slavery). By trusting in reason, triumph is assured. Reason is what detects the meaning of chance when the goal is to refute Providence, and it detects the meaning of regularity when the goal is to control the chaos in history. The concepts of labour and political economics play a crucial role in this effort. The idea of progress stems from the development of technology. Technology and its relationship with the principle of labour serve as mediators between nature and history which, in the realm of theory, would result in the

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<sup>5</sup> Regarding Voltaire’s philosophy of history, see Angehrn (1991: 69-71).

<sup>6</sup> This view of the philosophy of history as the secularisation of Christian eschatological thinking has been the target of numerous critiques from different points of view, which we shall not explore in depth in this paper. Historical thinking was forged not exactly because of the secularisation of eschatological thinking but because of early Christianity’s experience of the tardiness in the fulfilment of parusia, which had been expected as imminent, and with which the mediation of the Church appeared to span the abyss between the expected parusia and its failure to arrive immediately, thus instating time in its unity as history, in tension between what has already happened and what has not yet fully come to pass. According to this critique, historical consciousness did not emerge from the secularisation of eschatology but from the mundanisation of the Church. This is explained by Baumgartner (1987: 17).

establishment of a reciprocal relationship between the historicisation of nature and the naturalisation of history, and would thus contribute to making it plausible to think that real progress is necessary. Formulas within this train of thought can be found in the metaphors of the “fable of the bees” by Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733) and in the “invisible hand” coined by Adam Smith (1723-1790), which become the guiding ideas in the understanding of history (Zamora, 1995: 57).

In the *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Spirit* (1794) by the Marquis of Condorcet (1743-1794), we can see a paradigmatic outline of the Philosophy of History from the modern age. It includes the ideas of Voltaire and Turgot (1727-1781) (Turgot, 1991)<sup>7</sup> and is characterised by positing the indefinite growth in the sciences as a model of historical progress. After the explanation of a philosophical history, whose organising principle is progress in knowledge, the last chapter, entitled “The future progress of mankind”, outlines the concept of progress. This vision of the future is grounded upon the considerations of the past, and experience is used to predict the course of the future. The past has revealed the essence of history, just as by observing the facts of nature the physicist manages to learn about it. “The only basis for belief in the natural sciences is the idea that, whether we know them or not, the general laws governing the phenomena of the universe are necessary and constant. Why should this same principle be less true for the development of the intellectual and moral capacities of humankind than for other natural processes?” (Condorcet, 1980: 225) Because of his application of physics to history, called him the “Newton of history” (Löwith, 1973).

“Our hopes for the future condition of the human species can be reduced to three important points: the destruction of inequality among nations; the progress of equality within each people; and the real betterment of humankind” (Condorcet, 1980: 225). With this he lists the pathways along which progress shall unfold. At any rate, he soon makes the effort to nuance it: “It will therefore be necessary to show that these three kinds of real inequality must diminish continuously - without, however, being completely eliminated. For they have natural and necessary causes” (Condorcet, 1980: 230). What he stresses the most is “instruction”, because “well-organized instruction corrects the natural inequality in human capacities” (Condorcet, 1980: 234), and reveals it to be the engine that fuels progress, since through it mankind is perfected, and progress lies in the perfection of mankind.

Progress is based on a specific trait of mankind: human perfectibility, which means that man is constantly perfecting himself and he thus has been harnessing his possibilities and capacities throughout the course of history. The first explicit formulation of this principle comes from Condorcet: “The aim of the work that I have undertaken and its results will be to show by appealing to reason and fact that nature has set no term to the perfection of human faculties; that the perfectibility of man is truly indefinite; and that the progress of this perfectibility, from now on words independent of any power that might wish to halt it, has no other limits than the duration of the globe upon which nature has cast us” (Condorcet, 1980: 82).

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<sup>7</sup> Turgot’s decisive contribution could be considered the extension of the idea of progress to all fields: to the experimental and applied sciences, to language, to the mechanical and fine arts, to politics and to society; see Angehrn (1991).

As can be seen, history is linear progress based on nature which also unfolds naturally, even though it requires man's action, which helps in the unfolding of the natural process. Here we are quite far from glimpsing any even vague consideration of pain, and even less of theodicy.

Herder (1744-1803), too, offers a view of history with a somewhat ingenuous and objective feel, à la Condorcet. In *Another Philosophy of History* (1774) he describes the development of history following the phases of human biography: childhood, youth and adulthood, but as a process aimed at the goal of the realisation of human perfection, of full humanity. Only once, in order to expose the inexorable and necessary nature of the process, does he mention pain, by stating that "the course of Providence goes to its goal even over millions of corpses," (Herder, 1983: 147). This unitary, teleological view of history would later be fleshed out in his work *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man* (1784-91), in which he prioritises the diversity of nations and cultures to spotlight simultaneity above the idea of progress (Herder, 1959).

Similarly, Kant (1724-1804) establishes the first principle of the philosophy of history as a general principle, namely that: "All natural capacities of a creature are destined to evolve completely to their natural end" (Kant, 1975: 35). This principle allows us to glimpse how nature does not frustrate us or let us down; what is sown germinates, grows and ripens. Therefore, this is also the statement of a teleological meaning of nature, which is extended to the teleology of history and confirms optimism in the course of history.

However, the question soon arises: in whom and when does this "complete and adequate" development of "all natural capacities" happen? The second principle answers it: "In man (as the only rational creature on earth) those natural capacities which are directed to the use of his reason are to be fully developed only in the race, not in the individual" (Kant, 1975: 35); that is, the capacities of man, which point to the use of reason, achieve the full development not of the individual but of the race, throughout history. In the explanation of this development of mankind's capacities throughout history, a factor that includes negativity or pain enters the equation. Indeed, according to the fourth principle, "The means employed by Nature to bring about the development of all the capacities of men is their antagonism in society, so far as this is, in the end, the cause of a lawful order among men", which is nothing other than "the unsocial sociability of men, i.e., their propensity to enter into society, bound together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society" (Kant, 1975: 37). Therefore, Kant begins by considering evil, but without it in any way darkening his enlightened, optimistic vision, and he only considers it "the means" through which positive effects are yielded for historical development as a whole.

With this we have formulated the *underpinning*, the reason why there is history, why man develops in history: man is essentially a perfectible being; he is equipped with capacities that can and should be used. Secondly, we have formulated the *goal* of history: perfection and the realisation of mankind's essence and potentialities, especially reason and freedom, which are the human traits, the achievement of full humanity as a quality of man, reason and freedom. And thirdly, we have identified the *subject* of history: the human race or humanity, not individuals. Therefore, the *meaning* of history consists of



progress towards the goal of the full realisation of humanity, the development of reason and the realisation of freedom.<sup>8</sup>

This progressive, optimistic vision of history can be regarded as culminating in the vision offered by Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805). In his text "What Is, and to What End Do We Study, Universal History?" (1789), he claims: "History, like the Homeric Zeus, looks down with the same cheerful countenance upon the bloody works of war and upon peaceful peoples that innocently nourish themselves upon the milk of their herds. However lawlessly the freedom of man may seem to operate upon the course of the world, she gazes calmly at the confused spectacle; for her far-reaching eye discovers even from a distance where this seemingly lawless freedom is led by the cord of necessity" (Schiller, 1969: 159). Schiller begins by mentioning "the bloody works of war", but he suggests an Olympic view of it, like that of "Homeric Zeus", because from a distance he sees the goal towards which everything is headed "by the cord of necessity", and this sparks in her a "cheerful countenance". We would be unable to find a greater contrast with the view of history proposed by Adorno and by Walter Benjamin before him.

### 3. Hegel's philosophy of universal history

With these schematic lines from the modern Philosophy of History as the background, we can now try to sketch Hegel's vision of it and compare and contrast them, outlining some continuities and divergences.

#### 3.1. *"The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom"*

Hegel, too, views history as progress.<sup>9</sup> This is perhaps the most important shared feature with the typically modern view which sometimes leads them to be equated with each other. Hegel views progress as the difference between the changes that happen in the natural order and the spiritual order. "The changes that take place in Nature ... exhibit only a perpetually self-repeating cycle; in Nature there happens 'nothing new under the sun'" (Hegel, 1970: 149). In contrast, "only in those changes which take place in the region of Spirit does anything new arise" (Hegel, 1970: 149). The possibility that something new might arise is due to the fact that there is another determination in mankind unlike natural things, and it is none other than "an impulse of perfectibility" (Hegel, 1970: 149). Therefore, at first it may seem as though Hegel shares the modern, enlightened view by adopting its concepts to explain that the spirit

<sup>8</sup> These elements can also be found in Hegel's Philosophy of University History, albeit transformed because of his receptiveness to and transformation of Kantian philosophy. Horstmann (1982) studies the evolution of the conception of history in Hegel and summarises it by three milestones. This evolution can be explained by Hegel's clash with Kant; the Kantian conception of history is characterised by: 1) getting to know the subject of history, namely nature; 2) assuming that we cannot know this subject agent; 3) the purpose that nature pursues in history is the perfect political constitution. Hegel accepts 1 and 3 but is opposed to 2 with the transformation of nature into spirit.

<sup>9</sup> Riedel (1982) views Hegel's Philosophy of History as a theory of progress; unlike his predecessors, he avoids antinomies precisely thanks to the concept of the spirit, which joins immanent need with exterior reference, with data.

becomes what it is or unfolds in history. However, he soon adds a significant nuance: “Perfectibility indeed is almost as indefinite a term as mutability in general; it is without scope or goal...: the improved, more perfect, state of things towards which it professedly tends is altogether undetermined” (Hegel, 1970: 149 and forward).<sup>10</sup>

And here we come upon a difference. Hegel may connect with the modern view, but he determines it and gives it a goal and a purpose that comes from the very concept of the spirit.<sup>11</sup> The spirit wishes to attain a “conception of itself” (Hegel, 1970: 152). With this, progress not only achieves a goal to which change is geared, but it also loses its indefinite nature in terms of both the goal and the content that should be developed in history. Progress ends when the concept is attained, when it is fulfilled (Amengual, 1998: 89). Thanks to this determination, progress also takes on a more specific content: “The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom” (Hegel, 1970: 63). The goal of progress is not to reduce human capacities (skills) in general to perfection but specifically the capacity for reason; it refers to the realisation of the spirit. Thus, the criterion of progress takes on a much broader and more radical dimension, and, in the development of universal history, it takes on a clearly ethical and political dimension.<sup>12</sup> This ethical dimension is not isolated from the others; to the contrary, it assumes religious progress in the sense that this consciousness of freedom was born through Christianity (Hegel: 1970: 62 and forward) and in turn entails progress in other spheres,<sup>13</sup> such as the sciences and arts, industry and commerce, social and political relations, etc.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>10</sup> “The representation of the education of the human race (Lessing) is spiritual, but it only barely touches on the topic we are examining here. In these representations, progress generally has a quantitative form. Ever more knowledge, more refined culture: pure comparisons; we could speak at length about this without indicating any determination or expressing anything qualitative” (Hegel, 1970: 150).

<sup>11</sup> In fact, Hegel (1970: 504) expresses approval of both the idea of perfectibility and the education of the human race, since those who confirmed them “have sensed something of the nature of the spirit, of its nature”, and yet for those who reject it, the spirit is “an empty word” and history is “a superficial play of ambitions, of the so-called human passions”.

<sup>12</sup> In this, too, Hegel faithfully follows Kant, who considers “a society in which freedom under external laws is associated in the highest degree with irresistible power, i.e., a perfectly just civic constitution, is the highest problem Nature assigns to the human race; for Nature can achieve her other purposes for mankind only upon the solution and completion of this assignment” (Kant, 1975: 45). To Hegel, as well, the purpose of the universal history is to establish a post-revolutionary state (Siep, 1995).

<sup>13</sup> According to Jaeschke (1996), there is incoherency between this vision of history, close to the spirit, which Hegel never manages to fully develop, and his *Philosophy of Universal History*, which is reduced to the history of states, so Hegel is simultaneously the one who discovers history, wraps it in his *Philosophy of Universal History*, and then forgets the concept of history that should be that should be exposed at the start of the philosophy of the spirit, since it is its proper sphere.

<sup>14</sup> Hegel particularly outlines this congeniality of all the cultural forms of spheres from the same period as expressions of the same spirit (Hegel, 1970: 120-138) in *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, when he speaks about the historical nature of philosophy. His argumentation can be summarised precisely by the fact that since the spirit is the subject of history, this subject shall be presented differently depending on the philosophical view of history, such as if history is universal (political), or about art, religion or philosophy. But regardless, the spirit is what unfolds throughout history, and each period and each people is an expression of it. It is the same

Progress in freedom is necessary precisely because it is based not on nature but on the spirit, on its concept. “According to this abstract definition it may be said of Universal History, that it is the exhibition of Spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially” (Hegel, 1970: 61 and forward). The acquisition of this knowledge is not theoretical; instead the spirit gradually acquires it as it objectivises its essence, freedom, such that it can then gain consciousness as a subject, as something external that is there. Progress in the consciousness of freedom assumes the realisation and objectivisation of freedom, such that the spirit can gain consciousness of itself by means of this objectivisation. It is natural for the spirit to unfold, to bring to reality and action the self-knowledge is it made of while also gaining consciousness of itself in its objectivisable unfolding, in the objective realisation through which “the world of the spirit takes place in itself as second nature”. “The essential nature of freedom - which involves absolute necessity – is to be displayed as coming to a consciousness of itself (for it is in its very nature self-consciousness) and thereby realising its existence. Itself is its own object of attainment, and the sole aim of Spirit” (Hegel, 1970: 63 and forward). The statement that “The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom”, continues by saying, “a progress whose development according to the necessity of its nature, it is our business to investigate” (Hegel, 1970: 63). The need for progress is nothing other than the fact that the spirit must realise itself, must be unfolded according to its concept of being-at-work (Hegel; 1970: 50 and forward).<sup>15</sup>

### *3.2. Turning point: View of affliction and indignation in history*

After these observations on the approach that Hegel shares with modernity with certain nuances, namely the conception of history as the necessary progress towards the goal of freedom, when reading his lessons on the Philosophy of Universal History we can immediately notice certain traits that signal a turning point, such as his consideration of evil and pain.<sup>16</sup> No matter how much everything is ultimately justified as a means to an end, we cannot ignore the setbacks or pain that permeate history. His perspective on history is not an Olympian view à la Schiller but an afflicted one because of the spectacle of pain it affords. Similar to Kant’s style, Hegel, too, points to something natural, namely desires and needs, as the engine of history. “The first glance at History convinces us that the actions of men proceed from their needs, their passions,

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figure of the spirit that unfolds in the different spheres of human activity: constitutions and forms of government, ethics, social life, skills, mores and customs, art and science, religion, relations with other states, industry and commerce, etc. (Hegel, 1966: 38). For this reason, Jaeschke (1996), accurately observes that Hegel reveals historicity, history itself, the history of the spirit, in his methodological reflections on the history of philosophy.

<sup>15</sup> Regarding history viewed from the concept of the spirit, see Hesse (1998). This equation between spirit and history had already been noted by Theunissen (1970).

<sup>16</sup> When considering the common point of departure of the philosophies of history from German idealism, which is nothing other than the history of Kantian reason, Baumgartner (1987: 4) notes that compared to the others, Hegel shows a “greater proximity to historical reality” based on the fact “that Hegel articulates in an essentially more acute way the negative driving moment, or negativity, and in this way despite the general process of ascent and progress, at the same time he can diagnose moments of decline and make them understandable”.

their characters and talents; and impresses us with the belief that such needs, passions and interests are the sole springs of action — the efficient agents in this scene of activity” (Hegel: 1970: 79).

In this vision of history, all virtues are dispelled since “private aims, and the satisfaction of selfish desires, are on the other hand, most effective springs of action. Their power lies in the fact that they respect none of the limitations which justice and morality would impose on them; and that these natural impulses have a more direct influence over man than the artificial and tedious discipline that tends to order and self-restraint, law and morality” (Hegel: 1970: 79). This dimension of history is neither glorified nor justified, nor can it be. “When we look at this display of passions, and the consequences of their violence; the Unreason which is associated not only with them, but even with good designs and righteous aims; when we see the evil, the vice, the ruin that has befallen the most flourishing kingdoms which the mind of man ever created, ... a moral embitterment — a revolt of the Good Spirit (if it have a place within us) may well be the result of our reflections” (Hegel, 1970: 79 and forward). Regardless of the progress in the consciousness of freedom, history does not thus become progress in happiness; instead “the History of the World is not the theatre of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it” (Hegel, 1970: 92). There is certainly satisfaction in history, but it is not what is called happiness; instead it is the satisfaction of certain ends which are above individual ends.

Hegel does not eliminate the entire mass of pain in history by rationalising it; to the contrary, he takes it so seriously that he ineluctably poses the need for a reconciliation, and not just any reconciliation, but the kind effected by God, which is externalised and enters human history in order to overcome what is negative. This knowledge of reconciliation is theodicy, which takes place in the process of history. For this reason, if the process of history is universal judgement, it is not a vengeful judgement but a conciliatory one (Jüngel, 2001: 25).

With this we encounter the uniqueness in Hegel’s conception of history. First, Hegel claims that judgement does not take place at every moment and in every individual (as in Schiller’s poem *Resignation* [1983]), nor does it take place within consciousness (as in Kant) but instead in the course and progress of history, from one moment to the next, from the current era to the next one. In this way, it turns out first that the judgement judges, discerns and assesses what has a future, that is, freedom, that which serves freedom. And secondly, this conception of judgement is stripped of any moralising dimension (Jüngel, 2001: 27). Yet this equation of judgement with the process of history poses serious difficulties. Unlike the Christian conception of reconciliation, which in itself refers to eschatological fulfilment and is a reconciliation with God despite the negative aspects of the world, Hegel’s conception is characterised by these two particularities: it is a reconciliation in the present and with what is negative, not with God. To Hegel, therefore, neither God the judge nor personal responsibility before God has a place in history.

To calibrate even further what this justice consists of which discerns what serves freedom, especially in its political realisation, we should bear in mind that this judgement is the reason in history, but not the reason of history (Jaeschke, 1996: 370). That is, it does not mean that history (or the winners in

history) are always right, but that history is inhabited by reason, which exercises as such, that is, as a guide for human actions. This does justify not everything that helps a presumptive or perhaps planned end (even if it is a collectively planned end, or even politically planned by the state) but freedom, nor does it exclude actions that are contrary to the end, or backward movements. What is more, this presence of reason in history is the assumption upon which the Philosophy of History is based, the one on which it must be based, but its job consists of showing it within the specific course of history. The need for this principle as the point of departure is justified by comparing it with the way the natural sciences operate: “The investigator must be familiar *a priori* (if we like to call it so), with the whole circle of conceptions to which the principles in question belong — just as Kepler ... must have been familiar *a priori* with ellipses, with cubes and squares, and with ideas of their relations before he could discover, from the empirical data, those immortal ‘Laws’ of his, which are none other than forms of thought pertaining to those classes of conceptions” (Hegel, 1970: 168). “To him who looks upon the world rationally, the world in its turn, presents a rational aspect. The relation is mutual” (Hegel, 1970: 31)<sup>17</sup>.

### 3.3. Dialectical view: The astuteness of reason

These considerations which we have just made based on noting the vast amount of pain in history were based simply on the “first glance” (*nächste Ansicht*) (Hegel: 1970: 79). Certainly this first glance is not the last one, or the right one. Indeed, the right one knows how to look beyond those natural motives; it has an endless vision like that of the secret chamber (Hegel, 1952) with the contemplation of the passions and ambitions of the individual protagonists of history. Reason knows how to discover a meaning in this disastrous, pain-filled history. However, integrating evil, as Hegel does, does not consist of painting it as the shadows that contribute to enhancing the light of the whole, as the typically modern argumentation goes (Hügli, 1980),<sup>18</sup> nor does it consist of integrating it as a means or necessary step for our good, according to the truism that all growth involves pain. Hegel precisely thinks that the means are so closely bound to the end that the end cannot be achieved with means that contradict it.<sup>19</sup> The use of means is the fulfilment of the end. The dialectical vision of history that Hegel proposes consists more of the consideration that everything, both good and evil, passions and virtues, is the means, the fibres with which the spirit ultimately weaves the process of its realisation.<sup>20</sup>

This vision of history as a process of the realisation of the spirit is radically asserted by unity and global nature, such that what it becomes is its action, the immanent action that includes all levels and spheres. The spirit is not

<sup>17</sup> Regarding Hegel’s concept of history which joins empirical data and principles *a priori*, see Álvarez Gómez (1980).

<sup>18</sup> René Descartes (1977: 51) claimed this clearly: “But I cannot therefore deny that there may in some way be more perfection in the universe as a whole because some of its parts are not immune from error, while others are immune, than there would be if all parts were exactly alike”. Spinoza (1632-1677) radicalised this principle by stating that we cannot even speak about errors (Spinoza, 2000: 185).

<sup>19</sup> Regarding the relationship between the means and the end, see Hegel (1971).

<sup>20</sup> This dialectical conception of history has been outlined by Álvarez Gómez (2004).

a thing that emerges from a natural substance or not; rather it only reflects the rising ability of beings, who are always naturally situated but pursue a collective way of life that is regulated by rules, and that also recognises and fosters autonomy. In this way, all events, phases, nations and cultures, actions and suffering a part of the same process aimed at a single end.

This convergence of subjective, private ends with the universal end of the spirit is what Hegel called the “astuteness of reason”, which has sparked countless interpretations as well as many misunderstandings. Let us first recall the place and specific meaning of this expression and then examine its meaning within the Philosophy of History.

The place of the astuteness of reason is teleology within the logic of the concept. In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel explains astuteness as the power or violence that man exerts over an object to turn it into a means; it consists of the fact that the end “throws itself in the first place immediately upon the object, which it appropriates to itself as a Means; just as it also determines another object through it, it can be considered *power (Gewalt)*, in that the end has a nature very different to that of the object [...]. Nonetheless, the fact that the end is in a *mediated* relationship with the object and *interferes between it* and another object can be regarded as the astuteness of reason.” (Hegel, 1969: 180). As can be seen, the *astuteness* consists of not directly instrumentalising the object but doing so through another object which acts as a means. Rationality lies in this mediation (Jaeschke, 1996). In any event, it is about finite purposes and ends. How can this model be transposed to history? Certainly only through a transformation (Jaeschke, 1996) precisely because history is not about finite ends, such as satisfying primary needs. Let us see, then, in what respects the model is transformed.

First, a disclaimer that affects Hegel’s vision of history and any other vision: History is never the result of the conscious action of individuals, not even if we believe that everything that happens is the outcome of human action. There are other crucial forces and powers in history, or the confluence of these forces and powers, which escape the action of individuals. And yet, the fact that history is the result of conscious action can only be formulated as a desire, exigency or postulate. Seeing the course of history as a whole, the view that some individuals have acted as a means for its specific development should come as no surprise, and therefore they are the means history has used to unfold itself (Jaeschke, 1996).

Secondly, precisely in the Philosophy of Universal History, if on the one hand we can find statements, following what we have said above, which claim that individuals are the means for the spirit’s realisation in history, in this same context Hegel makes his own considerations about individuals as ends in themselves (Jaeschke, 1996). He thus states about laws and principles: “Of themselves they are powerless. The motive power that puts them in operation, and gives them determinate existence, is the need, instinct, inclination, and passion of man. That some conception of mine should be developed into act and existence, is my earnest desire: I wish to assert my personality in connection with it: I wish to be satisfied by its execution. If I am to exert myself for any object, it must in some way or other be *my* object. In the accomplishment of such or such designs I must at the same time find *my* satisfaction; although the purpose for which I exert myself includes a complication of results, many of

which have no interest for me. This is the absolute right of personal existence — to find *itself* satisfied in its activity and labour.” (Hegel, 1970: 82)<sup>21</sup> In this sense, it should be asserted that in both the *Philosophy of Law* and the *Philosophy of History*, Hegel maintains that the individual should never be used solely as a means as a categorical Kantian principle imperative.

Thirdly, the relationship between the means and the end, as we have seen, is internal, according to Hegel, never purely external, such that the end is carried out by use of the means. Therefore, when it is said that individuals serve the realisation of the universal end of reason, this is not an external end, but instead they realise their own ends by realising this universal end. And this is also asserted as their right. The universal end cannot be an end that does away with individuals in order to be realised; rather it must encompass them. This means that the universal also includes particular ends and this is how it becomes universal.

Fourthly, dealing now more directly with the meaning of the expression “astuteness of reason” (Jaeschke, 1996), it refers to the relationship between the object which has become a means and the end which it serves. Seen in this light, this expression cannot be used to explain history, since history has no object which could become a means for the end of history. In history it is a sort of mediation between the concept of history and the particular facts and events that the historian is viewing, or, more specifically, the relationship among different ends. Indeed, what the “astuteness of reason” aims to explain is the problem of the relationship between the end of the spirit of the world and the ends of individuals; between the universal, unconscious end and the particular, conscious ends of individuals. With this, it aims simply to explain and thus to show some connection between events in order to interpret the course of history as progress. The spirit of the world is not a yet another individual subject that enters into conflict or competition with individuals. The problem that Hegel tries to explain with this is the same one that Kant explained with his “intention of nature”. Ultimately, their aim is to explain why historical processes, unlike natural processes, irreversibly head towards an end, an orientation that can be explained not as the outcome of divergent individual ends but instead, from the outset, as the universal end or an internal logic. Hegel’s interpretation of history works with the distinction of two ends which are not mutually opposed to each other but instead operate at different levels. “The spirit of the world” is not an actor the way individuals are. The universal end of the spirit is not the same as the particular ends of individuals, which are formulated independently of those of the spirit of the world. Therefore, the “‘astuteness of reason’ consists precisely of the fact that the “spirit of the world” lets individuals pursue their own finite ends – unconcerned about their universal end, about which they are oblivious – and of the fact that despite everything [the spirit of the world] achieves its universal end through the mediation of individuals’ particular ends” (Jaeschke, 1996).

Fifthly, in this way Hegel can fully claim the individuality of individual agent subjects who are guided by their own interests, passions and needs, and thus contribute to the end of history (Jaeschke, 1996). In the course of history, not only is there “the infinite right of the subject [...]to find *itself* satisfied in its

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<sup>21</sup> This right was formulated by Hegel in FD §§ 123-124, pp. 230-236 (Amengual, 2001).

activity and labour” (Hegel, 1970: 82), but also, with that, it contributes to the universal end since “nothing great in the World has been accomplished without passion” (Hegel, 1970: 85).<sup>22</sup> Hegel is aware of the gulf separating particular and universal ends, and he does not deal with this idealistically, assuming, for example, that history is moved by ideas or ideals, as if individuals were seeking to achieve the universal end of the spirit; rather he does so very realistically by stating that individuals seek their own particular interests and seek to satisfy their interests and needs. Hegel explains the course of history, which wends its way towards the realisation of the universal end of the spirit, by the concept of the spirit, which is an activity oriented at itself, and specifically at self-knowledge. This activity does not take place at a higher level, above or beyond finite individuals; rather it also entails their knowledge, their will and their action, even if it happens without the knowledge of the actors in history – at least at first. “The History of the World begins with its general aim – the realisation of the Idea of Spirit – only in an *implicit* form (*an sich*) that is, as Nature; a hidden, most profoundly hidden, unconscious instinct; and the whole process of History (as already observed), is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one. Thus appearing in the form of merely natural existence, natural will – that which has been called the subjective side – physical craving, instinct, passion, private interest, as also opinion and subjective conception – spontaneously present themselves at the very commencement. This vast congeries of volitions, interests and activities, constitute the instruments and means of the World-Spirit for attaining its object; bringing it to consciousness, and realising it.” (Hegel, 1970: 86 and forward).

In short, reconciliation “can be attained only by recognising the positive existence, in which that negative element is a subordinate, and vanquished nullity” (Hegel, 1970: 48). Specifically, this knowledge consists of two sides: “the ultimate design of the World must be perceived; and, on the other hand, the fact that this design has been actually realised in it, and that evil has not been able permanently to assert a competing position” (Hegel, 1970: 48).<sup>23</sup> With this, Hegel not only proposes a reconciliation in knowledge but also suggests that it take place in history at the level of the objective spirit. In fact, this removes the theological dimension which the word and the project of theodicy embodied, such that the reconciliation with the divine is not with God personally but with the spirit, which happens in the sphere of actions, customs and institutions, whose action and knowledge are aimed at freedom (Jaeschke, 2003).

### 3.4. *The vision of history as a guide for action*

Because of its systematic place, at the end of the objective spirit or the philosophy of law, the Philosophy of Universal History takes on a peculiar meaning simply in that it is part of ethics in a broad sense, of the objective realisation of the spirit, which implies that it ultimately aims to say something

<sup>22</sup> This claim can also be found in Hegel (1969: 383).

<sup>23</sup> Here we can find the only place where suffering, according to Adorno’s expression, can be viewed as “trifling” when stating: “This reconciliation can be achieved only through knowledge of the affirmative, in which the negative disappears as something subordinate and overcome”.



about human action, define its meaning and framework of expectations and, in short, the ends and motives for this action. This aspect has been highlighted by E. Angehrn, who stresses the role played by historical-universal individuals in the Philosophy of Universal History and shows how in them history becomes, even if unconsciously, the guide for action. And precisely because what is worthwhile is action in history and in its universal individuals, this action requires an orientation that history itself does not have, so he points to a higher level, that of the absolute spirit, which reveals what the concept of freedom means. For this reason, the Philosophy of Universal History is the conclusion of the objective spirit and the step towards the absolute spirit (Angehrn, 1981; Riedel, 1982).

However, if we take the concept of objective spirit in the sense of the human self-understanding that the human community tries to carry out in its relationships and institutions, then as it unfolds in history, the objective spirit serves the purpose of guiding the action and cooperation of individuals and communities. Seen from this perspective, “Hegel’s Philosophy of History is critical with all metaphysical eschatology, and also with any prognosis of progress which aims to be more than momentary guidance to guide action” (Stekeler-Weithofer, 2002: 141). In this sense, Hegel does not make a theodicy but instead makes theodicy a concept: his theodicy is not a question of belief or disbelief in God; the justification of God does not constitute the belief in God but “it has an explanatory meaning relative to practice. Whoever wonders about a ‘theodicy’ [...] is more seeking a specific horizon of expectations that opens up proper ways of life”.<sup>24</sup> This conception of theodicy very strongly accentuates Hegel’s idea that history is the process of self-realisation of the spirit, meant as freedom and, in response it frees this concept from all theological references.<sup>25</sup> Giving it freedom as the goal and its realisation in law, Hegel makes his thinking Kantian in that the “justification of Nature – or, better, of Providence – is no unimportant reason for choosing a standpoint toward world history. For what is the good of esteeming the majesty and wisdom of Creation in the realm of brute nature and of recommending that we contemplate it, if that part of the great stage of supreme wisdom which contains the purpose of all the others – the history of mankind – must remain an unceasing reproach to it? If we are forced to turn our eyes from it in disgust, doubting that we can ever find a perfectly rational purpose in it and hoping for that only in another world?” (Kant, 1975: 49). From this same perspective, Hegel transforms Leibniz’s theodicy, redirecting it at the course of history as a course aimed at freedom, and with it at the ethical realisation of the spirit, yet while trimming it back, at least usually or for the time being, to the theological dimension.

### *3.5. Contemplation of expiration*

Another feature of Hegel’s vision of history, which also stems from its systematic place, shows that not only evil and pain contribute to the fact that it is an afflicted vision, but so does the expired nature of history. History appears

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<sup>24</sup> He mentions Marquard (1990) in favour of the dissociation between the problem of suffering and the justification of God.

<sup>25</sup> Affirming the theological dimension inherent to history, as the realisation of the spirit, see Theunissen (1987, 1991, 2001).

not as the field of victory but as the field of fleeting, perishable things, as the succession of empires and cultures which, after they manage to blossom and take off completely, wilt and disappear. In fact, “the march of history” comes in stages,<sup>26</sup> each of which features a State, a culture which disappears once it has made its contribution to history (Hegel, 1970: 155 and forward). “When we contemplate the evil, the wickedness, the decline of the most flourishing nations mankind has produced, we can only be filled with grief for all that has come to nothing. Since this decline and fall is not the work of mere nature but of the human will, our reflection may well lead us to moral sadness, a revolt of our good spirit [...]” (Hegel, 1970: 79 and forward). We then feel the profoundest and most hopeless sadness, counter-balanced by no consoling outcome, against which we want to defend ourselves or from which we want to emerge, thinking that things are like that, fate, there is nothing to be done, we cannot change anything.

This vision of the expiration of history is reinforced if we bear in mind the parallelism which can be found between the Philosophy of History, which culminates the revelation of the objective spirit, and the concept of species, which culminates the philosophy of nature.<sup>27</sup> Hegel establishes this parallelism in his Heidelberg lessons on the *Enciclopedia* (1817); it thus appears in his explanatory notes in §448 of the first edition of the *Enciclopedia* (which corresponds to §548 of the third edition). The parallelism lies in the fact that just as animals disappear in their individuality and thus give life to species so that they themselves enter the universality of the species by extinguishing their individuality, so certain spirits of people also disappear and give life to universal history, such that they thus reveal their limitations and the fact that their self-sufficiency is subordinate and they enter the general history of the world, whose events reveal the dialectic of the particular spirits of the peoples. Hegel places the parallelism between the organic and the historic process of the species, in the sense that “just as in the organic process of the species with respect to individuals [they find in it] their loftiest universal essence – reconciliation – formally” (Hegel, 1973: 205). Just as the species shows the particularity and expiration of animals, universal history shows the particularity and expiration of peoples, nations, States, empires and cultures.

#### 4. Conclusion

The idea of progress has been characterised as the last great myth of modernity: the myth of the progress of knowledge, of reason, of freedom or of emancipation. Of all the myths of modernity – which can still be said in the plural; they are all contained in each one, and in this sense the plurality does not break with monomythism – the most successful one, the primary, core and final one according to Marquard is “the myth of the unstoppable progress of universal history towards freedom under the banner of the philosophy of the history of revolutionary emancipation” (Marquard, 1981: 99).

<sup>26</sup> Hegel (1970: 155-157, 242-257) mentions four “realms” (the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman and the Germanic), while Hegel (1970: 61-64) only discusses three and omits the Roman realm; on this issue see Mayos Solsona (1990).

<sup>27</sup> Peperzak (1992) has drawn attention to and studied this parallelism.

This idea is the one that has become virtually wholly bankrupted in the 20<sup>th</sup> century; its failure and falseness have been revealed. Even though Hegel is unquestionably part of modernity, albeit with critics, he also draws from the belief in the myth of progress, also with critics. Specifically, the myth is broken by suffering, by physical and moral evil, by the expiration of what the spirit produces. In this sense, in Hegel we can witness a turning point, since in him the Philosophy of History is indeed posited as a theodicy, and this clearly means consciousness of the role played in it by evil and pain, that is, in the development of reason and in the realisation of the spirit. He begins to grapple with the problem, even though ultimately he still offers the theoretical, modern solution: a higher rational meaning justifies pain and negativity in general. The theodicy concludes and can be summarised in the “conciliatory consciousness”, for which “the thinking Spirit reconciled with the fact of the existence of evil” (Hegel, 1970: 48).

Hegel’s approach appears permeated by a twofold aporia, which becomes evident in his very interpretations of the Philosophy of History. The first aporia consists first in the fact that, as an outline of the process of the realisation of the spirit, universal history is progress in the consciousness of freedom, in which everything is integrated into and part of the same process that forms the spirit. In this respect, Hegel’s Philosophy of Universal History goes beyond the modern because it is more radical and far-reaching. In contrast, if it is only regarded as the political history of states, in that they are the political realisation of freedom, this excludes three spheres which are essential for the modern Philosophy of History, namely: 1) progress in man’s intellectual capacities and with it advances in the sciences and technology; 2) moral progress; and 3) the progress of happiness (Hegel, 1970: 92; Jaeschke, 1996: 369). This aporia can be expressed through the dilemma of whether the Philosophy of History is indeed the philosophy of history and, therefore, the history of the self-realisation of the spirit, or whether it is simply the Philosophy of Universal History meant as the history of the political realisation of freedom, of its recognition within the structures of the state.

The second aporia stems from the breadth with which the concept of spirit is understood. If we understand it in all its breadth (subjective, objective and absolute), then, at least as the point of transition from the objective to the absolute, it refers to the theological dimension, and thus the Philosophy of Universal History is indeed a theodicy, if not in itself at least for what it points to: the fullest realisation of the spirit as the absolute spirit. In contrast, if it is only viewed as the last chapter in the objective spirit, then it is not a theodicy but instead points to the concept of theodicy, in the sense of turning it into the instance of meaning for action. In this case, the Philosophy of Universal History simply offers clues to help us discover the meaning of human action and suffering (Stekeler-Weithofer, 2002).

This second aporia points to the clarification of the unknown. The requirement, which Hegel accepted, that his Philosophy of Universal History should be theodicy is not fulfilled in this philosophy but in the absolute spirit and specifically in the moment when “the *universal* substance effectively realised from its abstraction until *singular* self-awareness is exposed as an *assumption*, and self-consciousness, as *immediately identical* to the essence, exposes that *Son* of the eternal sphere transferred to temporality, and there it

exposes evil as overcome *in itself*; [...] dying in the pain of *negativity*”,<sup>28</sup> that is, at the time of the reconciliation realised by the Incarnation and the Cross of the Son of God, Christ. In this way, in the philosophy of the absolute spirit, and specifically in the philosophy of religion revealed and consummated, reconciliation takes place and with it the theodicy is fulfilled. Therefore, here is where we get a precise answer to the question about the meaning of history. Indeed, by presenting it as progress in the consciousness of freedom, progress in the ever more universal recognition of man, offering with this a framework of meaning for human action and suffering (the concept of theodicy), the question of whether there was room for recognition of the victims (if this concept of theodicy was fulfilled) remains unanswered. Here we can finally find this recognition. And Hegel thus concurs with Walter Benjamin’s vision that in order to do justice to victims, a theological vision of history is needed, or at least a metaphysical vision. Hegel has a metaphysics and theology of history in which the spirit, in its temporal realisation, loses nothing, nothing is left to oblivion or annihilation but instead everything contributes to the realisation of its essence, namely freedom in the sense of “the universal substance”. God has introduced human evil and pain into history and with it has taken on this entire mass of pain and has reconciled it with himself (Ottman, 1996).

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<sup>28</sup> See the commentary by Theunissen (1987: 274-290).

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## **Formation and evolution of ethnic enclaves in Catalonia before and during the economic crisis<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

*The spatial settlement of the immigrant population has become a reality, and the economic crisis has further deepened our interest in the concentration levels of immigrants. In this sense, the establishment of ethnic enclaves, defined as residential areas with a significant representation of one or more foreign populations, has become a subject of particular attention in the academic and political sphere. However, there are currently few studies that have quantitatively examined the establishment and evolution of these enclaves. Through the implementation of a residential classification method that allows us to take the census tract as the unit of analysis, we aim to inventory the different types of residential spaces and explain the basic demographics of their residents, in particular for the inhabitants of the 48 census tracts that could be considered ethnic enclaves in 2011. In them, we evaluate the trend in degrees of residential exclusivity for all settlement areas before and during the economic crisis.*

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**Key words:** Immigrant population, Catalonia, settlement, ethnic enclaves, economic crisis

### **1. Introduction: The debate on segregation in Catalonia**

Along with the fear of denationalisation, one of the concerns about whether the immigrant population in Catalonia is integrating or not has been segregation. The confluence of residential and work segregation has been viewed as the prime factors hindering knowledge of Catalan initially and later, and more generally, the possibilities of establishing exchanges and integrating with the non-immigrant population. These concerns have existed since the days of the first wave of immigration in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which culminated with the crisis of 1929 and the Spanish Civil War (Vandellós, 1935), as well as in the second wave during the 1960s, which ended with the oil crisis in the mid-1970s (Solé, 1982).

There are major differences between the migrants who came from the rest of Spain during the first three-quarters of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the current international migration, which culminated with the boom in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which was, in turn, truncated by the economic crisis which started to be felt after 2008. However, the debate on the pros and cons of residential segregation seems to continue intact, despite the fact that we have to admit that the negative factors seem to be gaining on the positive ones in the final accounting. Yet this debate is occurring not only in Catalonia. Internationally, estimates of the consequences of segregation also continue to fluctuate among authors who believe that it is an obstacle to integration (Fortuijn et al., 1998) and those, albeit fewer, who state that concentrations of immigrants in the territory should be considered a first step in settlement which allows them to retain their networks of proximity and socialisation, which are especially useful in times of crisis, even though inequalities do persist (Finney & Simpson, 2009; Musterd, 2011). Even today, the voluntary or involuntary nature of concentration continues to be one of the core issues in this debate (Peach, 1996).

What seems clear is that the spatial concentration of immigrant populations is a shared feature in the majority of countries (Hirschman, 1983). This phenomenon is rooted in the processes of spatial differentiation inherent to the urban economy (price of housing and accessibility to transport, for example). It is further reinforced by chain migrations (Mac Donald & Mac Donald, 1964), which encompass both family migrations that lead to the reunification of common-law or legal families and migrations assisted by friends or acquaintances (social network), as well as internal migrations of this population subgroup, which is recognised to engage in internal mobility more often than the local population (Rogers & Henning, 1999; Finney & Simpson, 2008), especially during the first few years after arrival, as a result of what is called *the residential adjustment process* (Nogle, 1994; Recaño & Domingo, 2006; Viruela Martínez, 2010).

Even though there is a large number of studies that analyse the territorial distribution of the foreign population in Catalonia (Bayona, 2007; Martori & Hoberg, 2012; Bayona & López-Gay, 2011; Sabater et al., 2012; etc.), and

qualitative studies of ethnicity-based concentrations have been performed, especially in what is called the *ethnic business* (Moreras, 2002; Solé et al., 2007; Arjona & Checa, 2009), ethnic enclaves have not yet been studied from the quantitative standpoint for Catalonia as a whole, with the exception of one study conducted by the Barcelona Metropolitan Area (Martori & Apparicio, 2011). We still do not know how many enclaves there are, what their population composition is and where they are located. Our goal is to help to close this information gap, and we shall do so in three directions: first, by typologically defining ethnic enclaves and their location based on the available data (from 2000 to 2011), secondly by analysing their formation and evolution, and thirdly by studying the socio-demographic characteristics of the people living there.

## **2. Statistical sources and methodology: How we can define an ethnic enclave using the available data**

The initial methodological challenges we faced were choosing what territorial scale we would use and then defining the ethnic enclaves themselves with the constraints imposed by the existing statistical sources.

### *2.1. Geographical scale, changing geographies and other biases*

In a study of this kind, the choice of geographical scale is not a minor matter. However, and perhaps more importantly, the major problem is due to changing geographies over time. Let us start with scale issue. It is well-established that the degree of concentration of a population in a territory tends to increase or be diluted according to the size of the area being measured. Given the lack of a standardised spatial unit designed so that the relevant organisation can perform statistical analyses, we have decided to use the smallest spatial disaggregation available to us: the census tract based on the continuous population censuses. This allows us to compare all the municipalities in Catalonia, and it contains information on the sex, age and place of birth of the inhabitants. The main scale disadvantage is that the area of the census tract is highly variable and can cover a block of buildings, as in many areas within the city of Barcelona, or up to 300 km<sup>2</sup>, as in one of the six tracts in the town of Tremp, in Lleida province. This disparity not only introduces a bias due to the different size of census tracts but also makes difficult to provide meaningful cartographic representations.

As mentioned earlier, the issue of changing geographies is of special concern. For example, we find that Catalonia was divided into 5,207 tracts in 2000, while in 2010 the number of tracts had dropped to 5,019, after having reached a peak of 5,410 in 2008 (Table 1 in the Appendix). This variability is the outcome of the administrative nature of the census tract, whose purpose is to keep track of the electors for the different elections. Directly related to this major disadvantage is the bias produced by the changing number of inhabitants in each tract. Even though the mean stipulated by electoral law is 1,500 people, this number refers to voters, meaning that residents with foreign nationality who do not have the right to participate at least in the municipal elections are excluded from the calculations. It is important to note, however, that 61% of the census tracts have between 1,000 and 2,000 inhabitants. Another important disadvantage is the way census tracts are delineated, which may divide historical neighbourhoods in some towns where the foreign population tends to

congregate because of the characteristics of the housing market, leading to both over- and under-estimations in spatial concentration and residential segregation of the immigrant population.

Of all of these difficulties, changing geographies and census tract delineation are the most worrisome ones, although the biases produced by each problem have not quantified yet. The variability in the number of census tracts within the same municipality can seriously distort our understanding of the evolution of ethnic enclaves. This is the case of the city of Barcelona, where from 1,582 in 2000 and 1,585 in 2001, number of census tracts dropped to 1,491 in 2002 and 2003 and later from 1,484 to 1,482 during the period 2004-2009. Since 2010, the city has been divided into 1,061 tracts. This decision – which is administratively justified because it best reflects the reality of the neighbourhoods (Barcelona Town Hall, 2010), which were blurred by the census division – makes it virtually impossible to reconstruct the distribution of the inhabitants by place of birth among the different territorial divisions. Finally, it is crucial to highlight that census tracts do not reflect ‘real’ neighbourhoods and, therefore, the estimates provided should always be regarded as a proxy for small (but not functional) areas.

## 2.2. *Regarding the definition of ethnic enclave*

We do not have a canonical definition that allows us to issue a semantic and quantitative definition of *ethnic enclave*. Regarding the semantic aspects of the word *enclave*, the dictionary of the Institut d’Estudis Catalans says that it is a “territory situated within another territory with different geographic, administrative or political features”. By extension, if we add the adjective *ethnic* to the noun, it is understood that the differences in this territory nestled within another are precisely the ethnic features of its population. This leads us to a second problem: how do we define *ethnic categories*, given that there is no statistic in either Catalonia or Spain that captures this characteristic, either by self-definition or by the interviewer’s determination? Bearing in mind this limitation, we define ethnic as the characteristics that people born in the same country or group of countries might have, with the awareness that this may be an overgeneralisation, since ethnicity can be defined by linguistic and/or cultural affinities and that oftentimes, but not always, an ethnic group is accentuated by the phenotypic similarity of its members. We have chosen the *place of birth* variable instead of the *nationality* variable with the purpose of providing statistical visibility to people who have become Spanish nationals over the course of this decade. This methodological decision was taken both because of the importance of the flow of immigrants from Latin American countries and because of this group’s ease in securing nationality. We are aware, however, that this leads to a bias that affects our results, primarily in terms of whether it refers to children of immigrants born in Spain, which means underestimations of a given group’s proportion of the population when they have had children in Spain, most likely the groups of individuals who have been settled here the longest time or who have the highest birth rate. Secondly, we divided the population according to place of birth and grouped together the home regions

(born in Spain, Latin America, Western Europe,<sup>2</sup> Eastern Europe,<sup>3</sup> Africa and Asia), with the awareness, too, that working with such broad categories blurs the socio-demographic particularities of groups with a strong presence in Catalonia, such as those born in Morocco compared to the other groups of people born in other African countries.

In the migratory reality of our country, the type of ethnic enclave applied to the census tracts matches the classification developed by Johnston, Forrest and Poulsen (2002) for English cities. This typology has previously been used to analyse the transformation of the residential spaces in Spain (Sabater et al., 2013), as well as to pinpoint the zones with the highest concentration of foreign-born people living in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area (Martori Cañas & Apparicio, 2011). In our case, we discriminated between seven kinds of residential areas depending on the percentage of local population and the composition of the foreign-born population living in each place. We call the points where the local population is the majority – born in Spain – *majority communities* and we distinguish two kinds. We call the places where they are not the majority *minority or ethnic enclaves*, and we distinguish five kinds. Thus, the majority communities include:

1. *Homogeneous majority communities*, where the population born in Spain accounts for 80% or more of the total population, while one or more groups of foreigners by region of birth form a minority within all the inhabitants of the same area.

2. *Non-homogeneous majority communities*, where the population born in Spain accounts for 50% to 79% of the total, while one or more groups form a significant minority within all the inhabitants of the same area.

Where the population born in Spain is not the majority, we can talk about *minority or ethnic enclaves*, which we divide into five types:

1. *Type-A plural enclaves*, where the population born in Spain still accounts for 30% to 49% of the population, and one or more groups of immigrants account for at least 20% of the total population, but none of them reaches more than 60% of the total population within the area.

2. *Type-B plural enclaves*. Just as in Type-A plural enclaves, the population born in Spain still accounts for 30% to 49% of the population, but no one group accounts for 20% of the total.

3. *Mixed enclaves*, where the population born in Spain is less significant within the population as a whole (less than 30%), while one or more groups form the bulk of the total yet without polarisation; that is, no group accounts for more than 60% of the total population within the same area.

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<sup>2</sup> Western Europe includes: Germany, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malta, Monaco, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Vatican City.

<sup>3</sup> Eastern Europe includes: Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Ukraine and Cyprus.

4. *Polarised enclaves*, where one immigrant group accounts for at least 60% of the total population in the area, and this group also has a significant presence in other census tracts.


5. *Exclusive enclaves* (some authors identify them as ghettos given the high concentration and segregation that characterise them), which simultaneously fulfil two criteria: the existence of polarisation (a group of foreigners which account for more than 60% of the total population) and a population group (higher than 30%) which lives in the same area, in our case, the municipality to which the census tract belongs.

### 3. Location of ethnic enclaves in Catalonia

Currently, there are few ethnic enclaves in Catalonia. According to our definition of ethnic enclave, in the 2011 census tract we could only find 16 municipalities in all of Catalonia which had one, a mere 1.7% of the 947 municipalities in Catalonia. All of the 48 census tracts that can be defined as ethnic enclaves (out of a total of 5,019) are what we have called *plural enclaves*; that is, even though the foreign-born population is in the majority, they have a lower concentration of foreign inhabitants – between 50% and 70% of the total population. Of these tracts, 43 can be defined as Type-A enclaves – a single group accounts for between 20% and 60% of the population in the census tract – while five can be defined as Type B – where no single immigrant group reaches 20% of the total population of the tract. In other words, the distribution of the foreign-born population, despite the high percentages it has reached in the past decade compared to the population born in Spain, is characterised by a spatial distribution that resembles that of the local population, with moderate concentration levels. In terms of type of residence, this translates into a scarcity of ethnic enclaves, although we accept the possibility of underestimation, as mentioned above (in terms of both the total number of enclaves and the degree of concentration). Seventy-one percent of the 5,019 census tracts in 2011 corresponded to homogenous majority communities where the population born in Spain accounts for more than 80% of the registered population, while 27.7% are non-homogenous majority communities, where between 50% and 80% of the population was born in Spain.


Where are these enclaves located? If we compare the percentage distribution of all the people born abroad on a municipal level with the location of the municipalities according to the presence of non-homogenous majority communities and enclaves in Catalonia in 2011 (Maps 1 and 2), we can see that half of the 16 municipalities with ethnic enclaves are concentrated in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. On the level of census tract, this percentage rises to 66.6%, since we can find 18 ethnic enclaves in the municipality of Barcelona alone, six in Santa Coloma de Gramenet, three in L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, one in Badalona, one in Mataró, one in Montornès del Vallès and one in Terrassa.

**Map 1. Proportion of the registered population born outside Spain on a municipal scale (Catalonia 2011)**



Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).

**Map 2. Municipalities according to the presence of majority communities, non-homogeneous majority communities and ethnic enclaves (Catalonia 2011)**



Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).

As could be expected for Catalonia as a whole, the five municipalities with the highest proportion of foreign residents – Castelló d'Empúries (48.6%), Guissona (46.4%), Lloret de Mar (43.4%), Salou (39.6%) and Salt (38.2%) – are indeed the homes to the ethnic enclaves, but with very different casuistics, even for those that share structural features, such as the prominence of the tourism industry. Thus, we find that two of the four census tracts in Castelló d'Empúries are ethnic enclaves, and they contain two-thirds of the entire population (11,885 people in 2011). In Lloret de Mar, a municipality with 14 census tracts, four of them are ethnic enclaves (two Type A and two Type B), and their population accounts for 36% of the total (40,282 people). In Salou, two of the eleven tracts can be considered ethnic enclaves; 7,800 people (29.8% of the total) live in these two tracts. Within this same typology is the town of Roses, 34% of whose residents are foreign-born, with one ethnic enclave among its eleven tracts. On the other hand is the case of Guissona, where both the recruitment of foreign workers for the food transformation industry and the supply of housing for these workers by their employer mean that one of the three tracts in the town, in



which 2,300 of the 6,500 residents live, can be classified as an enclave. On a larger scale, the importance of the meat industry has affected the fact that the ethnic enclave where the African-born population accounts for 45% of the total is located in Vic. Finally, the town with the highest proportion of foreign-born residents, and with a strictly residential profile unlike the other towns analysed, is Salt, which has four tracts out of a total of 16 that can be considered ethnic enclaves, which are the home to one-third of all residents in the town (10,259 people).

In the case of Barcelona, a municipality with 1,061 tracts which has the highest number of ethnic enclaves per census tract, we can nonetheless see that 15 of the 18 are concentrated in a single neighbourhood: El Raval (which encompasses a total of 20 census tracts). If we add to them the population living in the two tracts located in the Gothic Quarter plus the one tract in Sant Pere, we get a total of 41,300 people living in ethnic enclaves, which accounts for a mere 2.5% of the city's total population (1,615,452 people). On a different scale, Lleida and Figueres share their status as capitals of their respective *comarques* (and Lleida is also a provincial capital), but both only have one census tract which could be classified as an ethnic enclave. In the case of Lleida, of the 29,000 foreigners living in the city, 4.5% live in an enclave tract. In Figueres, 9.7% of the 13,000 foreign residents in 2011 lived in the only ethnic enclave in the city.

#### 4. Formation and evolution of ethnic enclaves

Before embarking upon a tentative description, we should note that the lack of census-tract level data on births and mobility severely constrains our analysis. This would allow us to disentangle whether the formation and evolution of ethnic enclaves is mostly due to natural change or (internal and international) migration. Nonetheless, due to the recentness of immigration, it is safe to expect that most spatial patterns related to the arrival of migrants, including the formation of ethnic enclaves in Catalonia, have mostly been guided by the migration component and, more recently, their growth in situ. Other non-demographic effects such as their legal recognition and the effect of the economic recession are pivotal to understanding the settlement dynamics over time. In recent years, for example, a great deal of attention has been paid to the impact of the crisis spatially depending on the individual characteristics (e.g. place of origin, age, sex) and the destination/ place of residence.

First, let us examine the impact that the laws may have had on the figures on the immigrant population. Taking 2000 as the start of our observation, it should come as no surprise that in 2005 the effects of normalisation<sup>4</sup> led to an increase in the number of people registered in the municipal censuses; therefore, this may cause variations in the ratio of population by place of birth in some of the census tracts. Indeed, some of them show more than 50% of the population born abroad, which might be counted as an "enclave". This may well be the case of Mataró, Terrassa, Lleida and the first enclaves recorded in Salt and Santa Coloma de Gramenet, for example. Seventeen percent of the 48

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<sup>4</sup> By "normalisation" we mean the regularisation of the status of foreigners living on Spanish soil without residence and work permits enacted by the socialist government led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

census tracts classified as ethnic enclaves appeared as such in 2005. In these cases, the census tract must surely have been an ethnic enclave previously, but the residents' failure to register in the municipal censuses prevented them from being identified. This might be the case of the only census tract in Lleida, in which 56.5% of its residents were suddenly born abroad in 2005. Only the town of Castelló d'Empúries shows an ethnic enclave from the start of the period, the first group of which was made up of people born in Western European countries; this lasted until 2011 despite the division of the tract in 2006. The emergence of enclaves in different municipalities around Catalonia in 2006, such as the first one recorded in L'Hospitalet de Llobregat, where the prime place of birth of those born outside Spain is Latin America, or in Salou, where Africa is the leading continental region of birth, and the growth in the percentage of those which had formed in 2005, such as in Mataró and Santa Coloma de Gramenet, can also be explained by the laws, bearing in mind the rise in family reunification which came in the two years after the 2005 normalisation, since one year of continuous legal residency was required in order to reunite.

However, regardless of the largest continental contingent of people born abroad, twelve of the enclaves appeared as late as 2008, that is, dovetailing with the onset of the economic crisis. This can be explained by the swiftness of the spread of the immigrant population around Catalonia during the migratory boom. Even though the population growth was exceptional because of the volume of newcomers, their internal mobility and dispersed settlement patterns may explain why the majority of enclaves appeared precisely at the same time as the shift in migratory flows. We might believe that a peak of saturation had been caused by the maximum immigration figures reached in 2007, but we should also bear in mind another important phenomenon besides the dispersion of the immigrant population: the more notable loss in the Spanish-born population living in the census tracts which became ethnic enclaves. It is difficult to distinguish to what extent this reduction is due simply to the chain of residential vacancies that the real estate bubble accelerated, whether it comes from the flight of the local population precisely due to the increase in the immigrant population in the shared census tract (Frey, 1979), or whether is due to both aspects at the same time.

Following this criterion on the twofold evolution of the population living in the census tract that would become an ethnic enclave by place of birth, we have isolated three main patterns. First, some towns have undergone a process of ethnic population replacement. Secondly, some have experienced heavy population growth primarily due to foreign-born residents (with a drop in the Spanish-born population). And third, some towns have experienced growth due to residents born both outside and inside Spain, but with very different paces and population distributions. Finally, the recent trend of concentration or de-concentration is related to the origin of the majority group in the census tract, as we shall see. In this sense, we could assume different responses to the economic crisis, as some groups show a greater tendency towards mobility than others.

#### *4.1. Ethnic replacement*



To illustrate the municipalities which have undergone a process of ethnic replacement, that is, municipalities where the number of inhabitants did not

vary excessively between 2000 and 2011 but where the number of persons born outside Spain did and consequently the number who were born here declined, let us take two examples, both from the Barcelona Metropolitan Area: Santa Coloma de Gramenet and L'Hospitalet de Llobregat. As we shall see, the change in population composition also includes the different groups of people born outside Spain.

On the one hand, Santa Coloma de Gramenet had 99 census tracts throughout the period, with a total population of over 117,000 people in 2000 and 120,000 in 2011. What changed considerably over these 12 years is the composition of its population and consequently the residential distribution within the municipality. First, between 2000 and 2011 the city lost around 21,000 people born in Spain, but it gained 25,000 people born abroad, although we should bear in mind that some of those born in Spain were the descendants of the foreign-born population and that the composition the latter also varied by origin (from the prevalence of people born in Africa before 2004 to those born in Latin America and Asia after that). These changes led to a transformation in the city's residential composition. While in 2000 it was exclusively made up of homogenous majority communities, they accounted for only 44% of the total in 2011, giving way instead to the proliferation of both non-homogeneous majority communities and six plural Type-A enclaves.

Even though people born in Latin America became the most numerous group in the city in 2004, within the ethnic enclave tracts, the first of which appeared in 2005, those born in Asia were the majority. As Graph 1 illustrates, the tendency within the six tracts is towards greater concentration, except in the oldest tract, where the loss of Asians, Latin Americans and Africans in 2011 led to a drop in the percentage of foreigners compared to 2010.


**Graph 1. Evolution of the residential concentration on the census-tract scale (Santa Coloma de Gramenet 2000-2011)**




Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).

Even though the number of inhabitants in L'Hospitalet de Llobregat is almost double that of Santa Coloma de Gramenet (from 241,000 people in 2000 to 256,000 in 2011), it can also be considered an example of population replacement in terms of its composition. While the number of census tracts remained steady (226), just as in Santa Coloma de Gramenet what changed was the composition of its population and in consequence the distribution of residential composition. This city lost a total of 42,000 people born in Spain during the period 2000-2011, while the gain in the foreign-born population was 56,000, three-fourths of whom were born in Latin America. Here, too, we find a city composed exclusively of homogeneous majority communities in 2000 (Graph 2), which began to disappear in favour of non-homogenous communities after 2002, which accounted for 61% of the total by 2011. What is more, during this period, up to five enclaves appeared, only three of which met the requirement of having less than 50% of the population born in Spain in 2011. For all of them, the tendency is clearly towards deconcentration spurred by the decline in the number of Latin Americans.

**Graph 2. Evolution of the residential concentration on the census-tract scale (l'Hospitalet de Llobregat 2000-2011)**







Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).

#### 4.2. Growth due to the foreign-born population

We have taken the towns of Salt in El Gironès and Vic in Osona as our representatives of the second kind of municipality according to the evolution in the population composition by place of birth. Specifically, these towns have experienced steep growth in the number of inhabitants due primarily to foreign-born residents.

Salt, which added a census tract in 2006, increasing from 15 to 16, also lost Spanish-born residents between 2000 and 2011, but in this case the losses (1,960 people) were more than offset by the gains in the number of foreign-born residents (10,300 people). Thus, the total population rose from 22,000 to 30,000 inhabitants. In this municipality, the main immigrant groups throughout the entire period were those born in Africa (from 900 to 7,400 inhabitants), followed later by those born in Latin America (from 150 to 2,500 people). On the other hand, the evolution in the percentage of people born abroad who live in the four ethnic enclave tracts in the town of Salt allows us to perceive the plausible effects of the economic crisis through the decline in the foreign-born population (or perhaps their relocation to other tracts). Thus, in three of the four enclaves, 2009 signalled a turning point in the previous trend towards greater concentration (Graph 3), primarily caused by the decrease in the number of people born in Africa and Latin America and, to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe. Even though the number of Asian-born residents was small in these tracts (between 50 and 100 people), it nonetheless rose during this period, despite the aforementioned overall loss in foreign population.


**Graph 3. Evolution of the residential concentration on the census-tract scale (Salt 2000-2011)**




Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).

In the case of Vic, a town where the number of census tracts rose from 22 in 2000 to 23 between 2001 and 2006 and to 26 between 2007 and 2011, the Spanish-born population experienced slight growth (from 29,700 to 31,100) between 2000 and 2011. In contrast, the foreign-born population, with a rise of 8,000 people, is chiefly behind the total growth of 9,300 people, as well as the change in the composition by residential type, with the appearance of non-homogeneous majority communities and an ethnic enclave. In this town, people born in Africa led the growth in the foreign-born population, reaching 5,000 people in 2011, followed by Latin America (2,200 people) and Asia (1,170 people). Regarding the evolution in the percentage of foreigners living in the ethnic enclave tract, the first thing we should note is that the decline since 2007 came from the increase in the number of census tracts. Here we can also observe how 2009 signalled a turning point after which the tract lost foreigners from all the continental groups.

**Graph 4. Evolution of the residential concentration on the census-tract scale (Vic 2000-2011)**









Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).

#### 4.3. Growth due to both the local Spanish-born population and the foreign-born population

We can find the oldest ethnic enclave of those we have identified in the municipality of Castelló d'Empúries in the Alt Empordà. In tract 003, which lies within district 01, the number of foreign-born residents had been more than 50% of the total population since 2000, with a clear pre-eminence of Eastern Europeans (Graph 5). The population growth in this tract made it necessary to divide it in 2006. Thus, the city went from having three to four census tracts. What is more, the most recent tract (01-004) was "born" as an ethnic enclave. The town's total population went from 6,200 people in 2000 to almost 12,000 in 2011. This growth was caused by the steady increase in not only the foreign-born population throughout the entire period but also in the Spanish-born population. In this sense, the decline in the relative proportion of people born outside Spain in both ethnic enclave tracts is the outcome of this twofold process: first, the growth in the number of people born in Spain and secondly the loss of foreign residents from all groups, except those born in Eastern Europe, since 2009.


**Graph 5. Evolution of the residential concentration on the census-tract scale (Castelló d’Empúries 2000-2011)**




Source: Authors’ own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d’Habitants, INE).

The town of Lloret de Mar, also in the Alt Empordà, underwent even greater changes in terms of both its division into census tracts (from 10 to 14) and the composition of its population. At the beginning of the period, the number of residents was around 20,000 people, 13% of whom had been born abroad, with Western Europeans accounting for almost one-half (45%) of this sub-group. In 2011, the total population of the town reached 40,000 people. The cause for this spectacular growth was primarily people born in Spain, with 5,000 more than in 2000, but even more importantly people born abroad, whose numbers had risen by 15,000. Furthermore, the majority presence of residents born in Western Europe had been replaced by Eastern Europeans and Latin Americans, in addition to growth in the number of Africans and Asians living in the town. These population transformations led to the disappearance of homogeneous majority communities and the appearance of four ethnic enclaves – two Type A and two Type B (Graph 6). These four tracts kept moving towards increased concentration, primarily because of the increase in the number of residents born in Eastern Europe, as well as in both Africa and Asia. Regarding the population born in Latin America, 2009 signalled a turning point after which the numbers dropped in both the four ethnic enclave tracts and the town as a whole.

**Graph 6. Evolution of the residential concentration on the census-tract scale (Lloret de Mar 2000-2011)**





Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).


## 5. Demographic features of the people living in the enclaves

In terms of population, we can see that 4.6% of the 1,322,566 born abroad and residing in Catalonia in 2011 lived in some kind of ethnic enclave, and only 0.75% of those born in Spain (Table 2 in the Appendix). If we break this percentage down by continental origins, we can find on the one extreme Latin Americans, the most numerous group (523,844 people), with more than 2.4% of their population living in enclaves, and on the other extreme the Asian-born population, the least numerous group (136,070 people), with 13% of their population living in these enclaves. In the middle are the Western and Eastern Europeans – both with 4.3% of their populations living in ethnic enclaves, and the population born in Africa, with 5.2% of their 297,000 total population living in ethnic enclaves.

To capture the diversity of demographic profiles of the people who live together in ethnic enclaves, owing to space limitations, here we shall limit ourselves to presenting the basic traits, namely sex and age, of the main populations registered as residing in the 15 ethnic enclaves in the city of Barcelona located in El Raval neighbourhood. The sum of these census tracts is what makes this entire neighbourhood an ethnic enclave. The three leading nationalities found there, except Spanish, are Philippine, Pakistani and Bangladeshi, meaning that this neighbourhood is a reference for those populations living in Barcelona (even though some of members of these groups live in the census tracts of other neighbourhoods).

In 2011, the tracts that could be regarded as enclaves accounted for 1.4% of the 1,061 tracts comprising the city. A total of 35,591 people lived in these plural Type-A enclaves (2.2% of the total population), 57.4% of whom were born abroad. If we examine the structure of the local and foreign-born population living in all the ethnic enclaves in El Raval by sex and age (Figure 1), the first thing that stands out is the ageing of the former compared to the latter. We should recall that we are working with the population by place of birth, which explains matters such as the fact that at the base of the pyramid the percentage of people born in Spain is disproportionately large for a population which, as mentioned above, is ageing; this is due to the children of immigrants born in Spain, many of whom were quite likely born in El Raval neighbourhood. In relative terms, Spanish-born residents of El Raval account for 1.2% of the total population registered in the city (1,273,594 people); their mean age is 43.6 years old – which would rise if we subtracted the children of immigrants – and their masculinity index is 97.7 men for every 100 women. Even though the brief space we have requires us to summarise the features of the 15 enclaves, we should note that diversity is one of their most salient features: diversity both in their countries of birth (130) and in the proportion of sexes and ages between the population born in Spain and born abroad. Despite this, for the whole, we can first highlight the age difference between the immigrants and locals: the 20,424 foreign-born people who live in enclaves account for 5.8% of the total foreign population (341,854 people). Furthermore, these immigrants' interest in insertion in the job market is clear if we look at both mean age (34.4 years old) and composition by origin, where the Philippines (4,639 people) is the leading country of birth, followed by Pakistan (4,562 people) and Bangladesh (1,396 people). Secondly, we can find a higher presence of men among natives of other countries, which can be explained by the massive presence of people born in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. Thus, for the foreign population as a whole, there are 144 men for every 100 women.


**Figure 1. Superimposed pyramids of the populations born in Spain and abroad living in the ethnic enclaves in El Raval neighbourhood (municipality of Barcelona 2011).**



Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).


When we break down the foreign population into its three major components (born in the Philippines, Pakistan and Bangladesh; Figures 2, 3 and 4), the picture changes considerably. On the one hand, we can see a higher presence of women among the Philippine natives (with a masculinity index of 74 men for every 100 women), as well as the heavily male composition of the Pakistani (405 men for every 100 women) and Bangladeshi (445 men for every 100 women) contingents. On the other hand, we can also see the higher mean age among the Philippine natives (37.4 years old) compared to their counterparts from Pakistan (31.8 years old) and Bangladesh (29.1 years old). With the data available to us, it is impossible to disentangle among the Spanish-born population under the age of 18 those who are the children of unions among the first three nationalities analysed, even though the more family-oriented and older Philippine settlement makes it a candidate for the circumstance that a higher proportion of these minors have parents born in the Philippines.

**Figure 2. Pyramid of the population born in the Philippines living in the ethnic enclaves in El Raval neighbourhood (municipality of Barcelona 2011).**




Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).

**Figure 3. Pyramid of the population born in the Pakistan living in the ethnic enclaves in El Raval neighbourhood (municipality of Barcelona 2011).**



Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).

**Figure 4. Pyramid of the population born in the Bangladesh living in the ethnic enclaves in El Raval neighbourhood (municipality of Barcelona 2011). (municipi de Barcelona 2011)**



Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).

## 6. Conclusions

Based on this initial examination of the formation and evolution of ethnic enclaves in Catalonia, we can extract a few tentative conclusions. Even though, as noted above, the kind of information available means that we end up underestimating the concentration of the immigrant population and therefore the number of ethnic enclaves, they are extraordinarily rare in the country as a whole. This relative scarcity and the low concentration of those that do exist compared to other autonomous communities around Spain – such as Valencia, where there were 74 ethnic enclaves in 2011 (Domingo et al., 2013) – is compounded by the noticeably late appearance of the laws which determined the migratory flows (primarily regulations and especially the normalisation of 2005) or at least the emergence of the population officially registered in the municipal census. This does not mean that the number of census tracts that have become majority non-homogenous in recent years may end up becoming enclaves, which will depend on the short- and middle-term evolution. It is also meaningful that the transformation of a given tract into an ethnic enclave is due to both the increase in the foreign-born population and in the decrease in the Spanish-born population (mostly due to emigration, even though in some cases it is also due to death, given the degree of ageing of the residents who still live in



these census tracts, as discussed above). In this sense, we should note that the sex and age profile of the people belonging to a census tract by place of birth leads us to believe that the relationships between locals and foreigners might be mediated by generation; that is, for the time being, they might be characterised not only by place of origin but also by age and the intergenerational relations which may be forged. Even though the majority of the enclaves have experienced a process of deconcentration which can be associated with the departure of people with foreign nationalities from some of these municipalities due to the economic crisis, we should bear in mind that in the forthcoming years the birth rate of the immigrant population may gain ground.

This means that for future analyses, it is essential to make a detailed examination of the natural growth components in the number of foreign residents whose demographic structure is characterised by more births than deaths in each group. Even though international and internal migration may become less important in some places in the near future, we should still bear them in mind either as part of “chain migration” processes or as elements of selection in terms of the inflow and outflow of migration. Therefore, we can expect that the population dynamic among both locals and foreigners will have consequences on the population concentration and dispersion trends around the territory. This, in turn, has clear implications when designing public policies related to the settlement of immigrants and territorial planning regarding not only the population volume but also the variety of socio-demographic profiles, which in turn diversifies the demands on the populations living in ethnic enclaves (regardless of their place of birth).

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## Statistical Appendix

**Table 1. Evolution in the number of census tracts by province**

Year	Barcelona	Girona	Lleida	Tarragona	Catalonia
2000	3,847	474	388	498	5,207
2001	3,892	491	390	513	5,286
2002	3,829	492	390	510	5,221
2003	3,828	495	390	518	5,231
2004	3,834	495	388	520	5,237
2005	3,838	504	389	520	5,251
2006	3,863	511	389	521	5,284
2007	3,921	513	390	521	5,345
2008	3,971	523	390	526	5,410
2009	3,984	525	390	531	5,430
2010	3,563	525	390	530	5,008
2011	3,577	525	391	526	5,019

Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).

**Table 2. Population living in ethnic enclaves by continental groups**

Catalonia 2011	Population of enclaves	Total population	Percentage
Spain	47,218	6,217,052	0.76%
Latin America	12,420	523,844	2.37%
Western Europe	7,399	171,468	4.32%
Eastern Europe	7,838	183,793	4.26%
Africa	15,335	297,427	5.16%
Asia	17,596	136,070	12.93%
Other	272	9,964	2.73%
Total foreigners	60,860	1,322,566	4.60%

Source: Authors' own based on figures from the Continuous Population Census (Padró Continu d'Habitants, INE).



## Tides and the Catalan Atlas [1375]

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### Original source:

*Cuadernos de Geografía*, 86: 165-182 (2009)

(<http://147.156.169.228/cuadernos/index.php>)

Translated from Catalan by Mary Black

### Abstract

*The Catalan Atlas [1375], attributed to Cresques Abraham, a Jew buixoler, is preceded by a long geographical, astrological and oceanographic text, part of which refers to the tides and is accompanied of the oldest known graph which shows 14 circumferences and 16 orientated sectors. In this article, we identify toponyms and discuss the sources of the theories of the lunital interval or establishment of a port and the texts (Isidorus, Honorius d'Autun or of Regensburg) and the classic roots of the theory.*

**Key words:** Catalan Atlas, Cresques Abraham, historical cartography, tides, lunital intervals, medieval commentators, Isidorus

The Catalan Atlas is a portolan chart expanded in a luxurious fashion which has almost unanimously been attributed to the “*buixoler* and master of navigation charts”, Cresques Abraham, a Jew from Mallorca, in around 1375. It consists of a large, foldable parchment measuring 65 x 300 cm reinforced with six support posts. The first sheet contains not only the calendar that has helped us to date it but also a long geographic, astrological and oceanographic text on which we shall focus in this article. The document, which comes from the royal library, is conserved in Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, *Ms. Esp. 30*) and has been the subject of numerous facsimile reproductions.

### 1. The text by Cresques Abraham

*“Oceanus vol aytant dir com lim de correjes o [fferres],<sup>1</sup> car la gran mar les.V.correjes o pertides [enferre] axí com a lim environa. L'escalfament de la mar, ço [és con] entra e con se'n torna, segueix la luna, axí que con la luna és*

---

<sup>1</sup> The etymology that Isidorus (15.1) gave from the past, “*eo quo in circuli modum ambiat orbem*” (“because [the ocean] wraps around the globe like a circle”), is the one that aims to translate document with “lim de correjes”; going to “fferres” is more problematic.

*minva, que torna-sse'n la gran mar, e con la luna creix o és plena la gran mar entre e s'escampa; emperò con la luna és en equinocci lavors les ones e aygües de la gran [mar] més decorren, e açò per lo vehinesc de la luna; e con la luna és en lo solstici ladonchs són menors les aygües e menys decorren, e açò per la lunyària de la luna; axí que per.XIX.anys aquesta gran mar fa son cors, axí con és dit; axí con fa la luna, e puys està en agual crexement e torna fer son cors axí con fa la luna. Emperò la gran mar, con la luna ix, lavors fa ella antipotis, que vol dir devorament, car lavors tira ella les aygües e les gita ab gran poder. [...] Devets saber de la luna que con ela deu pendre la volta que ela està sots lo sol.VI. hores e.DCCXCIII.punts.....*

*“Devets saber que les marees si créxan e minven per una via del ras sant mein tro en boca d'aver, jatsia açò que per unes pertides són pus qurens e pus forts que per altres. Con devets saber que con la luna és per grech les mares comensen a muntar, e aquela luna és per exeloch, que són.VIII.quartes de vent e són.VI.hores. Ítem con la luna és per axeloch les aygües comensen a muntar tro que la luna és per lebeg lebeg, e són.VIII.quartes de vent que són.VI.hores. Ítem con la luna és per lebeg les aygües comènsan a muntar tant tro que la luna és per mestre, e són.VIII.quartes de vent que són.VI.hores. Ítem con la luna és per mestre les aygües comènsan a muntar tant que la luna és per grech, e axí aquestes marees del ras de sant maén tro en boqua d'aver fan aquest cors nit i jorn dues marees munta[n]ts i qrexen[n]ts e dues marees munta[n]ts e basa[n]ts e quascuna.VI.hores, sí que quatre vegades. VI.valen e són.XXVIII.hores. Mas en aquesta rahó vós me puriets dir e demanar: «Com sabré yo hon és la luna?» Vós davets saber de la luna quantes hores aurà, car lo comte devets saber e per quascun jorn una quarta, donchs si la lun[a] ha.VIII. jorns serà luny del sol .VIII. quartes de vent; donchs si lo sol és per ponent la lu[n]ja ne serà .VIII. quartes de vent luny e serà per migjorn; donchs podets entendre que les aygües munten e qrexen; e per aytant[s] jorns con la luna aurà aytantes quartes de vent ne serà luny del sol. E ab aquesta rahó podets saber lo conte si les aygüe[s] crexen ho minven tota vegada sabent e avent lo conte de la luna, e ab aquel comte de la luna o podets saber verament e justa si és de nit, si és de jorn, ho en clar ho en asqur, ab que lo dit comte [sapiats]. Sapiats que aquestes marees crexen axí an rius con an astanys con an mar e minven per aquest[a] rahó matesa verament. Devets saber encara que si és tems clar encara que si volets saber quantes hores avets de la nit que ho podets saber ab çerta rahó e bona e breu. Devets saber que la tramuntana ha .VII. astellas que la vogen de nit i de jorn e aquestes han nom.....*

*“Asò és lo cors de les marees incomensand del mont de gíbetària entró astach de pomarch chi és in bretagna, luna in grech e lebeg P[lena] mar in mestre e vent forà B[aixa] mar”.*<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> This is the English-language version (translated from modern Catalan) of the basic passages:

“The heat [the inflow] of the sea, that is, when it enters and when it ebbs, follows the moon; as the moon wanes, the great sea ebbs, and as the moon waxes or is full, the great sea flows in and spreads; however when the moon is in equinox, then the waves and waters from the high sea flow more because of the proximity of the moon; and when the moon is in solstice, then the waters are low and the currents are slower because of the distance of the moon; so every 19 years the high tide completes its cycle, as mentioned; as the moon does and then it follows in equal growth and once again completes its cycle as the moon does. But the great sea, when the moon comes out, serves as an *antipotis*, which means maelstrom, because then the sea attracts the waters and launches them with great force”.

Figure 1. The first panel of the Catalan Atlas by Cresques Abraham. Below is the tide wheel which we are discussing, while the corresponding text is in the column on the right. (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Ms. Esp. 30).



“You should know that the tides ebb and flow in an expanse that spans from Cape Sant Mein [Pointe de Saint Mathieu] to the outlet of l’Eure [Havre], although they are quicker in some places and stronger in others. Likewise, you should know that when the moon is northeast, the tides begin to rise; the moon heads southeast, which are eight quarter winds, or six hours. Likewise, when the moon is southeast, the waters begin to rise [wane] until the moon is southwest, which is eight quarter winds, or six hours. Likewise, when the moon is in the southwest, the waters begin to rise until the moon is in the northwest, which is eight quarter winds, or six hours. Likewise, when the moon is northwest, the waters begin to rise [wane] until the moon is northeast. Thus, the tides between Cape Sant Maén [Pointe de Saint Mathieu] and the mouth of l’Eure [Havre] follow this course day and night: two rising tides and two ebbing tides six hours each, so that four times six equals and is twenty-four.”

“You should know that these tides rise equally in rivers and lakes as in the sea and that they truly wane for this same reason”.

“This is the course of the tides, from Mount Gibraltar to the Stoc de Pomarch [Beg ar Penmarc’h] which is in Brittany. The moon NE and SW: high tide; NW and with outward winds: low tide”.

The text accompanies the oldest diagram of the tides of which we are aware, which consists of a circle with fourteen concentric circumferences subdivided into sixteen sectors (each of which corresponds to an hour and a half). The northern orientation is marked by a symbolic star, as is the east (Maltese cross) and the south (half-moon). Initials are applied to the other winds and half-winds: *Grego*, *Scilocho*, *Labetzo*, *Ponente* and *Magistro*, in the style of the compass roses on portolan charts. The sector between N and NNE (the only one labelled; the others only have blue undulations and the red initials P and B) lists the following port or coastal names from outside to inside (Table 1).

**Table 1**

Toponym on the circle	Toponym on the chart	Current toponym
	BRITTANY	
-----	stoc de pomarch	Beg ar Penmarc'h (Pointe de...)
sayn	sein	Enez Sun (Île de Sun)
sanmae	sa mae	Pointe de Saint Mathieu
forndartus	[forno]	Le Four (canal on the Îles Molène)
insula de bas	Base	Enez Vaz (Île de Batz)
setrilles	-----	ar Jentilez (les Sept Îles)
	NORMANDY	
granexo	granexo	Guernsey (Guernesey)
ras branzard	-----	Raz Blanchard (Cap de la Hague)
	ENGLAND	
porlam	cauo (de) Porlan	Portland
uhic	huic	Wight
beocef	beacep	Beachy Head
gillsalexeo	guinsalexeo	Winchelsea
romaneo	romaneo	Romney
sanux	samux	Sandwich Bay
sayna	sayno	Seine River?

The initials P and B are arrayed around the respective circular crowns to indicate the time of high tide (P) and low tide (B) in each place depending on the position of the moon.

One example of how to read it can be applied to *sayn* (Enez Sun), which is located in the outermost circle: the P is at NNE and SSW, indicating that in full moon and new moon the high tide arrives at 1:30 am and pm; four sectors or six hours afterwards we find B, which shows low tide. The brief introductory text refers to the coasts falling between Beg ar Penmarc's (Brittany) and Gibraltar [?], and along these coasts high tide is recorded with the moon NE/SW (at 3 o'clock sharp) and low tide when the moon is NW/SE (at 9 o'clock sharp), a largely accurate observation (Howse, 1993).



## 2. Theory of tides and lunitidal intervals or establishments of a port

### 2.1. Theory of tides

It seems like tides have perennially been regarded by the author of the Catalan Atlas text as an oceanic phenomenon which has no actual importance in the Mediterranean. Indeed, classical authors, as we shall see, only mention tides on the Atlantic coasts and the Red Sea, the name that was applied by extension to the Persian Gulf, while the majority of the mediaeval authors focus on the ocean and, more specifically, on the English channel.

Setting aside the first few sentences in the chapter (the extravagant supposed etymology of the word *Oceanus*),<sup>3</sup> it begins by outlining the relationship of dependence, causality or coincidence between the phases and movements of the moon and the rhythm of the tides: “The sea... when it enters and when it ebbs, follows the moon”. The alternations in sea level which we tend to call the flow tide or ebb tide appear repeatedly in the passages cited with the verbs *entrar*, *créixer* and *muntar* and the nouns *gran mar* and *antipotis*<sup>4</sup> for the positive oscillation; while the negative is expressed with the verbs *minvar*, *baixar* and *escampar* and with the adjective *menor*. We should note that “these tides rise equally in rivers and lakes as in the sea and that they truly wane for this same reason”; the effects on coastal rivers and lakes, which is important from the standpoint of port navigation, is observed with the same attention as the sea currents, when the sea “pulls and agitates the waters with great force”.

Regarding the daily tide cycle – 24 hours and 50 minutes – it says that it flows and ebbs every 12 hours (it is actually 12 hours and 25 minutes), leaving six hours between high tide and low tide, considering that the moon travels 90°, “eight quarters of wind”,<sup>5</sup> every six hours. With a reiterative statement of the position of the moon every 90° and every six hours, he refers to the semi-diurnal astronomical tide and applies the cycle to the English Channel: “*Con devets saber que con la luna és per grech les mares comensen a muntar..., e axí aquestes marees del ras de sant maén tro en boqua d’aver fan aquest cors nit i jorn dues marees muntants i grexents e dues marees muntants e basants e quascuna .VI. hores, sí que quatre vegades .VI. valen es són .XXIII. hores*”. The incoming tide begins when the Moon is in the direction of NE and SW; to the contrary, the tide begins to ebb when the orientation is NW and SE.<sup>6</sup> Either

<sup>3</sup> Revisited by Honorius Augustodunensis, who borrowed it from Isidorus: *faixa de corretges = V partides que environen l’escalfament [el flux] de la mar*.


<sup>4</sup> I have not found this word in any dictionary; it must have referred to the drink (ποτήρις); thus, we should find a meaning that is the opposite of “devouring”. However, it is more likely a misreading or inaccurate transcription of *amipotis*, an archaic seafaring term that was used in mediaeval and modern English to refer to ebb tides. There is actually a somewhat unusual Greek word, ἀμπωτις (ἀνάπωσις), with the same meaning. The error in Cresques’ text, or by Honorius’ translator, might be due to a cross with ἀντιπαθής or ἀντιπάθια, which appears in the texts of Posidonius and Strabo when they talk about the tides and the well at the temple of Hercules in Gadir.

<sup>5</sup> The word *quarta* did not mean ‘quarter wind’ but each of the 32 divisions of the nautical compass rose, that is, 11° and 15’. Eight quarters is therefore 90°.

<sup>6</sup> The “Reglas de las mareas” by Diego García de Palacio (Mexico, 1587) is formulated in a similar way: “... when the moon is in the southwest or northeast, it is high tide; and when it is in the southeast or northwest, it is low tide. And therefore, when in the east or west, it would be between high and low tide”. (*Instrucción nautica para el buen uso, y regimiento de la nao...*, facsimile 1944).

the translator of the Latin text – which I have not located – or the copyist erred when giving four rising or incoming tides and no ebb.

**Figure 2. Semi-diurnal astronomical tide between Sant Mein and Eure. The scheme refers to the position of the Moon and the hours of the day.**



The monthly cycle of 28 days can be deduced from the coincidence with the phases of the moon.<sup>7</sup> “The sea enters and when it ebbs, follows the moon; as the moon wanes, the great sea ebbs, and as the moon waxes or is full, the great sea flows in and spreads”. Indeed, even though the text does not mention the sun, it does posit the syzygies (conjunction or opposition of two heavenly bodies: the new and full moon, which determine the maximum high tide) and the quadratures (waxing and waning quarters which reflect the minimum high tide) as a justification of spring tides and neap tides.

The author or inspiration behind the Atlas also recognises an annual cycle or period related to the equinox (maximum flow and ebb) and the solstice (minimum range and minimum extreme levels): “when the moon is in equinox, then the waves and waters from the high sea flow more because of the proximity of the moon; and when the moon is in solstice, then the waters are low and the currents are slower because of the distance of the moon”. Astronomically this is an accurate observation, regardless of whether or not it was inspired by the classical or mediaeval sources which we shall see below: the maximum tides

<sup>7</sup> Exactly 27 days, 7 hours and 43 minutes, which equals 13° per day.

dovetail with the equinoxial syzygies. What is more, the text stresses that the tidal currents are indeed stronger in the English Channel – referring to all the texts furnished – with a clear west-to-east direction during the flow tide and from east to west during the ebb tide.

The Metonic cycle, discovered in the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC and widely used to adjust the calendar, reflects the proof of the reiteration of the time of the tides parallel to the phases of the moon within a fixed period of time, that is, after 235 lunations, which corresponds to 19 tropical years. The text states: “*Axí que per XIX anys aquesta gran mar fa son cors, axí com és dit; axí con fa la luna, e puy està en equal crexement e torna fer son cors axí con fa la luna*”.

## 2.2. Lunitidal intervals or establishments of a port

“Qui pot saber què d’ell los fats ordenen,  
quan com e on finarà los seus dies?

.....  
Ell va de nit sens brúixola o carta,  
menys de pilot, en la canal de Flandes...”  
(Ausiàs Marc, poem 113, verses 201-206)  
1425-1450<sup>8</sup>

Between the astronomical tide – which would imply an exact correspondence with the position of the moon and the sun with regard to the Earth – and the real tide observed on the coast, there tends to be a difference, at times notable, which in the case of the English Channel leads to a major shift of mass, “the course of the great sea”, eastward, when it flows, in the description provided in the Catalan Atlas. Furthermore, the tidal oscillation varies considerably depending on whether the coast is more or less rugged (map, Fig. 3).

The extreme observation points mentioned in the text – with the exception of a disconcerting *Gibetària*<sup>9</sup> – and the toponyms written on the illustrative wheel fall between what we now call the English Channel and the coast of Brittany, an area that at the time was plied by the galleys of Mallorcan and Genovese merchants. *Stoc de pomarch*, *Beg ar Penmarc’h* and *boca d’aver*, the outlet of l’Havre or Eure, are the only references that appear in the text but not on the aforementioned wheel, but they form a coherent, orderly whole.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> “Who can know what the fates ordain,/ when how and where their days will end? / He goes by night without compass or chart, / less a pilot in the English Channel...”

<sup>9</sup> I have carefully combed both sides of the Channel and the Breton coastline for any homonym which might match this name and I have found none. All the transcribers of the Catalan Atlas have reduced it to Gibraltar (which on the cartographic sheet is written *mont gibeltar*), but the leap in considering the tides from the coasts of Andalusia to the coasts of Brittany would be unlikely, unless the text has been mutilated. However, we should not lose sight of the role played by the Columns of Hercules (Strait of Gibraltar) in the observation and interpretation of the tides by classical authors, especially Posidonius and Strabo.

<sup>10</sup> Of the 16 sectors in the wheel, which are marked with the eight primary winds, only one or two have been used, the NE ones. Might this suggest that there were others in the model (coast of Gascony, Galicia, Portugal or Cadiz)?


From southwest to northeast and after *stoc de pomarch*,<sup>11</sup> we have *sayn*, which is the little island called *Enez Sun* ('low island'), in Breton, located across from *Raz de Sun* point, a channel which is sadly well-known on the map of shipwrecks in the Atlantic; *raz* or *rash*, in Old English *ræsć*, means both 'storm', 'violent current' and 'strait' or 'channel', which is true in this case (Guilcher, 1950; 1979). *Sanmae* – initially 'holy stone' – corresponds to Pointe de Saint Mathieu, an outcropping which also supports a large lighthouse next to the ruins of a Benedictine abbey. *Forndartus*, *forno* in the Atlas itself, has been identified as what is currently known as Le Four, applied to the very dangerous channel separating the extreme point of Brittany – Pointe de Saint Mathieu and Kerk-Leon = Le Conquet – from the Molène and Ushant islands; P. Vesconte (1321) wrote *fornato*, while the most common spelling in the 15<sup>th</sup> century was the one used by Cresques Abraham; afterwards, misreading may have led to *torno* or *torn*.<sup>12</sup> *Insula de bas* is currently still used in Breton as *Enez Vaz*, across from Rosko. *Setrilles* correspond(s) to the Sept Îles, *ar Jentilez* in Breton; the archipelago only has five islands and many reefs, such that 'seven islands' is a false etymology which was not valid even back in 1375. *Granexo* is the British island of Guernsey, which sailors often ran into by chance before reaching *ras branzard* (Raz Blanchard). This toponym has a clear aetiology based on the strong current commonly found between the island of Alderney (Aoeur'gny or Aurigny) and Cap de la Hague on the extreme end of Cotentin; the average speed is eight knots, and during high tide at the equinox it can reach twelve. Mediaeval sailors were no doubt aware of this.

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
<sup>11</sup> *Stoc de Pomarch* is the transcription from the Breton *beg ar dorchenn*, 'torch point', a possible allusion to a kind of lighthouse. The first element in the toponym, which has Indo-European roots, is the Old Norwegian *stack* and in varied forms, including *tuc*, *cuc*, *cucq*, etc., it means 'cape', 'point' or 'key'. *Penmarc'h*, however, means 'horse head'. I owe many of the explanations of the toponyms to Ofis ar Brezhoneg (Karaez-Plougêr) and personally to Hervé Guéguen and Marc Cochard, whom I would like to thank.

<sup>12</sup> The so-called Mer d'Iroise (French nautical chart 7149) notes the strong tidal currents due to the funnel effect from Raz de Sein to Chenal du Four and especially at Fromveur. While the currents register at 3 to 4 knots in running water at sea filled with reefs, they can surpass 8 knots, and 5 at Le Four. The passes referred to include some of the most dangerous ones in the world because of the considerable tidal range, which is higher than 7 m, and the many reefs and seafloors less than 5 m deep (*Atlas des courants de marée de l'EPSHOM*, no. 560, by Goulven à Penmarc'h). A lamppost built in 1874 occupies the *Roche du Four*, across from Argenton.

**Figure 3. Map of the English Channel with the toponyms contained in the Catalan Atlas and the cotidal lines. The continuous lines represent cotidals (same tide height) in lunar time and the broken lines represent the tidal range (height difference) in metres.**



**Figure 4. The Molène and Ushant islands, the location of the Forndartus, of the most dangerous passes in the English Channel because of the tidal currents.**



*Porlam* or *porlan*, the next name, belongs to the United Kingdom, Portland, and it curiously followed the cotidal order on the other side of the channel. Then comes or *uhic* or *huic*, which brooks no doubts: Wight, the large island situated across from Portsmouth. The other points noted, all of them English, are *beocef*, Beachy Head, referring to the impressive cliff in Eastbourne where Cretaceous limestone justifies the false etymology of the classic Albion (Pliny and Ptolemy). After that comes *gillsalexeo* or Winchelsea, an old fishing port and Saxon castle that was rebuilt in 1200;<sup>13</sup> *romaneo*, which is Romney today, a marsh that is currently enclosed with the evading and changing Dungeness, and finally *sanux* or *sannux* (Sand-vik, ‘sand gulf’) corresponding to Sandwich Bay on the easternmost point of the county of Kent, before winding towards London.

We are left with one toponym still hanging, *sayna*, which must be the French Seine River, although this is out of context if we are following the coastline which *should* end in London. Did he confuse it with the *tamixa* or Thames? Besides *gibetèria* and *sayna*, all the rest match the tidal observations.

**Table 2**

Ports	Notation in the Catalan Atlas [1375]	Hour of high tide sc. Norie, 1844*	Cotidal in Moon hour sc. Proudman, 1953**
[Biscayne Bay]	NE – 3:00	3:00	[2:45]
<i>Sayn</i>	NNE – 1:30	3:15	3:30
<i>sanmae</i>	NE – 3:00	3:00	3:45
<i>fordartus</i>	ENE – 4:30	5:00	3:45
<i>insula de bas</i>	E – 6:00	3:45	4:30
<i>setrilles</i>	ESE – 7:30	7:30	4:45
<i>granexo</i>	SE – 9:00	6:30	6:15
<i>ras branzard</i>	SE – 9:00	7:45	7:00
<i>porlam</i>	SE – 9:00	7:15	7:30
<i>uhic</i>	SSE – 10:30	9:45	9:30
<i>beocef</i>	S – 12:00	11:00	10:15
<i>gillsalexeo</i>	S – 12:00	12:45	10:30
<i>romaneo</i>	NE – 3:00	10:50	10:45
<i>sanux</i>	NE/N – 2:15	11:00	11:15
<i>sayna</i> [?]	NE – 3:00	10:30	9:00

\* Taken from Howse (1993).

\*\* Note that the progression of the time of the moon on the list from 1375 is totally accurate.

The lunitidal interval or establishment of a port, as we said, is the time difference between the moon’s passage over the local meridian and the maximum tide waves. If we compare a modern map of cotidal lines and amplitude (mean level difference in metres) of the English Channel (Proudman, 1953) to the list of ports in Cresques Abraham’s wheel (Fig. 5), we may be surprised by the similarity. *Sayn*, *sanmaen* and *fordartus* belong to the 3-hour cotidal, while *insula de bas* and *septilles* have a delay of 4 hours. This time


<sup>13</sup> Winchelsea and Old Romney were part of the *Cinque Ports* which benefitted from high active trade in the post-Norman Middle Ages thanks to the maximum narrowness of the Strait. Major floods and sedimentation in the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries led the ports and inhabited nuclei to be moved (Eddison, 2002), as reported in Cresques Abraham’s information or model.

difference is ramped up to 6 hours in *granexo* and 7 in *ras branzard* and *porlan*. *Uhic* is located between the 9-hour and 10-hour cotidals, and the lunitidal interval at *beocef*, *gillsalexio* and *romaneo* is more than 10 hours. Finally, *sanux* and *sayna* (if we interpret the latter as London's estuary) show the extreme value of 11 hours of delay. I do not think it is overly bold to venture that the mapmaker was doing nothing other than tracing the most common seafaring route of the mediaeval merchants through *la canal de Flandes*, precisely along the riskiest stretch, with particular mention of the most treacherous passes.

### 3. The sources

Broadly speaking, we can venture the hypothesis that Cresques Abraham's text contains two different original parts. One refers to the theory of tides and the other is the passage that mentions the currents and changes with specific geographic references in the English Channel. We should add to the second part the toponyms that appear in the circle, which occupy two sectors, the N-NE ones.

**Figure 5. Wheel of the cyclical tide of the English Channel. Close-up of the first panel of the Catalan Atlas [1375] by Cresques Abraham. (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Ms. Esp. 30).**



### 3.1. The theory of tides

The provenance of the observation of the tides and their dependence upon the position of the moon is indisputably classical. We can start with *Posidonius* (130-50 BC) and *Strabo* (54 BC - 20 AD) if we want to know where the mediaeval writers got their theories. Posidonius ultimately tends to be the referent from which the majority of classical and mediaeval authors draw, and he, in turn, begins his discussion of the topic of the tides by contradicting Polybius (200?-118? BC), with a crumpled citation of the fountain or well of Hercules in Gadir (XXXIV.9.5), which, due to “antipathy” (ἀντιπάθεια) would run counter to the flow and ebb of the sea. In his examination of the theme of



the tides and their diurnal cycle, he makes the moon totally responsible, just as he attributes the monthly cycle to the moon (Diggle et al., 1999).

When the moon is more than  $30^\circ$  over the horizon – dovetailing with a zodiac sign – the sea begins to swell and invade the coastline until the moon reaches the meridian. When it turns, the sea ebbs gradually and when it is lower than  $30^\circ$  under the horizon (another zodiac sign), it is low tide. From then on, and with a maximum that matches the passage of the moon – which is now invisible – by the meridian, high tide comes again, and so on successively.

Regarding the monthly cycle, the most accentuated tide comes with the conjunction (ἡ συνοδοσ) of the sun and moon or new moon. From new moon to first quarter, the tide drops and then once again achieves its maximum with the full moon (πανσέληνος). Between the third quarter and the conjunction, the level rises and in consequence the currents of the tide are accentuated. Posidonius reports that the people from Gadir (Cadiz) told him about the maximum tides and ebbs which came with the summer solstice, and he deduced that the neap tide corresponded to the equinoxes and the high tide corresponded to the solstices, following the annual cycle.

Revisiting the texts by Posidonius, Strabo (III.5.7-8 [v. T17]) cast doubt on both the traditional version of a well that ebbs and flows opposite to the rhythm of the tide, and the interpretation that this is due to air pressure within the water veins. He inclined instead towards the presence of different wells and causes of their depletion and filling other than the tide. On the one hand, in terms of the diurnal, monthly and annual cycle, Strabo simply repeated Posidonius' arguments, even the mistake attributed to the Cadiz natives. The maximum high tides do not actually come at the solstices but at the equinoxes. The important role of the moon remains: it is a συμπαῶς τῆ σελήνη phenomenon. In his *Naturalis historia* (II, 99-100), when he discusses why the seas rise and fall, G. Plini (27-79 AD) found the cause *in sole lunaque*, that is, he involves both the sun and the moon; otherwise, he would have been forced to comment on the episode of the well of Cadiz where the tide “is not reasonable”.

For a Mediterranean mentality such as that of General Julius Caesar (100-44 BC), the phenomenon of the rise of the water level and currents derived therefore is an *aestus*, a ‘boiling’, which is barely perceptible on the usual Roman shores, and which caught him and his armies off-guard when they had to cross the Channel. In the *Commentarii de bello Gallico* (3, 12), he makes quite a precise observation: “...cum ex alto se aestus incitauisset, quod [bis] semper accidit horarum .XII. spatio”, when he sees that the semi-diurnal tide always happens every 12 hours on the coast of Vannes. Later on, during the disembarkation in England (4.29), he says:

*“Eadem nocte accidit, ut esset luna plena, qui dies a maritimos aestus maximos in Oceano efficere consuevit: nostrisque id erat incognitum”.*<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> “The same evening it happened to be full moon, the day when the tide is at its maximum: we did not know that.”

However, when he embarks, Caesar makes a few more observations of tides and currents (5, 8):

“...et longius delatus aestu, orta luce, sub sinistra Britanniam relictam conspexit. Tum rursus, aestus commutationem secutus, remis contendit ut eam partem insulae caperet, qua optimum esse egresum superiore aestate cognoverat”.<sup>15</sup>

Pliny could be used as a transition to Isidorus (560-636), the Venerable Bede (673-735) and the person who affects us the most, Honorius Augustodunensis (Honorius of Regensburg, more than of Autun, † ca. 1157), since the Cresques text is a translation, sometimes a choppy one, sometimes with insertions, of passages from the book *Imago mundi* by the Irish or German monk. Here are the contrasting passages:

39. *de oceano*

[Cresques Abraham]

*Oceanus dicitur quasi ocior amnis  
vel quasi zonarum limbis  
quinque enim zonas mundi in modum limbi ambit.*

Oceanus vol aytant dir [...] com lim de correjes o [fferres], car la gran mar les .V. correjes o pertides [enfferre] axí com a lim environa.

40. *de estu*

*estus oceani id est accessus et recessus lunam  
sequitur  
cuius aspiratione retro trahitur  
eius impulsu refunditur.  
cottidie autem bis effluere et remeare videtur.  
cum luna crescente crescit*

L'escalfament<sup>16</sup> de la mar, ço [és con] entra e con se'n torna, segueix la luna,  
[...]

*cum decrescente decrescit*

[...] axí que con la luna és minva, que torna.sse'n la gran mar,<sup>17</sup> e con la luna creix o és plena, la gran mar entra e s'escampa; emperò con la luna és en equinocci lavors les ones e aygues de la gran [mar] més decorren, e açò per lo vehinesc de la luna; e con la luna és en lo solstici ladonchs són menors les aygues e menys decorren, e açò per la lunyària de la luna; axí que per .XIX. anys aquesta gran mar fa son cors, axí con és dit; axí con fa la luna, e puy està en agual crexement e torna fer son cors axí com fa la luna.<sup>18</sup>

*cum luna est in equinoctio  
maioris oceani fluctus surgunt ob vicinitatem lune*

*cum in solstitio  
mitior est ob longinquitatem eius.*

*per .XVIII. annos ad principia motus*

41. *de voragine*<sup>19</sup>

*ampotis quoque id est vorago in oceano*

Emperò la gran mar, con la luna ix, lavors fa ella antipotis,<sup>20</sup> que vol dir devorament,<sup>21</sup>

<sup>15</sup> “...having been taken further by the tide, he saw that he had left Britain [the island] on the left. With that, near the change in tide and through the effort of rowing, he strived to reach that place on the island which he had found was the best disembarkation point the summer before.”

<sup>16</sup> ‘Warming’ in the literal sense, but it should be translated figuratively as ‘ebb’.

<sup>17</sup> He inverts the order of the sentence.

<sup>18</sup> A much more explicit paraphrase.

<sup>19</sup> The Paris school (Duhem, 1915 [1958]) paid a great deal of attention to eddies (*gulfus*) and voragines, in fact considering them the causes instead of the effects of the tides.

<sup>20</sup> Misreading of *ampotis* (‘ebb’).

*in exortu lune maiori estu*  
*fluctus involvit* car llavors tira ella les aygües  
*et revomit.*  
*hec autem vorago que totas aquas et naves*  
*absorbet*  
*et revomit*  
*hinc fit.*  
*est in terra abissus profundissima*  
*de qua scribitur*  
*rupti sunt omnes fontes abissi magne (Gen 7, 11)*  
 .....  
*et ea exundante iterum magno impetu repellent.* e les gita ab gran poder.

Honorius Augustodunensis, *Imago mundi* 1, 39-41. (Edition by Valerie I. J. Flint, Paris, 1983).

A writer almost one century after Honorius of Regensburg who might have gone beyond the texts of Cresques Abraham is Robert Grosseteste, the Bishop of Lincoln (†1253), the author of several works already commented on by Duhem (1915), who was not aware of the *Questio de fluxu et refluxu maris*, which was discovered in 1926. The text was published and translated by Dales (1966). In reality, Grosseteste's line comes from the ideas of Seleucus of Babylonia, compiled by Albumassar (9<sup>th</sup> century) and translated into Latin in 1133 and 1140. The role of the moon and sun is claimed with evidence that is "truthful from experience", which requires an explanation (Laird, 1990). Contrary to Honorius, he never speaks about *aestus* but about *accessio* and *recessio maris* (twice a day). If the word *aestus* meant 'boiling', *s.l.*, now the *accessio* is said to be accompanied by water that has been warmed from the sun's rays and a "condensation" (centripetal tendency) and "rarefaction" (centrifugal tendency) of water. The incoming tide theoretically matches the rising and setting of the moon, the ebb tide with the passage of the moon along the meridian. Even though we can find similarities, the language of the Catalan Atlas does not closely match the language of the Bishop of Lincoln.

Another possibility would be the *Tractatus de fluxu et refluxu maris Anglici*, attributed to Walter Burley (1275-1345).

### 3.2. Tidal tables and lunitidal intervals

A. Morel-Fatio (1875), a Hispanist trained in the École des Chartes, hinted that the *Libro del conocimiento de todos los rregnos...*, attributed to the second half of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, might have been written with knowledge of the Catalan Atlas. In fact, during the 14<sup>th</sup> century, several lists or practical descriptions about crossing the English Channel must have been in circulation. The imaginary journey in the *Libro del conocimiento* speaks about the "*punta de sanmae que es en la provincia de bretaña y dende fuy al golfo de samalo...*" and about "*un gran rrio que disen saina*" (Jiménez, 1877: 7). Breton sailors must have made an empirical contribution to the art of navigation in a place that had the heaviest commercial routes at the time, but it dated from earlier and the *cors de la marea* had occupied mediaeval philosophical encyclopaedias.

<sup>21</sup> *Vorago* in the original more likely refers to the whirlpools caused by the currents, but the text was mutilated.

Based on his own observations, the Venerable Bede (672-735) had enriched classic doctrine by formulating the law on lunital intervals (Duhem, 1915 [1958]). Sailors who frequented the English Channel had noticed the tidal currents and their alternating nature, along with how roiled they became in the straits. In reality, they were more frightened by the current than by the intumescence. The abbot of Jarrow (Northumbria) devoted chapter 29 of his *Opera de temporibus* (703) to “On the harmony of the sea and the moon”, referring to the outlets of the rivers, the penetration of saltwater and the “respiration of the moon”. In twelve lunar months (354 days), the tide ebbs and flows 684 times. However, the Venerable Bede’s most original contribution is that the tides around Great Britain did not reach their maximum at the same time and showed a N-S time difference which was clear on the shelf of the English Channel (Cartwright, 1999).

*“Those who inhabit the different coasts of the British Sea know full well that when the tide begins to rise in one place, it ebbs in another at the same time”.*

Far from scholarly or monastic discussions, the sailors’ empiricism carved a niche for itself and tidal tables were devised that would lead to the modern printed almanacs that predict the state of the sea level at any given time in determined ports. The oldest tables, dating from around the 11<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> centuries, were not like the ones of today, which are temporary or for a specific period of time; rather they contained a simple list of temporal and local rules of “high waters” (“high tide” or “flow”), according to the age or phase of the moon. The age of the moon, estimated at between 0 and 29 or 30 days, was the most crucial factor (Cartwright, 1999).

The expression lunital interval or establishment of a port, in the sense of the time lag of the high tide after the syzygy, dates from the 19<sup>th</sup> century, but the rules alluded to, which are quite haphazard, strove to express it. The inaccuracy came from considering that the shifting periods of the moon did not gain exactly 48 minutes per day but that they fluctuated, and that the lag of the maximum high tide was not a constant determination. However, in an age when clocks virtually did not exist, the sailors’ needs were mostly met.

The first tidal table known in Europe – the Chinese ones might date from earlier – is a manuscript from the 13<sup>th</sup> century conserved in the British Museum (Cotton Codex, Julius DXVII, p. 45b) for the “*flood at london brigge*”, which belonged to St Albans and was the work of the abbot John of Wallingford (†1213) (Cartwright, 1999).<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> The portolan, veritable rutters or sailing manuals, had to have been in the hands of sailors in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, as Kretschmer (1909) tries to prove. In the manuscript of Piero de Versi (1445) we can find not only the distances and directions but also the data on the tide records. Here are a few examples:

**32.** “... *traverse in lo chanal de fiandria...Furno dartus e godester se uarda griego e tramontana e ostro e garbin e sono lege 38...*”

**40.** “*In forno dartus la luna quarta de siroco al ostro bassa mar e quarta de griego ala tramontana e quarta de garbin alostro piena mar. In barbaracha la luna ostro*

On the other hand, Howse (1993) has described and illustrated diagrams used to predict the tides, guided with the compass, which date back to a period between ca. 1375 – the plausible date of the Catalan Atlas – and 1598. The first printed sailing directions or pilot book, *Le routier de la mer* by Pierre Garcie Ferrande (1430-1520), dates from 1502, and we know that it was reissued 40 times. It contains information on the coasts in the English Channel, including the currents and high and low tides, with information that could not be very different to the data from a century and a quarter earlier. In 1967, David Waters published a facsimile where we can see rich information on the tides based on texts, not figures. In a table, he compares the annotations of C. Abraham and P. Garcie:

**Table 3: Comparative lunitidal intervals**

	Catalan Atlas [1375]	Pierre Garcie (1502)	Norie (1844)
From Galicia to Bordeaux	3:00		3:00-3:30
Enez Sun	3:00	2:15	3:00
Guernsey	10:30	6:00	6:30
Portland	9:00	9:45	7:15

What is known as the Hague Atlas (Gravenhage Koninklijke Bibliothek, Ms. 129 A.24) contains a diagram with a rotating disk which allows the tides to be calculated for every day in the lunar month at 81 ports or embarkations from Galicia to Normandy, Brittany, Flanders, England and Scotland. This document is attributed to a date sometime before the Almanac (ca. 1546) by Guillaume Brouscon, a sailor from Le Conquet – a port located in the aforementioned ‘Forn d’Artús channel’, now known as Chenal du Four – which he drew up for Breton, French and English sailors. The document at hand is a bound pocket-sized parchment document which contains two kinds of figures: maps and diagrams. The former are cross-sectional charts with the lunar tide flows in each port, represented by lines of subdivided arrows which start at a wind rose corresponding to the port in question (he attributes SW flows to the ports in the Biscayne Bay and W flows to the ports in Brittany and Flanders). The other figures are concentric circles divided radially into 30 sectors which are used to calculate the time of high tide during each age of the moon; each diagram works for a given orientation. The outer crown indicates the moon age (in the Breton version of Roman numerals), and the next ring is divided into 30 days. The following ring shows the phases of the moon and the days of high and low tide; the third and fourth rings show high and low tide in time, hours and quarter hours, for each day in the moon age (Howse, 1993). The layout and content are somewhat similar to the diagram discussed in this paper.

It is not unlikely that the “philosophical” reflections of Bede, Grosseteste (1227) and Buridan (1366), which refer to the ports of Picardy and their lunitidal intervals, as well as the imbalance of the tides, including the tidal tables and the corresponding diagrams in the Breton style, would have reached the hands of Cresques Abraham. Today, if we do not find a more apodictic documents, the

text of the Catalan Atlas seems to be partly the translation of a passage from Honorius of Regensburg, with additions from other mediaeval treatise writers, perhaps Grosseteste, and partly the introduction to a Breton pilotage handbook or a commentary written when seeing it. We could suggest the same about the diagram.

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## The structures of youth participation in Catalonia since the democratic transition<sup>1</sup>

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### **Abstract**

*Youth participation is and has been a concept with many considerations, meanings and forms of application, both nationally and internationally. In order to ascertain the evolution of the main structures of youth participation, this article starts with the frames that have motivated this participation in Europe, and then it analyses the evolution of some of the participative youth structures in Catalonia in recent decades: local and municipal youth councils. The article also examines some of the longstanding challenges of youth participation, which aim to overcome the structuring of traditional channels of participation and generate other ways of taking part in everyday community life.*

**Key words:** young people participation, youth participation, democracy, youth policies, Catalonia

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## 1. Introduction

In recent years, there has been a number of publications which question the classical and traditional structures of youth participation. They claim that in a cultural context characterised by increasing individualism, it should come as no surprise that people do not want to be represented, and therefore the bridges of dialogue between citizens and public institutions enter into crisis (Luque & Giner, 2012). If, furthermore, we bear in mind the precarious situation, the lack of definition and the instability of the job and life pathways of many youths, it is easy to find an explanation for the lack of steadfast commitment and stable formal ties. Despite this, youths have been the ones to lead some of the most important participative movements in recent years (the 15-M movement, the movement to defend quality education, the anti-globalisation movement and others).

This article aims to analyse youth participation through an examination of Europe's political guidelines and recommendations and an analysis of some of the historical structures of youth participation in Catalonia in recent decades. We shall also survey some of the old challenges of participation and formulate proposals for a new history of youth participation, which aim to overcome the structuring of traditional channels of participation and generate other ways of taking part in everyday community life.

## 2. The historical structures of youth participation

By approving regulatory frameworks and promoting certain programmes, public institutions encourage the implementation of certain kinds of projects and actions that directly affect youth. The structures of youth participation, especially the more formal and institutional ones, are no exception. We could say that this creates a domino effect: European policy is crucial to understanding the implementation of certain projects, policies and structures of youth participation in the state, and the states are crucial in their national, regional and local influence.

In this section, we shall first contextualise the major European directives and then focus on the levels and structures of participation in Catalonia (Spain has transferred the competences on youth matters to Catalonia).

### 2.1. *The impetus of Europe*

This point on the historical structures of youth participation aims to briefly describe the key junctures and programmes that have been promoted by the main European institutions: the European Union and the Council of Europe. Both of them, with their recommendations, for example, have fostered and justified the development of local youth councils and the creation of youth forums, among other initiatives. We also examine some challenges and ambivalences around youth participation which can be gleaned not only from the regulatory frameworks and practices to date but also from the demands of the new generations of youth.

### 2.1.1. Reference frameworks and programmes

The European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CE) have played a key role in youth, youth policies and work with youth. In 1988, the EU initiated the Youth for Europe exchange and mobility programme (1988-1991). This desire to work on behalf of youth, their mobility within Europe and their participation in community life was also legitimised through different European Union treaties (Maastricht and Lisbon, for example). The Youth for Europe programme was followed by the Youth for Europe II and III programmes (1992-1995 and 1996-1999), Youth (2000-2006) and Youth in Action (2007-2013) (Devlin, 2010: 67).

In turn, the CE was one of the first international institutions to focus on the needs, rights and circumstances of young people and to recommend that youth participate in society (Devlin, 2010: 75). It has two permanent structures to implement the youth policies of the Council of Europe: the European Youth Centre in Strasbourg, created in 1972, and its counterpart in Budapest, created in 1995. They are centres where youth can gather and get training, with an annual schedule of events, many of them conducted in partnership with youth NGOs.

The first formal agreement between the EU and the CE in youth matters came in 1998 (despite previous informal contacts), and it revolved around the European Youth Worker and Youth Leader Training. It was complemented in 2003 with two more agreements, one on “Euro-Mediterranean youth cooperation” and another on “research on youth”.

One important touchstone for European youth policies is *The White Paper: A New Impetus for European Youth* published in 2001 (Commission of the European Communities, 2001) by the European Commission after a work and consultation process that got underway in 1999. The *White Paper* encourages governments to coordinate on four themes: participation, information, volunteer service and a better understanding of youth. Regarding participation, the paper argues that youths’ desire to participate “must be given room for expression at various levels, from local to international; it must take several forms -- active and representative -- and it must not exclude any type of commitment, be it one-off or ongoing, spontaneous or organised. Moreover, this involvement cannot be limited to a single consultation and certainly not to opinion polls. It has to include young people in the decision-making process” (Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 13).

On issues of youth participation, the CE’s Second Conference on Youth Policies was also important; at it, the issue of youth participation was prioritised and the groundwork was laid for the European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life (approved in 1992), which was amended ten years later and approved by the Congress of the Council of Europe in 2003. This second charter, which was translated into Catalan by the National Youth Council of Catalonia, should be regarded as a reference document for the political participation of youth in local life and was adopted by many European municipalities. The Charter holds that as citizens of towns and regions, youth should have access to all forms of participation in society.

The *White Paper* and the European Charter on participation were followed in 2005 by the European Youth Pact, which is organised around three strands: a) work and social integration; b) education, training and mobility; and

c) balancing work and family life. In this context, in 2005 the Council of Youth Ministers also adopted a resolution that encouraged the Member States to “develop a structured dialogue with youth and their organisations on a national, regional and local scale on the political actions that affect them, with the involvement of researchers in the field of youth” (Council of the European Union, 2005). Starting in 2005, as well, the EU and the CE strengthened their cooperation and established an agreement to provide a framework for the joint development of a coherent strategy on training young workers, youth policy and research on youth.

In 2009, the European Commission proposed a new strategy as part of its youth policies called “Investing and Empowering”. This strategy proposed: a) creating more opportunities for youth in education and jobs; b) improving access to the full participation of all youth in society; and c) fostering mutual solidarity between society and youth. The strategy also stressed the importance of youth work, the need for transversal work and the contribution of evidence that help us to properly assess these policies.

Also in 2009, the EU approved the “Council Resolution on a renewed framework for European cooperation in the youth field (2010-2018)”, whose goal was to improve cooperation among EU countries in order to offer youth better opportunities. The resolution encourages all EU member states to establish a structured dialogue with youth and youth organisations in order to jointly reflect on European cooperation in the field of youth matters. Regarding participation, the resolution says: “Young people’s participation in representative democracy and civil society at all levels and in society at large should be supported”. The initiatives that can be implemented include: a) “develop mechanisms for dialogue with youth and youth participation on national youth policies”; b) “encourage use of ... guidelines on youth participation, information and consultation”; c) “support politically and financially youth organisations, as well as local and national youth councils”; d) “promote the participation of more and a greater diversity of young people in representative democracy, in youth organisations and other civil-society organisations”; and e) “make effective use of information and communication technologies to broaden and deepen participation of young people”.

In the same vein, in July 2010 the EU and the CE signed a new partnership agreement which adopted binding goals in three priority areas: a) the social inclusion of young people; b) democracy and human rights, democratic citizenship and youth participation; and c) intercultural dialogue and diversity.

### *2.1.2. Current challenges and ambivalences*

Even though in recent decades there has been a number of programmes and actions to develop youth policies on a European scale, their translation into noticeable improvements for youth depends largely on the actions of the different member states, which have the authority over their own youth policies. The European bodies can facilitate, provide support and encourage, but without the commitment of the national governments (and the regional governments in some cases), their pronouncements can remain mere wishful thinking (Devlin, 2010:79). We can find one example of this in Spain itself. While the

aforementioned Council resolution recommended providing political and financial support to youth organisations as well as to local and national youth councils, in January 2014 the Council of Ministers of the government of Spain approved a draft law on rationalising the public sector which provided for the elimination of the Youth Council of Spain (Consejo de la Juventud de España, CJE), whose functions would theoretically be integrated into those of the Youth Institute (Instituto de la Juventud). This measure has been harshly criticised by youth organisations, which are witnessing as young people may be left without a voice that has defended their interests and rights before the public administration (Planas-Lladó, Soler- Masó & Feixa-Pàmpols, 2014: 560).

Both state- and nation-wide, youth policies still remain weak, fragmented and lacking a strategy. According to Loncle et al. (Loncle, Leahy, Muniglia & Walther, 2012: 21), this is what lies behind the recent emphasis on youth participation. These authors' hypothesis is that there is a huge gulf separating the multiplicity of political discourses on youth on the one hand, and the weakness of youth policies on the other. We could say that the stress on youth participation actually reflects the weakness of youth policies and the lack of a steadfast political will and strategy in relation to youth. Therefore, participation takes the place of political objectives and strategies.

However, if we analyse youth participation from a European perspective, we encounter several ambivalences (Muniglia, Cuconato, Loncle & Walther, 2012). The first refers to the very concept of participation: on the one hand, the acceptance that youths create new forms of participation and social interaction, which means accepting uncertainty and shifts towards new and unknown social mores (*White Paper from 2001*), and on the other, participation basically envisioned as the kind that happens within the existing social and institutional structures (as contained in the European Youth Pact). In this sense, the regulatory texts and frameworks are still ambiguous, and this translates into practical actions only by the institutional participative structures, which are often manipulated and used to legitimise the policies being promoted by the administration itself, which have a dubious focus on new forms of youth participation. The second ambivalence refers to the challenge of youth participation in all the areas and all the spheres that affect them (health, housing, culture, work, etc.). The political legitimacy of the administrations means, among other issues, helping youth express their citizenship and therefore their participation in everything that affects them. Thirdly, we can find the issues of the level of participation and a distinction between "real" and "superficial" participation. Many official documents and declarations say that participation should go beyond consultations and should instead get youth involved at high levels, such as decision-making. However, these higher levels of participation tend to be channelled through formal youth organisations, most of them comprised of youth with high levels of education, which excludes the non-organised majority of young people. Finally, the variety of areas, forms and meanings of participation allows for a broad range of interpretation, which means that it cannot simply be reduced to consultation or political decision-making. Participation should be considered in youths' everyday lives, and therefore it should be a fundamental part of social-educational practices and youth projects.

## 2.2. The levels and structures of youth participation in Catalonia

One of the first actions during the period of democratic transition in Catalonia was precisely the organisation of channels of youth participation. Thus, in 1977, at the First Youth Congress of Catalonia, the idea of creating an organisation that could serve as an umbrella for Catalan youth organisation was suggested based on a proposal from the Taula de Joves or Youth Committee (Coordinadora d'Entitats i Moviments de Joves). This youth mobilisation and its subsequent organisation were possible thanks to the important youth movement that existed in Catalonia at that time based on the tradition of free-time education and led by the actions of the scouting movement and “*esplai*” (recreational) movements and groups (Adroher, Jiménez & Vallory, 2005; Balcells & Samper, 1993; CNJC, 1984; Samper, 1993; Serrano, 1999; Vila, Puig & Ainaud, 2005).

On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of April 1979, by decree issued by the Generalitat de Catalunya, the National Youth Council of Catalonia (Consell Nacional de la Joventut de Catalunya, CNJC) was created with the goals of coordinating youth organisations and movements and serving as a bridge between youth associations and the administration on youth policy matters. This signalled institutional recognition that youth exercise citizenship, and it was a sovereign articulation of the Catalan youth movement, with Spanish cooperation and the presence of Catalonia in the European Community (Domènech, 2008).

Since the recovery of democracy in the last quarter of the 20th century, different forms and structures have been offered to materialise youth participation in public policy. In fact, democracy without participation is impossible, but there are many ways to understand these two terms, such that models with very different degrees and structures of participation can be advocated depending on whether we are discussing situations of social stability or civic virtue and the social nature of human beings (Soler, 2013: 252). Sellarès (2003) proposes a classification of the structures of youth participation which we still believe is quite valid. She proposes two forms of structures depended on whether they are participative structures created, run and managed by youth themselves or whether they are promoted and managed by the public administration. Table 1 shows a summary of this analysis and the main limitations and opportunities of each model.

**Table 1. Main local structures of youth participation in Catalonia**

	Participation structures managed by youth			Participation structures managed by the public administration	
	Local Youth Council	Youth Committee (mixed platform)	Youth Assembly	Municipal Youth Council	Youth Forum
Participants	Organisations and associations that are either formally established or not	Organisations and association that are either formally established or not and individual youths	Individual youths	Organisations, associations, youth and staff invited by the Town Hall	Open to all youth in the city individually

	Participation structures managed by youth			Participation structures managed by the public administration	
	Local Youth Council	Youth Committee (mixed platform)	Youth Assembly	Municipal Youth Council	Youth Forum
Limitations	Does not allow for youth who are not members to participate	Fragile structure because of the lack of homogeneity and the difficulty of articulating individual participation or organisation	Very difficult in large cities; difficulty accepting responsibilities and representation	Consultative body controlled by the Town Hall to which some youth are invited to participate	Very difficult in large cities and difficult to ensure continuity
Opportunities	Capacity of influence and ease of functioning because of the homogeneity of the participants	Participative richness, dynamism, flexibility and adaptability	Direct participation, horizontal and available to all youth	Body approved and recognised within the administrative structure	Plurality of participants and access to the public administration

Source: Prepared by the authors based on Sellarès (2003)

Based on a full conception of the words youth participation and democracy, it is clear that the most participative structures are those managed directly by youth. Structures managed by the public administration should only be viewed only as being in the early stages of promoting and encouraging participation. Despite this evidence, the administration's interest in "formalising" and standardising the forms and models of youth participation has given rise to different controversies and difficulties when delimiting, recognising and establishing dialogue with some of the less conventional structures of youth participation.

Regarding the participants in these structures, there has also been an open debate for years which revolves around whether the members had to join individually or whether organisations and associations could also join. Likewise, within this context another source of controversy has been whether organisations and associations should be formally established or whether more informal structures can be recognised. The tendency has precisely been to consider all kinds of organisations and associations, regardless of whether or not they are formally established. This option clearly appeals to the wisdom of including and opening participation up to many unconventional organisations and associations, even though this means a focus on representative participation at the expense of direct participation by youth. For this reason, some options defend more open models which make direct individual participation possible.

Among the five structures of youth participation presented in Table 1, Local Youth Councils (LYCs) are worth highlighting because of the impact they have had through the goal of implementing them in all the towns in Catalonia, and because of their explicit and ongoing defence of this model advocated by the CNJC in its different resolutions, the latest of which dates from the 28<sup>th</sup> of June 2014 and is entitled "Per un associacionisme fort, participatiu i transformador"

(In favour, of strong, participative and transformative associations). The 3rd Catalan Youth Charter (2004) explicitly states that participating means having access to and being an active part of the decision-making mechanisms. For this reason, LYCs were proposed as the structures of participation and organisation of the participative youth movement. In fact, article 59 of the Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life, approved by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe in 2003 (drafted in 1992), specifically recommends “effective participation of young people in local and regional affairs should be based on their awareness of the social and cultural changes taking place within their community, and requires a permanent representative structure such as a youth council, a youth parliament or a youth forum.”<sup>2</sup>

Today, both the administration and the organised youth organisations and movement keep insisting that local youth councils (LYCs) should be spaces where democratic values are transmitted and a locally-committed citizenry should be built as the “main interlocutors with the local administration on youth policies” (Luque & Giner, 2012: 57).

How have these structures of youth participation been implemented in the different towns around Catalonia? Over time, have they remained in the towns where they were created? Where have they cropped up the most: in large cities or small towns? These are just some of the questions we wish to answer below with the goal of furthering our analysis of youth participation and the changes that are taking place in it.

### *2.3. The evolution of local youth councils and municipal youth councils in Catalonia*

Participation by youth and youth organisations in Catalonia has been a constant feature in the programmatic documents of both youth organisations and the public administrations themselves. However, just as in all of Europe, what has been included under the concept of “youth participation” is not always the same, and it has ranged from merely attending certain events to direct involvement in decision-making in affairs that are inherent to youth policy. In all cases, despite recognising the important associational movement in Catalonia, youth participation is still regarded as insufficient (CNJC, 2004; CNJC, 2013).

In Catalonia, none of the structures of youth participation mentioned above has been implemented extensively and permanently. Despite this, the models that have taken root the most over the years, and the ones with a more or less continuous history, are the local youth councils (LYCs) and municipal youth councils (MYCs), with a clear predominance of the former.<sup>3</sup> MYCs have

<sup>2</sup> Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life approved by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (10<sup>th</sup> meeting, 21 May 2003, Annexe to Recommendation 128).

<sup>3</sup> Experiences similar to youth councils can be found in other countries as well. This is the case of the experience of “youth commissioners” in San Francisco, whose influence is recognised in the city’s public policies. The youth commissioners review the policies proposed by the city’s civil servants, establish priorities in meetings with the City Hall and defend their interests through face-to-face meetings with the public servants. With actions like these, they learn to organise themselves for political action in a scene dominated by adults (Checkoway, Allison & Montoya, 2005). Timmerman’s analysis of municipal youth policy (2009) is also worth reading.



often been viewed as early structures which should lead to a subsequent participative structure led by the youth themselves. In any event, they are participative youth structures where the youths' role is lower than in the LYCs, and, as Claret notes (2014:90), MYCs can be regarded as “empty carcasses, vacuous spaces aimed at artificially satisfying young people's demands for involvement in local policy under the fallacious appearance of a participation that is truly non-existent or extraordinary low intensity”.

Tables 2 and 3 and Graph 4 show the regional implementation of these participative structures locally from the democratic transition until today ((1978-2014). The figures were provided directly by the CNJC.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> We would like to thank the CNJC for its willingness to compile and provide information on this issue. The figures presented are the outcome of a tentative unpublished study coordinated by M. Peral from the CNJC and they span the period 1978-2003, to which subsequent data provided by the CNJC have been added.



Year	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14
Badalona			Recovery					Recovery	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local
Barcelona	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local
Cornellà																			
El Prat																Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal
L' Hospitalet	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local
Mataró					Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal
Rubí				Recovery															
Sabadell										Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local
Cerdanyola del Valès												Local	Local						
Sta. Coloma																			
Terrassa					Local										Municipal	Municipal	Local	Local	Local
Viladecans								Recovery			Local	Local							
Vilanova i la Geltru								Recovery			Local	Local							
Alella	Recovery	Recovery	Recovery	Recovery	Local	Local	Local												
Berga																			
Blanes					Municipal														
Castelldefels					Recovery														
El Vendrell																			
Granollers			Municipal	Recovery	Recovery	Recovery	Local	Local											
Franqueses del Vallès										Local	Local	Local	Local						
Manlleu					Municipal														
Igualada						Municipal													
Manresa					Municipal														
Mollet					Municipal														
Montcada																			
Montgat																			
Ripollet																			
Sant Adrià Besos					Recovery														
Sant Cugat						Local	Local	Local											Recovery
St. Feliu Llobregat					Municipal														
Sant Just																			
Sta. Marg. Montbuí																			
Súria																			
Vic							Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Crisis		Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal	Municipal
Vilafranca					Recovery									Recovery	Recovery	Recovery	Recovery	Local	Local
Molins de Rei									Local	Local	Local	Crisis							
Sant Boi													Local	Local	Crisis				
Mancomunitat de la Plana					Recovery					Recovery	Recovery	Recovery	Recovery	Recovery					
Matadepera									Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Local	Crisis	

	Municipal Council		Local Council		Recovery of a youth council or attempt to create a youth council		Crisis
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Source: Prepared by the authors with data from the CNJC.

**Table 3. Implementation of local youth councils and municipal youth councils in Catalonia (1978-2014) - Provinces of Tarragona, Lleida and Girona.**

Province of Tarragona																		
Year	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95
Alcanar																		
Amposta																		
Baix Camp																		
Montblanc																		
Reus																		
Tortosa																		
Tarragona																		

Year	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14
Alcanar																			
Amposta																			
Baix Camp																			
Montblanc																			
Reus																			
Tortosa																			
Tarragona																			

Province of Lleida																		
Year	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95
Cervera																		
Lleida																		

Year	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14
Cervera																			
Lleida																			


Province of Girona																		
Year	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95
Girona																		
Figueres																		
Sant Feliu de Guíxols																		
Blanes																		

Year	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14
Girona																			
Figueres																			
Sant Feliu de Guíxols																			
Blanes																			

	Municipal Council		Local Council		Recovery of a youth council or attempt to create a youth council		Crisis
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Source: Prepared by the authors with data from the CNJC.

**Graph 1. Evolution of local youth councils and municipal youth councils in Catalonia, 1979-2014.**



Source: Prepared by the authors with data from the CNJC

Based on an analysis of these data, we can see that the only LYC that has existed nonstop from the democratic transition until today is the Youth Council of Barcelona, even though it did experience a period of crisis between 1992 and 1993 (Consell de la Joventut de Barcelona, 2006). Therefore, it is clear that although it is the largest and longest-standing structure in which youth can participate in public policies, its model is not very widespread and it has encountered some difficulties.

The mean number of years that youth councils have operated during this period is 20 years. The maximum implementation took place in 1988, with 16 youth councils operating (12 LYCs and 4 MYCs), and in 1989, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2014 when a total of 12 youth councils were active. Therefore, it is clear that the period of the widest implementation of youth councils came after 2009. However, we cannot say that these structures have been welcomed by or successful in the majority of towns. Of the 947 towns in Catalonia, 51 have had some experience with youth councils (LYCs or MYCs) or have witnessed attempts to create them. This figure accounts for 5.4% of all towns. Yet it is clear that this figure is not very representative of the real impact of youth councils because precisely the most successful experiences have happened in the cities where the most youth live.

We can see youth councils have been implemented the most frequently in larger cities and that the majority continue to exist. This can partly be explained by the fact that these structures are not always needed in small towns. In any event, LYCs have been established and maintained more often in large cities, despite the difficulty potentially posed by the number of youth and youth organisations they have.

There is a parallel between the youth policy implemented by the public administration and the evolution of LYCs. In an ideal world, these structures for youth participation and organisation should remain outside the public administration and be impervious to the ups and downs of municipal governments. An analysis of the data gathered enables us to see that in the 1980s, with the implementation of the Catalan youth policy and the organisation of democratic town halls, there was a clear push for these participative structures, with a constant upswing until 1988, when there were 12 LYCs and 4 MYCs. We should recall that 1985 was International Youth Year,

and that there was a clear political will to make youth policies visible. However, 1989 signalled a crisis in many of these structures and in the attempt to create new ones, which was largely unsuccessful. The early 1990s were years of economic recession and restrictions on many social policies. Precisely after the 1992 Olympics, this stagnation and the withdrawal of many services and resources earmarked for youth came into clear focus. In this sense, after 1991 there was a decline in these youth participation structures until they reached their nadir in 2000. From that year until 2006, there was a slight upswing until a steady number was reached of between 10 and 12 youth councils all over Catalonia. The implementation of the first National Youth Plan of Catalonia 2000-2010 (PNJCat) signalled a revitalisation of these councils. In 2000, too, there were as many as nine attempts to create or revive youth councils.

LYCs have been implemented in 35 towns, and the average lifespan of these structures ranges between 6 and 7 years. This lifespan is short if we bear in mind the 36 years of history we are analysing. What might be the causes hindering their implementation and continuity? One of these causes is precisely the interventionism of the public authorities and the danger of their using these structures for their own purposes. Administrations have often wanted to oversee the association movement and neutralise its critical capacity. As Luque and Giner say, youths' participation and autonomous and independent organisation, "instead of being regarded as social enrichment and democratic learning, has been viewed as a threat to the power of the public institutions" (Luque & Giner, 2012: 18). In some cases, the shift from a MYC to a LYC was not very warmly welcomed and has prompted tensions and difficulties between youth councils and the city administration.

It is important to consider the model of local youth policies in each town. Choosing these participative structures entails, as Claret (2014) says, viewing local youth policy beyond the leisure-cultural vision that only encompasses actions in the fields of leisure, free time, culture and sport. Ballester expresses a similar viewpoint (Ballester, 2013) by calling for a shift from a policy of presence (more symbolic than transformative) to a policy of influence, such that youths' actions would actually have repercussions on everything that affects their lives and the life of their community.

This potential cause of the difficulty of implementing and continuing these participative structures is compounded by the lack of representativeness and the difficulty transmitting information. We should bear in mind that these structures have not resolved the intermediate strata between the grassroots organisations and the regional, provincial or national coordination structures. In this sense, Francés mentions that when young people question the logic of representation, in reality they are critiquing a model of participation based on associations (Francés, 2008). Other no less important causes are the low level of economic autonomy and the difficulty financing these structures, the corporatism of the organisations in which they take part, the bureaucratisation imposed on them and the difficulty of finding and maintaining generational succession.

### **3. Longstanding challenges for a new history of youth participation**

After analysing the historical evolution of the participative structures and identifying the difficulties consolidating them, we shall now examine three longstanding challenges of youth participation, namely: recognising youth as active participants with a great deal of potential, focusing on projective and metacognitive participation, and articulating the political socialisation of youth. The goal of this section is to break down these challenges in order to pinpoint the factors that might shed light on possible advances in the structures of youth participation

#### *3.1. Recognising youth as active participants with a great deal of potential*

According to Fierro (2000: 138), we define youths as individuals who are biologically adult but are not sociologically recognised as such. Historically, youth has been regarded as a period of instability, uncertainty and provisionality, but also as a time of enormous potential and new competencies. Today this potential is fed by both formal education and informal learning, the domain of the technologies and permanent interconnection, which makes youths highly informed and permanently connected to the public opinion circuit. Therefore, many youths are highly prepared to participate in their surroundings.

In recent years, a culture of immediacy and hyperactivity has taken root in our society, fostered largely by the behavioural changes triggered by the new technologies. This has led to the emergence of more flexible forms of participation among youth and among the not so young, which are organised by semi-presence which makes people more connected and able to meet their needs more quickly. The new technologies have also opened the borders to individual and collective participation; examples include interconnection, the dissemination of information and the generation of opinion through the social networks.

Participation as a process has a vast educational potential that cannot be ignored. Many of the core competencies in education today are exercised and tested continuously through participative practices. These competencies including forming and constructing opinion; projecting ideas in socially-committed initiatives and actions; managing, organising and creating action networks; generating knowledge and ideology; planning participation; defending just and socially-conscious causes; and governing oneself by democratic principles and values.

However, in order to deal with the challenge of recognising youths as active participants with a great deal of potential, it is necessary to identify some of the considerations that will allow us to move towards a new history of youth participation. They include:

- Building our image of youth based on their potential, not with the ballast of their historical stigmatisation.
- Recognising youths' active, socially-committed citizenship, integrating it into the community's day-to-day life and overcoming fears of giving those who are led power and of empowering them.

- Promoting youth policies that multiply and expand youths' participative opportunities and experiences. All youths have a potential that allows them to be increasingly competent. However, not all youths develop this potential equally. It is important to promote participative spaces and experiences because through these practices we can offset, develop and expand many of the essential formative competencies.
- Conferring value and validity on technological participation. The technologies that youths have mastered are vast participative platforms that can be used for everything from generating opinion to promoting mobilisations. Not only do they allow youths to activate participative processes more quickly, but opinion-generation also has a multiplying effect in terms of its impact.

### *3.2 Moving towards projective and metacognitive participation*

The concept of participation has multiple dimensions: as a principle, as an engine of personal and social development, as a democratic value, as a way of doing things, as an educational content, as a right and responsibility, and as personal and social wellbeing. All of these dimensions are active in the different participative structures. Participation means being part and thus taking part. There are many ways of taking part. Trilla and Novella (2001) suggest four forms of participation, namely: simple, consultative, projective and meta-participative. What has predominated in youth participation structures is simple and consultative participation: these structures are spaces of symbolic participation and, in the best of cases, platforms for gathering youths' opinions on public policies. However, what we should strive for in youth participation, and where the challenge lies, is spearheading projective participation, in which the participants are no longer the mere consumers of a proposal, nor do they participate simply by sharing their opinions. In this kind of participation, youths have to be the active agents in planning and developing initiatives, and therefore their involvement in the design – defining the what, the why, the who, the when and the how – and the practical materialisation of the action is necessary, as they are responsible and committed to the corresponding environment.

Expanding the opportunities for projective participation among youth can be the first level of this challenge. The second level may take shape by practising and internalising meta-participation. In this case, the goal of participation is participation itself in two complementary and interrelated ways. The first refers to the possibilities of discussing their participation, of analysing and reflecting on what their participative processes are like with the goal of improving and systematising them. And the second refers to certain collectives' capacity for protest so that their voices can be heard, taken into consideration and, of course, influence public policies. This would be tantamount to making youth capable of demanding and protesting that they should be an active part of the policies that affect them both directly and indirectly, so that they actually come to conceptualise their participation as a principle, a value, a right and a responsibility.

Youth participation should be characterised by being projective and becoming an element of protest. This will be possible if this participation is fed by moments of reflection and deliberation about what participating by



participating means. Further exploring the “why” and “for whom” of participation fosters its protesting, mobilising nature, and among youth it generates thinking and ideology of what youth participation is and what it should be. To achieve this, young people must be free and self-sufficient when projecting their goals, dreams and utopias. Inasmuch as this process is articulated through responsible, socially-committed action, it influences the community and their identity.

To move towards a new history of youth participation, the challenge of focusing on projective and metacognitive participation as the utmost expression encourages is to bear the following elements in mind:

- Overcoming the fear of youth participation. The public administration and some political leaders still perceive youth participation and youth participative structures as a threat to our supposed social and democratic stability. This mistrust or outsized perception of threat deflects from the potential advances of participative initiatives and can even thwart their emergence.
- Expanding the possibilities of leading participative processes, from their emergence by identifying and defining the need that mobilises and gathers youth, to the execution of an action plan which prompts progress towards utopia by achieving small dreams.
- Meta-participation is the utmost expression of youth participation. Opening up spaces to think about participation, to review it, to define it and to plan it allows youth to construct their participative identity and gives them the tools with which to claim it.

### *3.3 Articulating the political socialisation of youth*

Certain bodies are clearly concerned with youths’ political disillusionment, and they have reason to be. But based on Soler’s analysis of the 2011 Survey on Participation and Policy (Soler, 2013:252), perhaps we should note that “political disaffection is not a phenomenon specific to youth, because the political sphere interests or disinterests youth just as it does the rest of the population. However, there is an exception in party identification: young people show a clearly lower sense of affiliation with political parties.” We should not forget that political disaffection concerns us with regard to the exercise of representative democracy, in which we vote every four years to choose “someone” whom we delegate to decide for “us”. All the alarms go off with regard to the relatively low percentage of youth who exercise this democratic right, especially when surveys reveal the mistrust in the political class, political parties and politics itself. However, if we channel the same concern to political socialisation or assisting the processes of constructing political identity, we might actually make a difference.

Political socialisation still remains to be done. Based on the definition proposed by Anduiza and Bosch (2004), we view political socialisation as the process of developing the competencies that allow people to act as citizens by influencing the political process and its results. For a long time, studies and surveys have labelled youths as “irresponsible”, “indifferent” and “passive”. Behind the inconsistency of many of these claims hides the backdrop of our

inability as a community to assist in the training of citizens. If we base citizen training on representative logic – which requires nothing more than waiting until they are legally of age – we are mortgaging a model of country and governance on the exercise of the right to vote every four years, through the election of representatives whom we delegate the job of engaging in politics for us. The challenge is to promote political socialisation by helping to train participative citizenship in an active, intentional way. One of the clearest ways of dealing with this challenge is by including participation in the day-to-day lives of citizens from a very young age, and in this sense both the family and the school are extremely meaningful contexts, but so are free-time activities through work on socially-conscious projects, and the city itself through initiatives such as children’s councils. The essential values and procedures of participative democracy are built into these natural spaces of socialisation through active and activist experience.

Soler (2013) identifies three features that characterise the participation and political attitudes of today’s youth. First, he recognises the expansion of the political sphere, noting that youth participation goes beyond the structures established by the local or national institutions. Secondly, he identifies a normalisation of extra-institutional political action through the emergence of political participation initiatives outside the institutional participative structures which are instead associated with alternative means of participation. And thirdly, he points to a desire to control or to directly commit to whatever the young person is participating in, since youth seek action and a direct impact with their participation and refuse to admit intermediaries.

An analysis of this goal, namely to articulate youths’ political socialisation as a way of diminishing their “disaffection”, allows us to highlight a few guidelines and tools to project a new history of youth participation. They include:

- Accepting that there is no one way to engage in politics. Youth recognise and exercise multiple forms of political participation. Institutions and administrations should open up the horizons that participative democracy makes possible instead of limiting it to just representative democracy, and they should factor in the potentials of each of them.
- Promoting self-managed participative opportunities without either conditions or conditioning factors that are defined and brought to fruition by the youths and with youths.
- Promoting political participation from very young ages. The embryo of youth participation is gestated in participation experiences in childhood within the family, at school, in free-time activities or in the city. Youths learn to participate by participating in all these scenarios.
- Being an active agent in public policy is a process of identity-building that takes an entire lifetime. Still, there is some overlap when stating that political participation among youth is one of the defining features of constructing identity and the way this identity is expressed. Political participation is part of our being or non-being.

These are just some of the challenges that will allow us to project a new history of youth participation. We all have to take responsibility for these

challenges, but the people in charge of youth policies and youths particularly do. The former should do so *with* youth, not simply thinking about them or for them. And the latter, the youth, should be the primary stakeholders in charge of this participation, despite the limitations and obstacles that governments and adults may pose at times. Participation should become part of our reality as a value, a right and a responsibility.

#### 4. Final reflections

Youth participation requires free action by youths and, when needed, the assistance of the public administrations, which must recognise and integrate this democratic activism. In order to project a new history of youth participation, we must start from this premise and expand the concept of youth political participation by integrating other forms of participation that can transform day-to-day lives and foster the construction of a collective project. It must be possible for youths themselves to include the emerging participative forms and structures into their participation, which is shaped by their principles and needs and has an internal organisation that is defined and sustained by the youths themselves. These structures, built bottom-up by youth, should be able to coexist alongside the – equally necessary – youth structures coming from representative democracy and defined by the public administrations.

The local youth participative structures that have been promoted the most throughout the past 35 years, the LYCs and MYCs, show weak, fraught implementation. It is important to find solutions to the causes that hinder their functioning or to seek new participative structures that guarantee youth action and organisation and that ensure that youths play a key role in youth policies.

Francés (2008:46) suggests bearing three key dimensions in mind when evaluating any participative figure. They are inclusiveness, which allows any youth to participate; intensity, or a desire to allow any youth to implement all the actions that comprise the process; and an influence on public policies, recognising the connection between the decisions reached or results achieved and institutional action. Therefore, the goal is to seek participative structures that are as inclusive, intense and influential as possible.<sup>5</sup>

We agree with Claret (2014:69) when he states that the unsurmountable hindrances to participation are poverty, weakness of the democratic edifice and the lack of democratic culture in the institutions and population. Indeed, we must understand that youth participation is not an effect of public youth policies: it is a necessary condition for the very existence of these policies.

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<sup>5</sup> In this sense, Francés (2008) proposes considering the criteria that generate a participative space that is open to the new logics of participation called for by youth. He suggests 18 criteria, which he classifies into 7 areas of the participative space: communicative interaction, information, participative openness, deliberation, decision-making, appropriation and institutional commitment.

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